FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-160
Friday
17 August 1990

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-160 CONTENTS *17 August 1990*

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Batsanov Speaks in Geneva on Chemical Weapons *[TASS]* 1
FRG Inspectors Find No Chemical Arms in GDR *[TASS]* 1

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Reportage on Grimitskikh's 16 Aug Briefing 2
  Iraq To Help Soviets Leave Kuwait *[TASS]* 2
  Relations With Panama Viewed *[TASS]* 2
  On Liechtenstein's UN Membership *[TASS]* 2
  On Chemcial Weapons Ban, Nicaragua *[TASS]* 3
Politiburo's Yanayev Outlines Foreign Policy *[TASS]* 3
'Repercussions' Program Views European Problems *[Moscow TV]* 3
Concern on International Arms Trade Viewed *[TASS]* 13
Petrovskiy, Karpov Meet With UN's Akashi *[IZVESTIYA 11 Aug]* 14

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

U.S. Senator Interviewed on Arms Reduction *[TASS]* 15
Rogachev Talks With U.S. Policy Group Head *[TASS]* 15
Soviet 'Expert' Interviewed on U.S. Presidency *[Moscow TV]* 15

China

Chinese Premier's Asia-Pacific Visit Praised *[Moscow International]* 16
Working Group Meets on Chinese Border Questions *[IZVESTIYA 11 Aug]* 16
Supreme Soviet Chair Receives PRC Court Group *[Moscow International]* 16

Northeast Asia

45th Anniversary of Korean Liberation Celebrated 16
  Korean Unity Prospects Viewed *[TASS]* 16
  Liberation Day Meeting Held *[Moscow International]* 17
Industrial Products Supplied to DPRK Plant *[Moscow International]* 17

Near East & South Asia

Iraq's Saddam Criticizes Bush in Open Letter *[TASS]* 18
Bush Clarifies Mideast Goals in Pentagon Speech *[PRAVDA 17 Aug]* 18
Shevardnadze Says Gulf Events 'Hard To Predict' *[TASS]* 18
Soviet Envoy Tours Region To Consult on Crisis 18
  Departs for Mideast *[Moscow Radio]* 18
  Meets With Syrian President *[TASS]* 19
PLO Envoy, Top Soviet Officials Discuss Gulf 19
  Seek 'Pan-Arab' Solution *[TASS]* 19
  U.S. Actions Criticized *[PRAVDA 17 Aug]* 19
Reportage on Persian Gulf Crisis Continues 19
  U.S. Airlift 'In Full Swing' *[PRAVDA 17 Aug]* 19
  Few Signs of Crisis in Baghdad *[Moscow Radio]* 20

Commentaries Summarize, Assess Gulf Situation 20
    Adversely Affecting Disarmament *[IZVESTIYA 17 Aug]* 20
    U.S. Arms Buildup Questioned *[Moscow International]* 21
    'Prudence,' 'Respect' Needed *[KRANSAYA ZVEZDA 17 Aug]* 22
    Likelihood of Oil Crisis Noted *[PRAVDA 17 Aug]* 23
Foreign Ministry Reacts to Iran-Iraq Settlement 24
    Newspaper Carries Statement *[IZVESTIYA 17 Aug]* 24
    Belonogov Receives Envoys *[TASS]* 24
Afghan Rebels To Negotiate Release of POW's *[TASS]* 24

East Europe

Envoy to CSFR Views 1968 Events, Relations *[Prague Radio]* 24
Soviet, Czechoslovak Scholars To Study 1968 *[TASS]* 25

West Europe

FRG Foreign Minister's Visit Previewed 25
    Plans To View Relations *[Moscow Radio]* 25
    'Fruitful' Meeting Expected *[Moscow Radio]* 27
Shevardnadze, FRG Counterpart Meet 16 Aug 27
    Shevardnadze Welcomes Genscher *[TASS]* 27
    Ministers Open Talks in Moscow *[TASS]* 28
    German Unity, Gulf Discussed *[TASS]* 28
Ecological Expedition Planned With Finland *[Moscow TV]* 28

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political & Social

Citizenship of Solzhenitsyn, Others Restored *[TASS]* 29
Ryzhkov on Government Program for 'Single Entity' *[Moscow Radio]* 29
Gorbachev Warns Students of Cultural 'Shortage' *[PRAVDA 10 Aug]* 29
Abalkin Discusses Transition to Market Economy *[Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 13 Aug]* 31
Soviet Germans Meet on 'Restoration' of Autonomy *[TASS]* 35
Western Border Checkpoints 'Back to Normal' *[TASS]* 35
Problems, Tasks of Border Guards Assessed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Aug]* 35
Kalugin Discusses Disclosure of State Secrets *[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH 18 Jul]* 37

Economic

Status of USSR-IMF Contacts Reviewed *[IZVESTIYA 6 Aug]* 42
Far East Aviation Gets New Passenger Aircraft *[Khabarovsk TV]* 44
Sverdlovsk Cooperative Operates Materials Plant *[Moscow TV]* 44

Agriciltural

Problems of Gathering Harvest Highlighted *[Moscow Radio]* 45
Special Harvest Trains 'Often Stand Idle' *[Moscow TV]* 45

Scientific

'Progress M-4' Docks With 'Mir' Station *[TASS]* 46
'Resurs-F' Earth Satellite Launched 16 Aug *[TASS]* 46

Military

Yazov Reported Making Visit To Odessa 14 August *[RABOCHNAYA TRIBUNA 17 Aug]* 46

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Reportage on Lithuanian-RSFSR Negotiations 47
'Text' of Communique *[Vilnius Radio]* 47
'Equal' Cooperation Noted *[TASS]* 47
Gorbunovs Meets Leaders of Free Latvians Group *[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH 12 Jul]* 47
Trade Union Leader Protests to Landsbergis *[TASS]* 48
Communist Monuments Dismantled in Siauliai *[Vilnius International]* 48
Lithuanian Oil Plant Faces Tanker Car Shortage *[Vilnius International]* 48
Latvia's Gorbunovs Discusses Neo-Fascist Groups *[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH 14 Jul]* 48
Communist Party Stand on Paramilitary Group *[Moscow Radio]* 49
Latvian Workers' Party Club Considered *[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA 5 Jun]* 49
Soviet, Estonian Officials Discuss Ties *[TASS]* 49

RSFSR

Yeltsin Returns to Moscow, Stresses Economics 50
Comments on Economic Reform *[TASS]* 50
Meets Economic Working Group *[Moscow Radio]* 50
Views Work of Reform Group *[Moscow TV]* 51
Decree Issued To Protect Economic Sovereignty *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 14 Aug]* 51
USSR Decision Suspended for Sake of Harvest *[Moscow Radio]* 52
Gidaspov, Leningrad Communists Discuss Tasks *[Moscow Radio]* 52
Moscow Party Membership Statistics Published *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 3 Aug]* 52
Novgorod Chosen as Russia's Northwest Capital *[TASS]* 52
Karelian ASSR Drafts Sovereignty Statement *[Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT 25 Jul]* 52
Novosibirsk Oblast Party Conference Resumes *[PRAVDA 12 Aug]* 53
Khudobina Report on Ryazan Oblast Local Issues *[Moscow TV]* 53
Background of Krasnodar First Secretary Viewed *[TRUD 10 Aug]* 54
Mass Graves Found in Groznyy; Inquiries Begin *[Moscow Radio]* 54
New Newspapers Appear in Bashkiriya *[Moscow Radio]* 55
Private Television Firm Founded in Vladivostock *[Moscow International]* 55

Western Republics

Belorussia-Azerbaijan Agreement Signed 16 Aug 55
Ties Outlined *[Moscow Radio]* 55
Azerbaijan's Bagirov Responds *[Moscow Radio]* 55
Chernobyl-Related Strikes Sweep Gomel *[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 14 Jul]* 56
Views of New Head of Ukrainian Parliament Seen *[SOYUZ No 31]* 56
Implementation of Ukrainian Sovereignty Viewed *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 12 Jun]* 58
Recruitment for 'Ukrainian Army' Reported *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Aug]* 59

Caucasus

Armenian Supreme Court Breaks Party Links *[TASS]* 60
Armenia's Arutyunyan Views Party's Condition *[Moscow Radio]* 60

Batsanov Speaks in Geneva on Chemical Weapons

LD1608173290 Moscow TASS in English 1559 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Geneva August 16 TASS—Sergey Batsanov, Soviet representative at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, took the floor here today to speak on a chemical arms ban.

This year's work by the special Committee on Chemical Arms highlighted the problems that have to be resolved.

These include a system of verification, including challenge and special inspections, "ways to make the future convention banning chemical arms universal, a ban on the use of chemical arms, protection from a chemical attack, cooperation in peaceful chemistry, the line-up of the executive council of an international organisation in the framework of the future convention and its financing, Batsanov said. [no closing quotation marks as received]

The Soviet representative backed the [word indistinct] proposal to hold a special session of the conference on disarmament at the level of foreign ministers, in order to remove the last obstacles to the universal convention on chemical arms.

Ministers could approve the basic provisions of the convention and tell their representatives to hammer out the necessary technical documents and appendixes to the convention within the shortest possible time. This would lay the groundwork for preparing the [word indistinct] convention for signing by heads of state and governments before the end of 1991, he said.

A conference to discuss the implementation of a conventional banning of the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons will be held next year. "[word indistinct] believe that the experience of [words indistinct] effective verification, confidence-building measures and openness gained during preparations for the chemical arms convention will be of great use in the forthcoming joint work to improve the convention banning biological weapons," Batsanov said.

The Soviet delegation presented concrete proposals on verification, notification and information-exchange procedures that could considerably strengthen the ban on biological arms.

The sides should also discuss what should be done to make countries who have not joined the convention do so, he said.

FRG Inspectors Find No Chemical Arms in GDR

LD1608205390 Moscow TASS in English 2034 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Chistyakov]

[Text] Bonn August 16 TASS—An inspector group of the West German Defence Ministry has not found chemical weapons that would belong to the Western Group of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

According to a statement by group leader Hans Dieter Jopp, only conventional weapons were found during an inspection of depots in the area of the city of Hohenleipisch in Cottbus district. The inspectors found no signs that would indicate that chemical weapons had been stored there earlier.

Sepcialists of the Bundeswehr received an opportunity to inspect all the premises on the territory of the Soviet military facility, the group leader said. West German officers used special gauging equipment, including a mass spectrometer and an X-ray outfit.

This was the second trip by West German military inspectors to the GDR. A month ago the Bundeswehr inspected other military facilities belonging to the National Army of the GDR and, likewise, found no signs of the siting of toxic agents there.

What prompted the need to carry out the second inspection? The Soviet leadership is known to have repeatedly stated that there were no chemical weapons on East German territory. However, some local news organisations kept asserting the opposite, stepping up a clamorous campaign over the issue.

With reference to Western intelligence services, they wrote in particular that the Soviet Union ostensibly sited about 30,000 tonnes of toxic agents in nine storages along the border with West Germany.

The inspection is over and unambiguous conclusions have been drawn. These are expected to put an end to speculations on the subject. At the same time it has become clear that the inspection was of importance not only from a purely military point of view.

Local political circles believe that the inspection will promote the removal of one of the last barriers, which have remained since the cold war times, to the building of trust between the two countries.

Reportage on Gremitskikh's 16 Aug Briefing

Iraq To Help Soviets Leave Kuwait

LD1608160390 Moscow TASS in English 1535 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Boris Zverev and Yuriy Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—The stage-by-stage evacuation of the members of the families of Soviet specialists in Iraq is to be launched in the coming days, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh said here today.

The first, 230-member group of oilmen and members of their families has already been taken cross land from Kuwait to Baghdad, he said.

After the necessary rest, the evacuees will proceed to Amman across the Iraqi-Jordanian border. From Amman the evacuees will leave for home by Aeroflot planes. The second group of Soviet specialists together with their families is expected to leave Kuwait for Baghdad along the same route today.

Iraqi authorities are assisting in the evacuation of Soviet citizens from Kuwait and ensuring their safety along the route, Gremitskikh said.

He denied reports by some foreign news organisations that Iraqi authorities have banned Soviet men from leaving the country.

"No one told us that Iraqi authorities forbid men from leaving the country," Gremitskikh said. The evacuation will be carried out in stages, he explained. Therefore women and children will be evacuated first. "Then, naturally, the question of the evacuation of men will arise," he added.

Gremitskikh informed journalists of steps being made by the Soviet Foreign Ministry in view of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict.

Speaking of the tour of the Middle East by Mikhail Sytenko, special envoy of the Soviet leadership, he did not give an exact number of countries Sytenko would visit during the tour but confirmed that Sytenko would visit Baghdad.

Gremitskikh also read out a statement issued by a Soviet Ministry spokesman in connection with the statement by President Saddam Husayn about his readiness to settle the dispute with Iran.

Relations With Panama Viewed

LD1608185790 Moscow TASS in English 1603 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Yuriy Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—The Soviet Union does not view its ties with Panama separately from the situation in and around the country, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh [words indistinct] today.

Commenting on the statement by President Guillermo Endara of Panama on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Panama and the Soviet Union, Gremitskikh said the expansion of contacts with this country can only be discussed after the situation there normalises.

The Soviet Union and Panama have maintained trade and economic contacts for several years, he said:

Several Soviet organizations have representatives in Panama including the fishing, merchant marine, and civil aviation ministries and several news organisations.

The Soviet Union and Panama have trade agreement and several other accords, and "we hope that the Panamanian side will respect them," Gremitskikh said.

On Liechtenstein's UN Membership

LD1608162190 Moscow TASS in English 1606 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Yuriy Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—The Soviet Union supported at the United Nations Security Council the application of the principality of Liechtenstein for UN membership, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here today.

He said the Security Council on Tuesday [14 August] approved a resolution recommending the UN General Assembly to admit Liechtenstein to the organisation.

"The Soviet Union hopes that the recommendation will be supported by the General Assembly which will consider the issue at its 45th session in the second half of September," Gremitskikh said.

"Liechtenstein would be the 160th UN member, and this would be one more step towards the universality of this international organisation."

The spokesman expressed hope that Liechtenstein, "with which the Soviet Union is linked by long-standing bonds of friendship and cooperation and which plays a constructive role in the framework of the pan-European process, will make an original and constructive contribution to UN activity for the benefit of the international community."

On Chemcial Weapons Ban, Nicaragua

LD1608190690 Moscow TASS in English 1850 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Yuriy Rublevskiy]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The spokesman [Gremtiskikh] touched upon issues discussed at the Geneva conference on disarmament. The Soviet representative at the conference, Sergey Batsanov, took the floor here today to speak on a chemical war ban.

The Soviet representative backed the French proposal to hold a special session of the conference on disarmament at the level of foreign ministers, in order to remove the last obstacles to the universal convention on chemical arms. [passage omitted]

Touching upon a statement by Nicaragua's Minister of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo about the planned visit to the Soviet Union by President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, Gremitskikh said: "There are now favorable objective and subjective prerequisites for a continuation of the dialogue at various levels on all matters of mutual interest."

The possibility of establishing contact with Nicaragua at summit level is not ruled out, he emphasised. But Gremitskikh said that no specific arrangement have yet been made.

Politiburo's Yanayev Outlines Foreign Policy

LD1508161390 Moscow TASS in English 1536 GMT 15 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—A high-ranking Soviet Communist Party official said here today that the Soviet Union opposed the use of force in settling the Gulf conflict.

Speaking to journalists at the Soviet Communist Party press center, Gennadiy Yanayev, a party Politburo member responsible for the party's foreign policy, spoke about the party's new approach to foreign policy after the sixth article of the USSR Constitution enshrining the CPSU's leading role in the country was abrogated.

Once this article was cancelled, the role and place of the party in society fundamentally changed. These changes could not fail to affect the foreign policy sphere, Yanayev said. At the same time, he noted that as the most powerful political force in the country today the party could not stand on the [words indistinct] work to elaborate the foreign policy strategy.

Answering journalists' questions, Yanayev said that the Politburo discussed the situation in the Persian Gulf. "The stance adopted by the Soviet Union as regards the developments in the Gulf is fully consistent with the political line elaborated by the Politburo," Yanayev said.

"The problem can be solved only by peaceful means," Yanayev went on, noting that the USSR did not approve "when one aggression rectified another aggression."

Yanayev said that the USSR's involvement in settling the Gulf conflict should be viewed only in the context of UN decisions, only under United Nations auspices.

"We do not support unilateral actions aimed at a naval blockade which separate countries are now trying to impose. It seems to us that the economic sanctions, which were enforced by the UN Security Council, should be given a chance to work," Yanayev said.

Yanayev reiterated the Soviet side's position concerning its support of Arab peoples in settling the Middle East conflict. "We favour restoring the rights of the Palestinian people which were trampled upon, and our position here remains unchanged."

He emphasised the party's desire to develop relations with social democratic and socialist parties in many countries and with the Socialist International. He emphasised the possibility of "vigorous" cooperation with the Socialist International in disarmament, military production conversion, and ecology.

Yanayev said the party planned a series of very important meetings with the leaders of the Socialist International both in the USSR and abroad.

Yanayev expressed confidence that Soviet-Japanese relations had good prospects. The resources for improving both political and economic relations are not yet exhausted. He described as an anachronism the fact that the USSR and Japan still did not have a peace treaty. "I think that this historical anachronism should be overcome. All opportunities are available for this," he said.

Yanayev supposed that President Mikhail Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Japan would "provide a fresh impetus to the development of Soviet-Japanese relations."

In his view, a united Germany involved in the European process in the building of a common European home, "can be a guarantor of peace, stability, and predictability of European policy."

'Repercussions' Program Views European Problems

LD1508175390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 15 Aug 90

["Repercussions" program with Zubkov, announcer; Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, USSR deputy foreign minister; Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobnov, Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces chief of staff; Lev Aleksandrovich Bezymenskiy, member of the NOVOYE VREMYA editorial collegium; Prof. Daniil Mikhaylovich Proektor, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] [Zubkov] Good evening, comrades. And so, we have on the air a direct broadcast of the international program "Repercussions." It follows from the title itself—"NATO and the Warsaw Pact: What Next?"—that the program is being dedicated to European problems. Using today's mutual relations between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact as an example we will look at the tendency to strengthen security and develop cooperation on the continent. Naturally, we will not leave out the issue of the unification of the two German states. We will also touch upon the preparations for the pan-European summit which has already been scheduled for the coming November.

And so we await your questions which, as always, the participants in "Repercussions" will answer. Our telephone; we have one number but a great many lines.

And so I will introduce the participants in the program. Today, we invited to the studio Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, USSR deputy foreign minister; Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov, chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces; Lev Aleksandrovich Bezymenskiy, member of the editorial collegium of the magazine NOVOYE VREMYA and the author of many popular books on the German question; and Prof. Daniil Mikhaylovich Proektor, a leading scientific employee of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences and doctor of historical sciences.

Well, we already had the first questions over the phone before the program began. We have also had some in letters which preceeded the questions which we shall now get, and are already getting, by phone.

And so we begin with you, Viktor Pavlovich. The question concerns the forthcoming Paris meeting between the heads of state and government from 30 [as heard] European states, the United States, and Canada. What can you say about the course of the preparations for this event of major importance?

[Karpov] The preparations are closely interlinked with the negotiations in Vienna, since it is already understood that the meeting of the 35 states-participants in the pan-European process will take place when a treaty on reducing armed forces in Europe is ready for signing. That is why everything now depends on how efficiently the negotiations in Vienna on the preparation of this treaty proceed. We now have some 30 percent of the text of the treaty and we have about half the protocol concerning verification and inspection. There remain some complex issues, first and foremost concerning reductions in aviation assets of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the zonal division and distribution of quotas among the states and the alliances. These issues still have to be resolved before we can say "Yes, the treaty can be produced by mid- November." But in order to produce it by mid-November the principal questions have to be resolved some time in October to make it possible to deal with the technical side of the texts of the treaty, to check them through. They have to be in six languages, so this too produces extra work.

And of course there is the question concerning additional confidence-building measures which could be approved by all 35 participants, since the treaty on arms reductions will be signed by 23 states, the NATO and Warsaw Pact members. Here at the forefront now is a proposal put forward in various versions equally by the Soviet Union, by France, and by the Federal Republic of Germany. This proposal is about the creation of a pan-European center for conflict prevention and information exchange. This is a realistical looking opportunity to adopt a complex of measures concerning the next stage after the Stockholm decisions which could further what they now call the institutionalization of the pan-European process, that is the creation of structures of new pan-European security.

[Zubkov] The first person to get through to us is a senior lecturer from Alushta, a captain first class, and perhaps you could take in the answer to his question as you continue. Please go ahead.

[Karpov] This set of issues can be prepared and we are counting on its being prepared for the summit meeting. They ask the following questions: Is there going to be a reduction of the submarine armed forces? It has to be said that naval forces are not a subject of the talks in Vienna. At the time, when the mandate for the talks was being prepared there were great arguments on this. The Soviet Union was in favor or making subject to consideration not only the land forces and the air forces, but also the naval forces which relate to the continent of Europe, that is to say the naval forces of the European participants and also those forces of the United States and Canada that have been allocated to European waters as part of NATO. Unfortunately, however, we did not manage to secure the inclusion of these issues in the mandate for the talks and what is now under discussion in Vienna is just the land forces and the air forces.

[Zubkov] Thank you. Vladimir Nikolayevich, here is a question that could be answered either with a whole lecture or very briefly with a yes or a no: Will the Warsaw Pact remain in the form in which it now exists? The Western press even publishes the view that this organization is breaking up; responsibility for the term used lies with the authors of these articles. And here are also these two questions that you can take in at the same time: Why shouldn't the Warsaw Pact amalgamate with NATO in order to have a single defensive force? This question comes from Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kirsanov from Moscow. And Comrade Prokopenko from Leningrad asks how events that have taken place in East Europe have been reflected upon and have influenced the Warsaw Pact. Please go ahead; we are listening.

[Lobov] Well, they're interesting questions of course. First, I'd like to take the one about whether it's disintegrating or not disintegrating. I'll put it this way. Our

Western partners in the talks—and partners now no doubt not just in talks—have always indulged in wishful thinking. I think we should therefore dwell upon what is actually the case. The Warsaw Pact really does exist, it functions. Its combined armed forces also exist, they fulfill all the plans they have been instructed to fulfill by the political organization of the Warsaw Pact. Naturally, it is expected that there will be certain changes. Everyone knows that a meeting of the political consultative committee took place in Moscow this year at which it was stated clearly that the Warsaw Pact has to be transformed and changed and politicized more. Talks are therefore taking place now at the level of state representatives and new structural patterns for the Warsaw Pact are being worked out, including both the political part of the Warsaw Pact and the military part. I do not think there is any need yet to anticipate events. All this is going to be published in the press some time in October or November after definite conclusions have indeed been reached on what the Warsaw Pact and its military organization are going to be like in the future.

On the question that is asked here about whether or not the Warsaw Pact should amalgamate with NATO, well this is not a new question you know. After the NATO bloc was formed—and afterwards the Warsaw Pact under well-known conditions in the world and under the political situation, the different situation that existed at that time in Europe—the question was raised of whether the states that belong to the Warsaw Pact should join the NATO bloc. At that time, however, that proposal did not meet with understanding. But if one is to talk about the present day, what is taking place now, the military and political situation are such that in my view by all appearances there is no need for the Warsaw Pact to amalgamate with the NATO bloc, or rather to enter the NATO bloc.

Rather another question, that of the creation of an all-European security system, is on the agenda now. There may by questions perhaps regarding the way it is going to be set up. Maybe a certain integration of individual political, economic, and military organizations into this all-European security system will take place. To all appearances, one should think and do a lot of work in this area, as the saying goes.

[Zubkov] Thank you. Here are a number of other specific questions for you. Please read them while we let others speak. Yes, Lev Aleksandrovich, please.

[Bezymenskiy] Regarding the existence of the Warsaw Pact, I would like to see it on television, too, for we have seen NATO headquarters dozens and hundreds of times. As far as I remember, Georgiy Ivanovich, you have made reports from there on how it works and looks, whereas you have not yet shown us anything about the Warsaw Pact. I think one could do this now.

[Zubkov] Well, I will tell you that we have done many programs...

[Bezymenskiy, interrupting] From the headquarters?

[Zubkov] No, I do not recall any from the headquarters, but...

[Bezymenskiy, interrupting] You ought to make a visit.

[Zubkov] There have been no reports from the headquarters yet, but profiting from the presence of the chief of staff, we will enlist his support, as it were. There are already questions and I think such questions will be coming frequently, so to speak. Daniil Mikhaylovich, these questions bear upon the following subject: Should we be wary of a united Germany? On the whole, this is a many-sided and even profoundly emotional question, but still what do you think about this as a scientist?

[Proektor] Should we be wary of a united Germany?

[Zubkov] Correct.

[Proektor] I do not like straightforward answers to such questions, but in this case, considering all the pros and cons, I would say in a straightforward way that, no, there is no need to be wary. Let us think about this together a little. Against what political background is the process of German unification developing now? The cold war is over, East-West confrontation is over too. In essence there are no enemies in Europe for anyone. I cannot fail to mention the meeting in Arkhyz between our president and the FRG chancellor, a meeting which, as a matter of fact, I would say has a major historic importance. Unfortunately it seems to me it was not covered adequately in our press.

[Zubkov] A very recent meeting.

[Proektor] Yes, a very recent one. I have in mind Stavropol and the north Caucasus. But I would say that it has an epoch-making importance for it, in essence, dotted all the "i's" and opened a way toward German unification and German membership in NATO. Let us continue with our reasoning. I think we have to acknowledge and understand quite profoundly—in this case I am addressing those television viewers who have asked this question because this question is raised very often—we must acknowledge that Germany has changed and the Germans have changed. The Germans have become different. Germany—I am speaking here about the FRG and the future united Germany—is a wealthy democratic state. And we know quite well from history that democratic, and especialy wealthy states, become aggressors only very rarely. In this case, I think, this is a sufficient guarantee, that is democracy is a sufficient guarantee against any kind of military or other threats from this united major economic power. One cannot fail to say the following: A new generation has come to policymaking, specifically in the FRG. And this new generation is not linked with the totalitarianism of the previous epoch. This new generation has seen a new and civilized world and has no intention, so to speak, to return to the past.

If my memory does not fail me—perhaps Lev Aleksandrovich will correct me later—as early as the 1950s the conclusion was drawn in the FRG, and as a matter of fact in all of Germany, in both German states, that Germany would not have survived a single day of a modern war. In this case I would refer to the well-known fundamental study by a group of West German scholars edited by Karl von Weizsaecker, brother of the current president, a prominent physicist and philosopher. He came to the conclusion that Germany would not be able to survive a single day of war. And naturally this has penetrated the minds of all Germans. Let us move on. Undoubtedly it is very important that Germany will be a EEC member, a Common Market member. The Common Market is a special formation, I would say. It is an alliance of democratic states; it is a single family of states, I would say, and as in every decent family any member who misbehaves will be immediately put in his place.

And of course one need have absolutely no expectation that in this community—which from 1992, the end of 1992, will in essence be a unified state, politically and economically, without borders and with a unified currency—one member of this community could become an aggressor. And finally the last consideration, if I may, Georgiy Ivanovich. The final consideration is this: The unified Germany will be a member of NATO. We have given the green light to this decision. We have imagined NATO for the many years of the cold war as some kind of monster, as an aggressive imperialist bloc that is waiting and seeing how to attack us. Now we have to change our attitude toward NATO, without a doubt, and I agree with what Vladimir Nikolayevich was saying about this topic. At the moment there is in NATO...[changes thought] I would say, rather in the future Germany there will now be no general staff, the general staff that for many decades has brought grief to the German people, the general staff that existed in the times of the sect of the "state within the state." There will be no such general staff, and hence Germany itself will not be able to make any military decisions on its own and will not do so. Everything is decided in Brussels. And so this whole set of issues, and of other issues, compels me to come to the general conclusion that we need expect no threat on the part of Germany, and we definitely need to establish broad cooperation with this major future European power.

[Zubkov] Thank you. Lev Aleksandrovich, continuing this conversation, a question has been received in fact, regardless of this quite detailed contribution from Daniil Mikhaylovich, about the fact that nevertheless some alarm is aroused by the revival of nationalism and of revanchism in the unified Germany. What do you think about this, as a person who has studied this problem in depth and has written several books on this topic?

[Bezymenskiy] You see, it seems to me that in this sphere as well we have to think in a new way and look at Germany differently because I have to admit that I am perhaps involved in this through my publishing work, perhaps Daniil Mikhaylovich less so. We have examined very carefully, incredibly carefully under the magnifying glass, all the manifestations of nationalism, all the manifestations of neo-Nazism in West Germany, and we have forgotten completely the fact that time is passing. It is not possible to imagine Germany as it was in 1945 or even in the 1950s. All the extremist, right-wing extremist sentiments, the revanchist ones, did occur, they did occur, but they were squeezed out to the fringes of political life and in this regard we have to say and recognize certainly that the internal structure of the Federal Republic and the democratic forces, the progressive ones to be precise, have not provided the opportunity for this wave to come up. So I think we should leave behind this old talk of ours. These are the men of the past. It is the past; now it is a different Germany. Now there could be other dangers, but as far as revanchism is concerned I do not think we should talk about that now.

[Proektor] Lev Aleksandrovich, would you agree with this idea: I would say that the fact that Germany will be a member of the EEC will lead to the Germans feeling themselves to be more European than Germans, so to speak; not all of them but the majority. And this will be an insurance against nationalism.

[Bezymenskiy] Well you see, no one can give any insurance, any absolute guarantee.

[Proektor] No, it is not a question of any absolute one, of course.

[Bezymenskiy] And in general we should in our reflections about the future of Germany bear in mind that this will be a process, and that a very great deal will depend upon us and on the Germans themselves in order for it to proceed in the normal framework of the civilized development of Europe as a Pan-European home and not deviate to one side. And so there are still a lot of open aspects here.

[Zubkov] Thank you very much. Our participants in the program today are very erudite people, but all the same I have to interrupt you because we have some very specific questions, not always quite on today's topic, but they are so important that we will probably reply to them won't we? Carry on please; you have the floor.

[Karpov] Continuing the theme of the unification of Germany, there is a question here from Comrade Vinogradov from Moscow: Is everyone in the GDR ready to unite? Was there a referendum, and why should a united Germany join NATO? Let it be a neutral country. Well of course there are differing viewpoints in the GDR, and this was shown by the May elections which essentially are being viewed as a sort of referendum on the issue of the unification of Germany. As a result of those elections the proponents of unification were victorious. They have a majority in the people's chamber of the GDR and which today are solving the questions connected with unification. Why should a united Germany join NATO? We consider that every state has the right to independently determine its membership in this or that alliance. And we cannot deprive a united Germany of that right. If a united Germany decides to become a NATO member, clearly everyone must go along with that. So the question of the neutrality of Germany or its membership in this or that alliance must be decided by the Germans themselves.

I have some questions not connected with the theme of our program today, but on questions which indeed are worrying everyone now. That is the question about the events in the Near East, the question about Kuwait, Iraq, and our people who are in those countries. How will the Iraqi conflict affect Soviet-Iraqi relations? Why are Soviet citizens not being evacuated from Kuwait? Will our troops be present in Kuwait in connection with the Iraqi conflict?

I must say that the Soviet Union from the very beginning in the Security Council has come out with the other members of the Security Council with a condemnation of the Iraq aggression against Kuwait, a totally unprovoked aggression. The Soviet Union is consistently adhering to the decisions of the Security Council—to wit Resolutions 660, 661, and 662—which proclaim nonrecognition of the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, announce an economic blockade of Iraq until it withdraws its troops from Kuwait, and also condemns other actions by Iraq connected with that aggression. So the Soviet Union supports these decisions by the Security Council and from the viewpoint of observing the economic blockade is precisely carrying out the decisions of the Security Council. But the Soviet Union does not intend to send its troops there since the United Nations has not made such a decision. The fact that the United States is now sending its Navy to the Persian Gulf and its troops to Saudi Arabia—they are doing this on their own initiative. There is no such UN decision. But they are doing this in concert with Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Persian Gulf. We, I repeat, do not intend to send any troops to this region. We have no ships in the Persian Gulf. Soviet citizens are being evacuated from Kuwait. Soviet specialists who have been working there are being evacuated, and the evacuation of families of Soviet specialists who have been working in Iraq is starting from Iraq. There are difficulties in as much as the Iraqi government is not permitting evacuation by sea and air, but is permitting the evacuation only by road, that is across the whole country, across the whole of Iraq and Kuwait through Jordan. This is over 2,000 kilometers. This of course complicates the evacuation, but I repeat, this evacuation has started.

[Zubkov] Thank you very much. Vladimir Nikolayevich, let us continue this theme connected with events in the Persian Gulf, very briefly, because time is limited, and then we can return directly to the theme of our broadcast today.

[Lobov] There are very many questions, but they are very different. First of all, questions are being put to me as to a military man and on the other hand as a participant of the general event in the Warsaw Pact. So clearly these two questions must be separated. First of all on the Warsaw Pact. Some comrades are concerned to know whether there will be joint maneuvers by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I think this will not happen in our lifetime. And I don't think that such joint maneuvers will serve any purpose because our policy is aimed at ensuring that there will be no maneuvers at all, no confrontations between blocs. But on the other hand, the bloc structure itself was designed for confrontation and with the disappearance of the blocs there should not be any such maneuvers. The next question is connected with the withdrawal of our troops from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR. First, how much will the Soviet Union save after the withdrawal of these troops? I can put it this way: We will save exactly as much as we are now spending there. And the expenditure, naturally, is not inconsiderable. Well apart from that, I should say that everything that has been withdrawn there—first and foremost, of course, the personnel—will be sited on the territory of the Soviet Union. The families will be living and working on the territory of the Soviet Union. Naturally they will make their contribution to our common economic cause. The next question is about compensation. Have we received it or not for the airplanes and tanks which are stationed in the GDR?

[Zubkov] Please name the writer of the questions.

[Lobov] The writer is Comrade Panov from Moscow. This is the question he asks: Is compensation being demanded for airplanes and tanks? I can only put it this way: the Vienna negotiations are currently in progress. As a result of these Vienna negotiations, if a treaty is concluded then naturally there will be a reduction and scrapping of weaponry which is now in the possession of the National People's Army of the GDR. But there is another such statement that all the hardware which is no longer needed for further use in the united Germany and its armed forces will be scrapped. There was a statement to this effect. And I can say another thing: This hardware belongs to the GDR. It is a possession of that state and how it disposes of it is, naturally, the business of that state.

Next, why did our troops destroy all the buildings when leaving Hungary? This question is asked by Comrade Dorofeyev, Pavel Stepanovich, a war invalid. I can only say one think, Pavel Stepanovich, that your information is incorrect. The Soviet troops leaving Hungary and Czechoslovakia destroyed absolutely nothing. On the contrary, everything built by us when we were staying in Hungary and Czechoslovakia is being handed over to Czechoslovakia and Hungary in exceptionally good order. And I want to say a few more words about this. Even if something there did require some sort of capital overhaul, our troops are carrying out that capital overhaul and naturally will hand it over whole and preserved.

[Zubkov] Our recent two-hour program about Hungary bears you out on that.

[Lobov] Another question in connection with this.

[Zubkov] For God's sake, make it quick. Time's running out on us.

[Lobov] Yes. To do with accommodation and consumer services for those returning from there. The question is put like this: Can it be that we did not foresee that we would be withdrawing from Czechoslovakia and Hungary and that now the families of officers and warrant officers are in a difficult position?

I think we will have to have a look at this and perhaps also remove something a little more useful from here in our own interests.

And the following questions deal with the Persian Gulf. Viktor Pavlovich has in fact answered these questions so I don't think I've anything to add on them, as they say.

[Zubkov] Alright. Lev Aleksandrovich, would you like to take your questions?

[Bezymenskiy] Comrade Kotelevits from Moscow asks the following question: Does the united Germany recognize the act of unconditional capitulation? This question is certainly a very interesting one because it deals with a very important, a very important side of the matter. The fact is that the present united Germany is not the old Germany; it is not the Third Reich; it is not the Fourth Reich. It is the result of the unification of the FRG, the GDR, and Berlin. Not one of these countries, not one of these, waged war against us. And our attitude toward the new united Germany is not the attitude one would have to the product of an unconditional capitulation by which we possess rights of occupation, but precisely the opposite. Herein lies the great meaning of the agreement between Kohl and Gorbachev, that we are returning to the new Germany its sovereignty in full measure, that is to say the rights of occupation are being ended. This is indeed the end of the post-war period.

And I am also asked here by our Comrade Smirnov, Petr Sergeyevich: What is the fate of the four-power agreement on West Berlin? Of course that will also cease to operate, not immediately, but it will continue while the troops, the symbolic troops of the Western powers and the Soviet Union remain in Berlin as is provided for in the accord. I, for example, do not think this is very logical. For example, I would not leave troops belonging to the four powers in Berlin given that it is now a united city, the capital of Germany. But the agreement that has now been reached is not ideal. It is the result of compromise by different parties and in this particular case it is an important agreement for us.

[Zubkov] Thank you. Yes, if you please Daniil Mikhaylovich. We're listening.

[Proektor] A very interesting question is asked by Comrade Kostenko, Georgiy Isayevich from Rostov-na-Donu. Is there any guarantee that a new Hitler will not make his appearance in a united Germany? Or that a structure similar to fascism will not do so either? Georgiy Isayevich, I would like to answer you like this: The situation of the future united Germany—both internationally and internally—is in no way and will be in no way similar to what was the case during the days of the Third Reich. Let's remember that Hitler came to power in an utterly special—I would use the word unique—situation as a result of many circumstances coming together: the defeat in the First World War; the extortionate treaty of Versailles; the revanchist tendencies; the deep economic crisis; the mass unemployment; and what is particularly important the very powerful right wing, the political right wing, the right wing extremists as we now like to put it which put pressure upon politics and pushed forward the kind of figure that Hitler was. In fact there were a lot of Hitlers, a lot of lance corporals of that kind among the German militarists during the First World War period. And one of them was pushed forward. Today the situation will be totally different. It is a wealthy country. It is a democratic state. Right-wing extremism is quite weak, although it's often said in our country that there is a republican party, that there are revanchist groups. All that is true, but their authority is extremely low. They are tiny groups. But the main thing is that this is a country which is going to be integrated, as I have already said, into the Common Market and which will implement a peace policy I would say on a world scale. And of course I consider the emergence of a Hitler or a similar figure in the future united Germany to be ruled out.

[Zubkov] Viktor Pavlovich, a lot of questions to you have also accumulated already, but...

[Proektor, interrupting] I still have several questions here, Georgiy Ivanovich.

[Zubkov] We'll come back shortly. Forgive me for interrupting you. We'll definitely come back to you. You know, there are very many questions affected...[changes thought] it simply has to be explained that it is roughly one and the same subject. The essence is that the possibility of accrediting diplomats from Warsaw Pact member countries to NATO was stated at the latest NATO session in London. Now, as we know, Czechoslovakia and Poland have already announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with NATO. So the question is being asked: How will they be characterized? Please, be so kind as to explain that and then go on to your questions.

[Karpov] What is the essence of this, the establishment of direct relations between Warsaw Pact countries and NATO? In other words, for example, we have already agreed with the NATO leadership—with NATO Secretary General Woerner during his visit here—that Nikolay Nikolayevich Afanasyevskiy, our ambassador in Brussels, will simultaneously represent the Soviet Union at NATO headquarters. This means he will have direct contact with the NATO leadership, be able to obtain information from them, and convey information which we want to pass to them, to maintain such permament contacts in the interests of clarifying particular issues or, the other way around, of informing the NATO leadership. The other states are setting the same tasks, strictly speaking.

I have questions concerning a peace treaty with Germany. Comrade Lukin from Moscow, a participant in the war, asks about this. So does Comrade Tkach from Moscow. For Comrade Ivanenko, regarding territorial issues, everything is also tied together to a certain extent in one problem: How to sum up the World War II now; how to guarantee that Germany will observe the accords which characterize the post-war arrangement in Europe.

A new treaty will be concluded with the united Germany. That treaty is being elaborated now. The treaty will embrace the whole range of relations between the Soviet Union and the united Germany. All matters concerning the commitments adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany under the treaty of 1955 and under the treaties which we had with the GDR, of which there were a lot, and everything which needs to be incorporated in the new treaty will be incorporated in it. Therefore questions connected with a review of post-war borders do not arise. The Final Act of the Helsinki conference guaranteed back in 1975 the inviolability of borders in Europe. Besides, there already exists a relevant accord now between the two Germanies and Poland regarding a guarantee of Poland's western border and also, strictly speaking, a guarantee that the united Germany will not lay claim to any territories which formerly belonged to the German Reich. They will be enshrined in appropriate international agreements.

There are, if I may, another two questions which concern the Soviet Union. One question is asked by Comrade Gavrilov from Volgograd. He says we do not have a Soviet Union. After its total disintegration, will there be 15 nuclear powers or will Russia remain a nuclear power? The second question is put by Nikolay Fedorovich Zhuravlev from Moscow: How did it come about and who is to blame that we have ultimately ended up destitute after winning the war and emerging from the war with an immense economic and political potential?

[Zubkov] You know the essence of that question is in many others, some two dozen questions. So go ahead.

[Karpov] Right, the second question. The administrative and command system of our economy, which was practized here in both the post-war and pre-war periods, provided at a particular stage the opportunity to concentrate our efforts on preparing what I would call certain areas of our development. Before the war that meant military industry, the creation of a military potential. After the war we turned out attention to nuclear and missile weapons. Here too we achieved great successes. But as far as the civilian economy is concerned, the administrative-command system turned out to be bankrupt. And now we are in essence trying to clear the obstacles that were created along the road of economic development of the Soviet Union and to seek ways toward raising the well-being of our country.

[Proektor] Viktor Pavlovich, may I put one brief question to you connected with this issue?

[Zubkov] Just like a viewer.

[Proektor] Indeed.

[Zubkov] Go ahead, please.

[Proektor] Would you not think it correct to draw the following conclusion that in our security policy, which we pursued say from the end of the sixties and throughout the seventies, we allowed ourselves a certain excess from the point of view of military development and hence our enormous advantage in the numbers of medium-range missiles, tanks, and so on?

[Karpov] That was I meant...

[Proektor, interrupting] And that takes money, billions of it.

[Karpov, continuing] ...that we had concentrated on the development of the missile and nuclear industries. Here we indeed have great successes. We make good quality missiles. We make many of them.

[Proektor] And now, as the example of the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles shows, we have to admit in essence that the quantity of missiles we had made turned out to be unnecessary.

[Proektor] That's right. And the same thing with tanks.

[Karpov] And the same thing with tanks. The 60,000 tanks that we had and now we are going to cut back by 40,000 tanks. These questions are also connected with the fact that spending on military industry, on the military economy in our country, was disproportionately large, greater than we needed for our security.

[Proektor] I remember Comrade Shevardnadze once speaking about mass production of weapons.

[Karpov] Yes, of course that's how it used to be. We mass-produced missiles, we mass-produced tanks, we mass-produced artillery guns. And as a result, now in these categories of weapons we are ahead of NATO, and that is why we will have to cut back to the same levels—if we agree—by more than the NATO countries.

[Zubkov] Would you like to add anything?

[Lobov] Well on this issue I would of course like to add something, to put over my point of view. The point is that the memory of the Great Patriotic War is with our Soviet people probably right up to this day as well as of the great losses our Soviet people suffered. After all it was 20 million, or as we say by now 27 million. That's one. We should under no circumstances forget that.

The second element I would like to speak of is, you know, we talk a lot about the well-being of the Soviet people. But the well-being of the Soviet people does not mean merely eating well, dressing well, and having a home. It presumably also means peaceful skies over your head. That can probably be provided in a variety of ways. But under our old thinking, let's us say, and then during the times of stagnation, we naturally resolved this from a position of strength and we had to have the strength also, by the way, carrying out the will of our Soviet people. And my memory is not failing me. Whomever I have spoken to in my, let's say, adult life used to say: Come what may, we'll endure hunger, we'll endure cold as long as there is no war. And "as long as there is no war" was always connected with "as long as there is a good force which secures skies over the head of every Soviet man." Now, of course...

[Karpov, interrupting] Now of course the situation is changing and we are finding that if in the fifties, at the time of the Khrushchev thaw, we had set a consistent course for accords on arms cuts, on the creation of systems of security, perhaps we wouldn't have come to the current hard economic situation.

And I also wanted to answer here the following question: Will there be 15 nuclear powers as a result of the breaking up of the Soviet Union? Well first of all, Comrade Gavrilov, I am not that much of a pessimist. I think the Soviet Union exists and will continue to do so. It will continue to exist as a Union state or a federation state, but on a new basis, on the basis of a Union of sovereign states. A new Union treaty is being prepared now and I believe that in the end common sense will prevail and we will be able to create truly new structures of a Union, federation, or confederation state.

[Zubkov] Thank you very much. Vladimir Nikolayevich, you know you have a great many specific and interesting questions, so over to you now. But I have selected a group of questions which I have in front of me here. They are about the following—they are formulated in various ways, but their essence is the same—you are asked to describe what is the current attitude of all the Warsaw Pact member-countries toward the Warsaw Treaty. We know that it is not unequivocal let's say in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia. Go ahead please. But, be very brief if possible. And then go on to those questions.

[Lobov] Well, there are very many questions here you understand, and I imagine they have again been directed at me because I am indeed sitting in front of the viewers in my uniform. First of all, I am grateful that these questions are being asked. The main thing in these questions is anxiety. If I were to sum them up I would do so as follows: What is actually going on now both in the Warsaw Pact and in NATO? What is going on now in East Europe and in Europe in general?

[Zubkov] Those are the themes of our program today.

[Lobov] That's what it's about, yes. And there is a very wide variety of questions, naturally. In drawing all these questions together the only thing I can say outright in a single sentence is that this concern is a justified concern. And I can say that our government and military comrades, so to speak, those to whom the government and the people have entrusted the main thing that they have—their freedom and independence—that this will be defended for ever. And naturally, the security of our Soviet people will in no event be encroached upon. We will deal with these matters with every means at our disposal, as they say. All the same, however, I would like to answer the questions specifically.

[Zubkov] Absolutely. Don't forget the (?opposition), eh?

[Lobov] You can't get by without doing so. For example, Comrade Gorelov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich asks the following question, and in fact he doesn't just ask the question he provides the answer to his own question. The Warsaw Pact has disintegrated. Germany is uniting and joining NATO. Why should we keep 360,000 of our troops in Germany? What are they going to be able to do there without any rear? Wouldn't it be better to bring them all out of there? And he gives an answer, an answer to this has already been given. We are withdrawing our troops from there. We are withdrawing troops from there not because a united Germany is joining NATO, not because NATO exists, and not because the Warsaw Pact as he puts it is collapsing. Not at all for those reasons. We are doing so because the political situation in the world has changed sharply. Now as never before the conditions have been created for resolving all the tasks that face us, that face our state and our country be peaceful and political means. And indeed that is what is being done. The time of confrontation, the time of bloc confrontations has gone. It is already pasing by. And one should also say this about the united Germany: As soon as Germany unites not only will a full-stop effectively be put at the end of the cold war, but one will also be put at the end of the hot war. I don't think we yet have a peace treaty with Germany. So that full-stop is going to be put down and thereby it wil lbe said that not just cold wars but hot wars must not be repeated in the future. Hence, the methods for providing stability and security must of course not involve armed forces, they must not involve groupings or confrontation between these blocs but other, different methods.

[Karpov] But here, Vladimir Nikolayevich, one also has to take into account the fact that essentially the united Germany will possess fewer armed forces than the present Bundeswehr. There already exists an accord that all armed forces of the united Germany will be limited to 370,000, including the navy. Now the Bundeswehr stands at nearly 500,000 men and the National People's Army of the GDR at about 100,000 men. So there are going to be substantial reductions here.

[Proektor] And to this one can add that there are plans for the further reduction of the Bundeswehr down to 300,000 and even 250,000 men.

[Lobov] Yes, that is quite right. But to continue this topic, I'll give perhaps a somewhat contradictory answer to your rejoinder. I consider 370,000 or 500,000, in terms of armed forces, to not make any difference whatsoever. They could be monitored or whatever you want. We can probably speak about this here today so that the public can know it as well. We probably need most importantly to keep an eye on what they have in the unified Germany, or what there will be. This means the trained reserve that we should not forget about. It will have more than 10 million men. That's the first thing. Further, the powerful military economy that exists and which the unified Germany will have, that's the second thing. And of course, to some extent there is the spirit of revanchism, that's the third. That is we should also pay attention to this in our further actions.

[Karpov] But it also means the creation of a new structure for European security, the building of the common European home, or a unified legal and humanitarian extent, and so on. That is, it means a combination of all these measures of the pan-European process.

[Lobov] That is, political methods.

[Karpov] Political ones, yes.

[Proektor] What comment do you have on the obligation taken on by Germany not to extend the NATO infrastructure to the GDR's territory; first, not to station tactical nuclear weapons there and the total rejection of what are called ABC weapons, that is, atomic, chemical, and bacteriological ones?

[Lobov] Well, I can make this comment on that for you as a participant in today's battles around this table. To begin with there would be no point in NATO extending its infrastructure to the territory of East Germany because such an infrastructure has already been created on the territory of East Germany.

[Proektor] But not a NATO one.

[Lobov] Not a NATO one, but if it unifies then the infrastructure that has been created will be the property of the unified Germany. It is another question how to monitor the infrastructure which the unified Germany will inherit so that it is not utilized either by the NATO bloc or by the unified Germany in its own interests. I have in mind an event of some kind of adventuristic interests.

[Zubkov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, I am going to insist because I stand guard over the viewers' questions. You have forgotten to reply, even if only briefly, on the position of the countries which are Warsaw Pact members. Just a few words, please.

[Lobov] What position?

[Zubkov] Their attitude toward NATO—sorry, not NATO, the Warsaw Pact!

[Lobov] Well these positions are well-known. You know, if you take our position first of all, the Soviet Union's, then we are against all blocs. Thus we are in favor of a simultaneous disbanding of the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact. This is what the position has been and quite evidently it has been preserved, as they say, to this day. When is another matter. We have simultaneous disbanding but quite obviously history will see to it that one bloc might depart earlier, the other bloc may depart later. This will evidently depend on how many states are members of one bloc, how many are members of the other bloc. They are not equal in composition, these blocs. But, if we speak on the large scale, then the bloc system has outlived itself and hence, naturally, the position of the states of the Warsaw Pact on blocs and the NATO bloc first and foremost is unambiguous. It should be disbanded just like the Warsaw Pact. So I can tell you that is the position.

[Zubkov] Thank you very much. There is a question for me: Why, it says here, am I hurrying the participants in the program, not allowing them to have their say? Well, because our program ends in 15 minutes; now it's even 12 minutes, it has been cut a little short. The questions are very interesting and we want to answer as many as possible. Daniil Mikhaylovich, please, we are listening to you.

[Proektor] I have a whole series of questions. I will begin with a personal one. Were you or your relatives at the front? How much we lost through the unification of Germany! Yes, I was at the front myself as were my relatives. Lev Aleksandrovich fought, and I am a colonel in retirement. Vladimir Nikolayevich and I are old acquaintances through the Frunze Academy.

[Lobov] Yes, I am your pupil really. I studied under you! Fate has brought us together behind this table.

[Proektor] Here is one, from Comrade Kanayev: In the past the FRG has claimed the return to it of former Polish lands and Kaliningrad. How do thing stand today? Will the unified Germany make claims to these lands or not? No. The German borders have been defined and there can be no question of claims either to Polish land or to Kaliningrad. Further, Comrade Semen Iosifovich Shafferman of Moscow says it is quite a long question: The considerable reductions in armed forces and weaponry by the participants in the Warsaw Pact and NATO satisfies all peoples of the world. That is quite right. But how is one to understand assistance and practical participation in arming the countries of the Third World with the very latest weapons, especially those of the Near East?

We now see the results of these actions through the example of events that are now taking place in the Near East and threatening the whole world. I consider this to be a very serious question, of course. The problem of the arming of the countries of the Third World is a very major one as is the problem of arms deliveries there. We observe with great alarm the arming of a whole range of Third World countries with missile weapons, and medium-range weapons at that, not just short-range missiles. And there is even data, so to speak, that concerns the spread of the production of nuclear weapons. Here I believe there should be some international agreements, some treaties that would restrict (a) deliveries of weapons and (b) the use of armed forces in whatever region in the form of what is now taking place in the Persian Gulf region.

Then there is the following question: Why do they want to dismantle the Victory Monument in the GDR while they maintain that everything is fine between us?

[Zubkov] There are very many questions like that.

[Proektor] No doubt you have some too, Lev Aleksandrovich?

[Bezymenskiy] Yes, yes.

[Proektor] Then perhaps you could answer it so that I won't take up too much time.

[Zubkov] By all means, let's give you the floor and then we'll sum up. Alright?

[Proektor] I've got two or three other questions, too.

[Zubkov] You have? Then excuse me. Please answer and then we'll close our program.

[Proektor] There is a question here about how it would be desirable to make Germany a neutral country. Well, this has already been discussed. I would add only this to what has been said by Viktor Pavlovich: You know, comrades, how we have been reproached in the West [as heard] for the agreement that we reached in Arkhyz between Gorbachev and Kohl, in particular for the fact that we gave such free access for Germany into NATO. But it seems to me that besides what has already been said we have to bear in mind the following: Yes, perhaps it is to our advantage that Germany will be in NATO because a neutral Germany would be unchecked, to put it crudely. It would be able to offer us surprises of various kinds, so to speak. But being in NATO together with the United States, and with a U.S. military presence on that country's territory, there is a certain amount of political insurance here.

[Zubkov] Viktor Pavlovich, your opinion on this?

[Karpov] I have already spoken, you know.

[Zubkov] Alright.

[Bezymenskiy] I would of course prefer for it to be neutral and non-nuclear. We would all of us prefer that. But one has to take account of the real situation, the world in which we live and the will of the two German states. We cannot impose things upon them. We cannot impose our will upon them. That is what our art consists in now. Indeed, Gorbachev said we are now conducting Realpolitik, he even used the German word meaning real politics, the politics of the possible, the art of the possible, and I think that is the only way, not by dreams of any kind along the lines of "of course it would be good if...."

[Proektor] One cannot have dreams of any kind in politics.

[Bezymenskiy] The more so, though it's true I have a question here.

[Zubkov] Please go ahead, Lev Aleksandrovich, answer the question.

[Bezymenskiy] I have a question which runs the risk of torpedoing the whole of our program.

[Zubkov] Well, go ahead and we'll try and answer it.

[Bezymenskiy] How do you assess German history and the lessons from it?

[Zubkov] It's a good question.

[Bezymenskiy] It's a question, of course, for a short university course. Surely you don't believe in metamorphosis? One doesn't have to believe in metamorphosis. One has to look at real states of affairs. The fact is that I believe we are not yet taking into consideration one point when we now start worrying about what is going to happen with Germany. We must not forget the great importance of our victory. The effect of the victory over fascism is not something for just one time only, is not just for a single minute. It lasts for centuries, for centuries. And now, following all of these tranformations, following the whole of this undulating history of Germany, of the two German states, I think the long-term effect of our victory, the destruction of fascism, and the severe lesson that the German people were given must take effect. I do not want to think like Vladimir Nikolayevich that we are going to control something. Unfortunately we cannot control anything. We cannot. But a joint policy within the framework of the common European home, within the framework of the new structure which is being created and which was mentioned by Viktor Pavlovich, that is a real opportunity for exerting an influence upon the development of affairs in Germany, for not being scared, and incidentally for not describing as feebleminded those who allegedly cannot see the unlikely threat that faces us.

[Zubkov] Who says that?

[Bezymenskiy] Well there is that General Makashov who once said that some of our egghead academics are clucking that nobody is planning to attack us and that that is a formula calculated for the feebleminded. I think that we have a different military and political doctrine all the same, and not Comrade Makashov's doctrine.

[Zubkov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, you have the most questions. You have the final say, but you have two minutes to do so. Go ahead.

[Lobov] I personally want to thank all the viewers for the questions which they have asked. Besides the questions which they have asked are really very serious ones, some of which have agitated me. I want to tell you and the viewers this directly. I also want to tell them that I will take all these questions home, produce a general summary of them, and answer them in writing in an article which might be published either in the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA or in some other magazine.

[Bezymenskiy] We can offer you space in the magazine NOVOYE VREMYA.

[Lobov] Maybe in NOVOYE VREMYA because they are very interesting questions. I thank the viewers for them.

[Zubkov] Thank you. You have briefly....

[Karpov, interrupting] In the spirit of what Lev Aleksandrovich has just been talking about....

[Zubkov, interrupting] The questions have been there.

[Karpov] Maltsev, Kuprian Georgiyevich from Moscow, asks: If there are no enemies, how is the question of the rejection by the United States, Britain, and France of the strategy of a first nuclear strike against the USSR and the cancellation of the "Drop Shot" plan viewed? This question, the question of strategy, is indeed very important. The July session of the NATO Council in London has now taken the first step in the direction of a review of NATO strategy, a strategy which was really based from beginning to end on nuclear weapons, but they are now beginning a review of it, a review of the strategy of flexible response, the strategy of first strike, and so on. Of course this does not yet mean a decision but just approaches to a decision. But the first step has been taken and it has to be said that joint discussions between NATO countries and Warsaw Pact countries on matters of strategy and military doctrine have begun. They will continue and we hope that it will be possible ultimately, within the framework of new European political structures, to elaborate new approaches to strategy and military doctrines which will signify a switch to defensive doctrines and structures.

[Zubkov] You know, here is some plesant news. I have been given a note saying that our time has been extended a little. Let us hope that this is taking account of the viewers' interest and your answers. So please, you have a little more time for answers. [participants all begin speaking at once] Please, all together, a minute each. A minute: That's agreed.

[Lobov] You know I still have these questions. They concern our general military situation as they say. Here is the first: If you have nowhere to put the troops, Comrade Kirillov from Moscow, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, asks...if you have nowhere to put the troops, please send them to the militia because it is working very badly here. I think, first, that this question should be sent to the appropriate address. That's the first point. And second I have to say this, too: The business of creating order in the country is probably not just the business of the militia or the Army alone but the business of all Soviet people. We all really have to engage in that together because there are indeed very many negative phenomena of all sorts in our society, and then those negative phenomena are transferred to the Army and then, so to speak, the Army gets cursed for those same phenomena.

Then there is the second question: What will you do, comrade soldier, when everybody finally becomes friends? Do you have any other profession? This is asked by Comrade Filkin, Stanislav Mikhaylovich. I don't think he is asking me that question but putting it to all us military men. I want to reassure Comrade Filkin that we have enough strength, energy, and knowledge to use them in the event that we have to leave the Army. There is somewhere for our strength, as they say. And together with Comrade Filkin we will build what we are building now as they say a better future for our Soviet people.

[Zubkov] Well let us end on that because, all the same, our time on the air is already running out. Our immense thanks to all of you for participating in this program. I think that I will be expressing with this gratitude the opinion of our viewers today who have stayed in front of their screens at this hour.

Concern on International Arms Trade Viewed

LD1608184490 Moscow TASS in English 1804 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

Moscow August 16 TASS—The flourishing international arms trade causes widespread concern in the world, and rightly so.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that conventional weapons have become as potent as tactical nuclear arms. Missiles, including ballistic, are spreading all over the Third World.

Approaches to military aid and arms sales needs additional consideration on the basis of new political thinking. This is exactly what the Soviet Union has been calling on the international community to do.

A letter sent by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to the United Nations secretary general contains concrete proposals to put limits on international arms deliveries and sales on the United Nations agenda.

What solutions does the Soviet Union propose for this complex problem? First of all it would be expedient to replace excessive arms stockpiling with the principle of reasonable defence sufficiency, which would exclude the possibility of accumulating offensive potentials.

It is necessary to stop the proliferation of the most destructive and destabilising weapons.

It is also necessary to create an effective multilateral regime for the non-proliferation of some types of missiles and missile technologies.

It would be wise to ban deliveries of weapons banned under a convention on non-selective conventional weapons or weapons causing excessive destruction.

Also, agreements to reduce arms in one part of the world should not unleash military rivalry in other regions.

The Soviet Union supports greater openness in the international arms trade. Admittedly, the Soviet Union has itself been secretive in the past on this issue.

The Soviet Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations and the Defence Ministry were in total control of the arms trade. The Soviet Union now plans to prepare and submit to parliament a corresponding bill.

The search for a general consensus in the arms trade has not yet entered the negotiating stage. However, the Soviet Union is convinced that states can jointly find a constructive solution to the problem of limits on conventional arms deliveries and trade, thus enhancing international stability and peace.

Petrovskiy, Karpov Meet With UN's Akashi

PM1608084590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Untitled item from column of TASS-attributed "Official Reports"]

[Text] USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy has met with UN Deputy Secretary General Y. Akashi (Japan). In the course of a conversation they examined questions of the development of multilateral cooperation in the sphere of security and disarmament.

USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.P. Karpov received Y. Akashi at the latter's request.

There was an exchange of views on topical problems of disarmament and the United Nations' role in this field. Particular attention was devoted to the topic of military conversion in the light of the upcoming UN international conference "Conversion: Changes in the Economic Field in an Era of Arms Reduction" to be held in Moscow 13-17 August.

United States & Canada

U.S. Senator Interviewed on Arms Reduction

LD1608200590 Moscow TASS in English 1953 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Vyacheslav Akimov and Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—In a TASS interview, U.S. Senator John McCain (Republican, Arizona), who is attending an international conference in Moscow on the subject "Conversion: Economic Adjustments in an Era of Arms Reduction," today set out his view of how the "peace dividend," released as a result of conversion, should be used.

Conversion should be considered as the product of a significant improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, he told TASS.

"For years the Russians and Americans have been making a lot of financial sacrifices, spending money on the conduct of the cold war, whereas now we speak of "peace dividend," McCain said.

"Of course, we should take care of those who for years have been ensuring our security and who may now find themselves out of business as a result of conversion," he said.

The senator believes that it is primarily lawmakers that should take care of these people, envisaging certain guarantees for them.

At the same time McCain thinks that the "peace dividend" should not be used to implement new huge-scale social programmes, because this would inevitably entail the emergence of new costly bureaucratic structures.

"Conversion should help us give more freedom to the individual," McCain said. Therefore the "peace dividend" should be used to free people for onerous taxes and get fid of excessive state spending, he added.

Rogachev Talks With U.S. Policy Group Head

LD1508204290 Moscow TASS in English 2036 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev today received L. Mattison, president of the U.S. International Center for Development Policy.

They discussed political settlement of regional conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region, including the situation in Cambodia and on the Korean peninsula.

Soviet 'Expert' Interviewed on U.S. Presidency

LD1608220490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2030 GMT 16 Aug 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Announcer] This news is already two months old, but among the Soviet mass media we are the first to report such an unprecedented event. On 14 June in Camp David, President Gorbachev asked his American colleague to share his experience in the organization and work of the Presidential apparatus. Bush agreed and a few days later a group of Soviet experts flew to Washington. All the doors of the White House opened up before these people, except for one. And so, a night-time conversation. In our studio is Valentin Vasiliyevich Solomatin, an expert from that very delegation. Well, then, which door did not open up for you in the White House?

[V.V. Solomatin] The Situation Room for the direction of military and extraordinary events in the world and in the United States.

[Announcer] But, well, in your opinion, what was the most important thing that you saw in the White House?

[solomatin] I think the most important conclusion is that the President alone is insufficient for the operation of presidential power. A whole far-flung network of bodies executing presidential power is necessary. Incidentally, it exists in America and is provided with state of the art information technology based upon thousands of computers. That network is capable of preparing any decisions and guaranteeing their implementation.

[Announcer] And, as I have understood, information moves very quickly in the White House. We have said for a long time that the cadres decide everything, and I know that the president personally appoints hundreds of staff. Eh, what did you find interesting in the cadre work of the White House?

[Solomatin] There are 600 such staffers but for one appointment to be made, on average, 50 candidates are analyzed. The analysis is made, first of all, on qualifications, and on how views of the candidates compare with those of the President. They must be of like mind.

[Announcer] How accessible is the American President to this staff?

[Solomatin] The American President is accessible to his staff. The principle of accessibility is considered to be the fundamental principle of the functioning of presidential power.

[Announcer] And of what practical importance do you consider your information to be for the functioning of presidential power in the Soviet Union?

[Solomatin] I do not support copy the methods and forms of others, but I think that it will be highly useful. After all, our apparatus of Presidential power has only just begun its life.

[Announcer] Thank you very much. That was a night-time conversation in the studio of the Television News Service.

China

Chinese Premier's Asia-Pacific Visit Praised

OW1608184890 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Commentary by Chernukha on Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to Indonesia and Singapore; from the "World Today" program]

[Text] Li Peng's Asia visit was obviously in step with the process of world progress. The Chinese leader's visit will no doubt help improve the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of the world. First of all, this has been proven by the fact that China and Indonesia signed a memorandum in Jakarta to resume their diplomatic relations, which had been suspended for 23 years. Severance of diplomatic relations, discontinuance of economic, trade, and other ties, and suspicion between these two big Asian nations were, of course, not in the interest of consolidating stability in the area. Recently, their suspicion disappeared and there has been a turn for the better in the situation. In the wake of the resumption of their diplomatic relations, China and Indonesia signed a trade agreement, which states that they will give each other most-favored-nation treatment.

Another major achievement of the Chinese premier on this visit was the normalization of relations with Singapore, a small country with an enormous economic strength. As a result of their talks, the two sides decided to exchange ambassadors. During his visit to Singapore, Li Peng also expressed the hope to reestablish normal relations with Vietnam.

However, the significance of Li Peng's visit to the three Asian nations was not limited to the above. During the talks held, he discussed the question of promoting peace and security in all of Asia. He spent a lot of time discussing the conflicts on the Indochina peninsula, which have poisoned the international atmosphere for years. What is meant here is, of course, the Cambodia issue. In Jakarta, China and Indonesia reached an agreement to make joint efforts to settle this issue. Chinese Premier Li Peng also proposed that the two co-chairmen of the international conference on the Cambodian issue and representatives of the four Cambodian factions hold consultations in Jakarta on the formation of a Supreme National Council. Li Peng said that if the other side does not supply weapons to the rival parties [as heard], China will discontinue its military assistance to the opposition faction in Cambodia.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that China's policy of developing good-neighborly relations with other Asian countries is praised and supported by the Soviet side.

Working Group Meets on Chinese Border Questions

PM1608081990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Untitled item from column of TASS-attributed "Official Reports"]

[Text] The latest round of meetings of the working group at the Soviet-Chinese border talks was held in Moscow 26 July-9 August.

In a businesslike atmosphere the sides discussed questions of the position of the border line and achieved certain progress. A unified understanding was also reached on several sectors on the western section of the border. It was agreed that this work will be continued.

On 8 August the head of the Soviet Government delegation to the Soviet-Chinese border talks, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister I.A. Rogachev, met with the Chinese and Soviet participants in the working group session. A conversation took place on certain questions of Soviet-Chinese cooperation and further steps in the field of a border settlement.

Supreme Soviet Chair Receives PRC Court Group

OW1708100790 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Nishanov, chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, met with a delegation of the Supreme People's Court of China in Moscow on Wednesday. The PRC delegation is visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Court. Hua Liankui, vice president of the Higher People's Court [as heard] of China, is the delegation head.

The Soviet leader said that he regards the delegation's visit as the first step toward expanding, deepening, and strengthening full relations between the Soviet Union and China. Both sides emphatically pointed out that developing friendly contacts between the two countries has great significance and a sound and promising foundation for developing such contacts exists.

Northeast Asia

45th Anniversary of Korean Liberation Celebrated

Korean Unity Prospects Viewed

LD1608184690 Moscow TASS in English 1653 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS political observer Gennadiy Petrov]

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—The celebration of the 45th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese colonialists again drew world public attention to the problem of the unification of the world's only remaining country divided into two parts by the cold war.

Although North and South Korea failed to agree on joint celebrations of the event—South Korea's proposal to open the North-South border for five days was rejected, and a North-initiated national conference for peace and unification in Korea was not attended by a South Korean delegation—the current developments on the peninsula inspire optimism.

North Korea has consistently called for the country's unification. Now steps in the same direction have been made by Seoul.

President No Tae-u of South Korea said his country was ready to begin direct summit talks with Pyongyang on any political and military issues, including the signing of a non-aggression pact and a peace treaty that would replace the armistice agreement now in effect.

The achievement of such an accord would make a major contribution to detente in the whole of the Asia-Pacific region.

However, the South Korean stand on the issue has not been consistent. The Ministry of Defence has recently asked more allocations for military needs.

The Soviet Union attaches much importance to the normalisation of relations between the two Koreas and the creation of a single democratic state in Korea.

This would mean the elimination of a dangerous relic of confrontation, and broaden possibilities for economic, scientific and cultural cooperation in the region, which would benefit all sides concerned.

Liberation Day Meeting Held

SK1708074990 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 16 Aug 90

[From the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Text] Yesterday marked the 45th anniversary of the liberation of Korea. The Soviet people, together with the DPRK working people, celebrated this significant, felicitous day.

On the occasion of this national day of the fraternal Korean people, a commemorative meeting of representatives from the social circles in Moscow was splendidly held yesterday at the friendship hall in Moscow.

Present on the rostrum of the celebrational meeting were Bayan Iskakova, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; (Vasiliy Kutvog), secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Igor Rogachev, deputy minister of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and other officials.

Gennadiy Korenko, vice chairman of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society Central Committee and responsible functionary of the Soviet Ministry of Transportation [as heard], made a report at the meeting. He extended sincere congratulations on the national day of the Korean friends and wished them success in their construction for a new life and the cause of their national reunification.

Kim Hui-su, charge d'affairs ad interim of the DPRK to the Soviet Union, spoke next. He extended sincere thanks to the Soviet people and the Soviet Army for their liberation of Korea. He added that the Korean-Soviet friendship which took its first step 45 years ago has been further verified with the passage of time.

On this felicitous day, the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society Central Committee exchanged congratulatory messages with the Korean-Soviet Friendship Association Central Committee.

Industrial Products Supplied to DPRK Plant

SK1708071490 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Unattributed talk from the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Text] [Announcer] A number of enterprises in the Soviet Union produce and supply equipment and other products to fill orders from the DPRK. One such enterprise is (Mos Tabel), a plant located in the capital city.

This station's reporter reports on this plant:

[Reporter] The plant, (Mos Tabel), is known as a leading plant for the Soviet construction industry. This plant produces more than 10,000 kinds of products. These products have been supplied to (?central) cities in our country and also exported to foreign countries.

One of these countries is the DPRK. Products of (Tabel) are also supplied to an iron plant in Chongjin and a clothing plant in Pyongyang. During the first half of the year, large quantities of products of this plant were supplied to Pyongyang.

Sunsinov Khanikov, head of the supply department, said: These products include [word indistinct] for long-distance telephones and communications, [word indistinct] electric wire, and many other iron and steel wires required for producing electric motors and engines.

A greater number of products will be supplied to the DPRK by the end of the year. These products are chiefly power (?instruments) that are being widely used in the transportation sector.

The cooperation between the workers of (Mos Tabel) and of the DPRK has a four-year history. Such cooperation is not restricted only to the domain of manufacturing. Production of electric wire began in this plant in the early sixties, and a large group of the Korean delegates visited (Mos Tabel) to learn from our experiences. Experts in Moscow also visited Pyongyang many times.

Comrades Sergey Romachin and Nikolay Romanov taught about the manufacturing process to the Korean friends and helped their work.

Near East & South Asia

Iraq's Saddam Criticizes Bush in Open Letter

LD1608193690 Moscow TASS in English 1922 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Malyarov]

[Text] Cairo August 16 TASS—Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has accused U.S. President George Bush of being a liar, of harming Iraq and defiling Arab and Muslim holy shrines, the MENA news agency reported on Thursday, quoting the Iraqi News Agency.

In his strongly-worded "open letter" to Bush, issued today as a response to the U.S. President's speech at the Pentagon, Saddam Husayn denounced U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf and Bush's personal stand.

He said that, speaking about Iraq's "mythical aggressive plans," the U.S. President lied to his people and the world.

Saddam Husayn said it was the United States that had aggressive plans and was interfering in Arabs' internal affairs, demonstrating "undisguised hostility towards all Arabs and Iraq in particular", MENA said.

Bush Clarifies Mideast Goals in Pentagon Speech

PM1708101490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Aug 90 First Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Persian Gulf: Confrontation": "G. Bush: 'We Will Attain These Noble Goals'"]

[Text] 16 Aug—U.S. President George Bush delivered a speech at the Pentagon on Wednesday on U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. "Our aims are clear: the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government; security and stability in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and the protection of the lives of American citizens abroad. We will attain these noble aims," the head of the U.S. Administration said.

"Our actions in the Gulf," he continued, "are linked with the fight against aggression and the preservation of national sovereignty. It is also a question of preserving access to energy resources which are needed not only by the United States but also throughout the world. Today Iraq's Saddam Husayn is cut off from the Arab and Muslim countries around him. The Arab League has condemned the Iraqi aggression. We back them, and we are not alone in this. Sanctions are in force. Ground and air forces from Egypt, Morocco, Britain, and the Gulf countries stand shoulder to shoulder with us in defending Saudi Arabia. Many countries' ships have joined our ships in ensuring the fulfillment of the unanimously adopted UN sanctions. However, we must strive to ensure that no freight is delivered (to Iraq—TASS note) and no drop of oil is exported from there."

G. Bush denied Iraqi President S. Husayn's claims that the conflict in the Persian Gulf is a conflict between Arabs and Americans, and he accused the Iraqi troops of committing atrocities in Kuwait.

Meanwhile debates are unfolding in U.S. political circles over the president's decision to send U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia. "Americans do not want to die for princes, sultans, and amirs," Republican Congressman Robert Dornan from California said. "Republicans will soon begin to ask why American guys are defending one monarchical regime and trying to restore another."

Shevardnadze Says Gulf Events 'Hard To Predict'

LD1708071190 Moscow TASS in English 0704 GMT 17 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Sergey Ryabikin and Georgiy Shemelev]

[Text] Moscow August 17 TASS—The situation in the Middle East is hard to predict and is a source of great concern to all countries, including the Soviet Union, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told TASS today before meeting his West German counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Shevardnadze said "no one can guarantee against an explosion in the region—neither the Soviet Union nor the United States nor Europe. I think in these conditions various options should be pursued."

The minister said Arab countries could do much "if they act in unity."

Shevardnadze said the "adoption of collective measures, above all through the United Nations Security Council, is an important condition for the settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict."

Soviet Envoy Tours Region To Consult on Crisis

Departs for Mideast

LD1608130690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] A special representative of the Soviet leadership has flown out to the Near East in order to hold consultations with leaders of Arab countries in connection with the situation in the Persian Gulf. His itinerary includes Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and certain other countries. A visit to Baghdad is also proposed.

Meets With Syrian President

LD1608134790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1320 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Vadim Shchennikov]

[Text] Damascus, 16 Aug (TASS)—H. al-Asad, president of the Syrian Arab Republic, today received here M.D. Sytenko, special representative of the Soviet leadership, who has arrived in the Syrian capital within the framework of his tour of Near Eastern countries. The aim of the tour is to hold consultations on ways of finding a political settlement to the acute crisis in the Persian Gulf and to avert the danger of an explosion of direct military confrontation.

The conversations in Damascus demonstrated a coincidence of the approaches of the Soviet Union and Syria to this issue.

PLO Envoy, Top Soviet Officials Discuss Gulf

Seek 'Pan-Arab' Solution

LD1608154990 Moscow TASS in English 1511 GMT 16 Aug 90

[BY TASS correspondent Mikhail Margelov]

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—The Palestinian leadership is trying to find a solution to the Persian Gulf problem within the "pan-Arab framework" and prevent the region turning into a new seat of war, the Palestinian ambassador to the Soviet Union, Nabil 'Amr, told a news conference today.

'Amr said the tension in the Gulf directly affected the interests of Palestinians, of whom 400,000 live in Kuwait alone. As many Palestinians live in other countries of the region.

The ambassador stressed that the Palestine Liberation Organisation was not hurrying to take either side in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict.

"We want to equally help both the Kuwaiti and Iraqi peoples find a mutually acceptable solution," he said.

'Amr said the results of a recent emergency Arab conference in Cairo "were not objective and did not reflect the real state of affairs".

He noted that those who went to Cairo had been given only the "roles of extras" intended to "discuss and approve solutions worked out by someone else. If any decisions are taken at such meetings, they are adopted unanimously".

The ambassador said the United States was trying to make "The purely Arab problem into an international one with an Arab cover, interpreting the (U.N.) Security Council's recent decisions in its own way as giving the U.S. a free hand in the Gulf".

'Amr described as "inconsistent and deprived of logic" the stand of the United States, which he said demanded strict compliance with the Security Council's resolution but forgot about other council resolutions on the Middle East, above all Resolution 242 on the Palestinian issue.

"Taking such a stand, the United States is losing a possibility to be a real force in a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem," he said.

He warned "any countries" against attempts to solve the problem by force.

Speaking highly of the Soviet stand on the Gulf crisis, the ambassador expressed hope that the mission of Soviet special envoy Mikhail Sytenko, who left for the Middle East on Tuesday, "will help the Soviet Union specify its position and make it more active".

'Amr said he met "high-ranking officials" from the Soviet Foreign Ministry on Thursday morning to discuss the situation in the Middle East. However, he declined to give any details of the talks.

U.S. Actions Criticized

PM1608155990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Aug 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by V. Belyakov under the rubric: "Echo of the Crisis":"Rule of Law Is Indivisible"]

[Text] The PLO has come out in support of the initiative put forward by Iraqi President S. Husayn, the crux of which is to stop all forms of occupation in the Near East simultaneously.

Speaking at a news conference today, N. 'Amr, ambassador of the State of Palestine to the USSR, stated that the crisis in the Persian Gulf region should be settled by the Arabs themselves.

He criticized the actions of the United States, which is stepping up its military presence in the region. According to the ambassador, Washington interpreted the Security Council resolution as a license for unilateral actions. Yet Security Council Resolution 242, adopted with U.S. consent back in 1967, which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, has not yet been fulfilled. The international rule of law is indivisible, the Palestinian ambassador said. You cannot be in favor of it on one issue and against it on another.

Reportage on Persian Gulf Crisis Continues

U.S. Airlift 'In Full Swing'

PM1708103090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Aug 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent V. Linnik: "On the Line From New York"]

[Text] The airlift between the United States and Saudi Arabia is in full swing. According to Pentagon reports, a U.S. Air Force transport aircraft touches down every 10 minutes in Saudi Arabia.

It has been announced that the President plans to call up 80,000 reservists in view of the fact that the U.S. professional army is unable to cope with the volume of tasks facing it in the Persian Gulf. This step has been taken only five times in the history of the United States.

The talks with King Husayn of Jordan, who has come to Washington, it is believed, with a message from the Iraqi president, have been postponed for a day. It was the White House's decision. According to a CNN television correspondent, it shows an "amazing lack of understanding of the urgency of the situation." There would seem to be another reason, however. It appears that Washington is deliberately limiting the possibilities for peacefully resolving the conflict.

This course will not bring Washington any credit in the Arab world. Even the action to support Saudi Arabia—potential victim of Iraq aggression—does little to alter the Arabs' age-old suspicion concerning any Western interference in their region's affairs. The mood here is such that, as one perspicacious U.S. correspondent put it, as time goes on, the image of Saddam Husayn as aggressor will fade from the Arabs' minds and he will increasingly become a symbol of Arab hostility toward America, which has essentially never ceased to exist.

Few Signs of Crisis in Baghdad

LD1708103190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 17 Aug 90

[Text] We present for your attention a dispatch by Aleksandr Levchenko, our correspondent in Baghdad. Unfortunately, at present there is no telephone link with Baghdad, and the dispatch arrived on our teletype. Therefore, you will hear it read by the announcer.

Having travelled a fairly long way, Aleksandr Levchenko reports, I finally managed to get from Moscow to the Iraqi capital. During this time Baghdad, in the crisis situation in the Persian Gulf region, has changed little from the outside. There is not even the slightest hint of camouflage. The advertisements in the central square of the great city are lit up as before; it is full of traffic. Virtually all the shops are open and there is no sense of a shortage of daily products. According to a presidential decree, the owner of any food shop or store will be executed for any attempt to hoard goods.

The only outward sign that the situation in the Persian Gulf region is at boiling point is the absence of young and middle-aged people on the usually vibrant streets. They have all joined the ranks of the Iraqi Army, including 11 divisions which have just been formed.

According to U.S. analysts, the events in this region may develop as follows: Either the concentration of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia will scare off the Iraqis—which seems very improbable—or the United States and its allies will place their main stakes on a full-scale naval blockade. This calculation is based on the fact that such a blockade will be very damaging to Iraq. At the same time, the Iraqi papers have published a statement by Muhammad Mahdi Salih al-Rawi, the Iraqi minister of trade. He stressed that an economic and trade blockade of Iraq by the United States will not bring the desired results and is doomed to failure. According to him, at resent Iraq has at its disposal considerable food supplies which will last a year. And, said the minister, our country has never had such large supplies of grain as are now stored in our warehouses.

Now, a few words about the Soviet citizens working in Kuwait. I have just come back from the USSR Embassy in Baghdad, where I spoke to Comrade Koshyrev, deputy chief of the headquarters for the evacuation of Soviet citizens from Kuwait and also of women and children from Iraq. He told me that the first group of 230 Soviet citizens had already arrived in Iraq and was now accommodated in a settlement for Soviet specialists outside Baghdad. They have all they need, including a place of residence and foodstuffs. Staff of the Soviet general consulate in Baghdad have been accompanying columns of motor vehicles and buses carrying Soviet specialists all the way to Baghdad itself. Early this morning, the column was moving toward the Iraq-Jordan border.

Commentaries Summarize, Assess Gulf Situation

Adversely Affecting Disarmament

PM1708095890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by L. Koryavin: "Who Is Rescuing 'Stealth'"]

[Text] The international impact of events in the Persian Gulf is obvious. Iraq's aggression against little Kuwait caused a wave of indignation to sweep the world. It showed how dangerous the regional conflicts factor remains. At the same time, the Soviet Union and the United States for the first time adopted a joint stance, condemning Iraq's reckless attack on Kuwait.

But there is another aspect to the new Near East crisis. Iraq's aggression has had an adverse effect on the disarmament process that has started in the world. Baghdad loudly declares its irreconcilable opposition to the "global aims" of the United States and its "mailed fist" [voyennyy kulak] policy. However, paradoxical though it may seem, by its aggression, it has stimulated forces in the United States who are backing extensive armament plans. The military and those who control the production of modern weapons can certainly say "Thank you!" to Saddam Husayn today.

Let us consider the facts. The military budget is being debated in Washington at the moment. During its first readings, following the logic of the times and the processes of the improvement of the world situation, Congress made significant adjustments in order to lower the expenditure ceilings. And it was proposed in the House of Representatives that entire programs, for example, the production of the invisible "Stealth" aircraft, should be canceled altogether.

However, Iraq's aggression against Kuwait changed the situation radically. It caused a reaction on the part of the United States, which has economic interests in the Near East, mainly associated with oil. In this case Baghdad's aggression and Washington's actions are a cause and effect formula. And this has also affected the U.S. miitary program and the budget that is under discussion. "The transfer of U.S. forces to the Arabian Peninsula," THE NEW YORK TIMES writes, "changes the nature of the debate about the military budget, promising to slow down the movement for a radical reduction of military expenditure."

Many Congress leaders, even advocates of a cut in the military budget, have changed their attitude. Only yesterday House of Representatives Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin was saying that "we could reduce military appropriations," but now he says: "The picture has changed. We have not yet decided what weapons and what tactics will suit the changed situation."

Weapons which, as they say in Congress, "are potentially necessary for a zone of regional conflict in the Persian Gulf are attracting congressmen's and senators' heightened attention." So what you have is no longer a reduction of military arsenals, but, on the contrary, a major increase in them. And the debate is not only about conventional weapons and military transport facilities. The emphasis is on ultramodern strike facilities, on the B-2 "Stealth" bomber. Those who advocate the creation of these types of weapons are exploiting the Iraqi aggression factor.

It seems to me that even even if the worst comes to the worst in the Persian Gulf the United States is hardly likely to find such a superbomber as "Stealth" strategically necessary. However, the military, in particular U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Dugan, believe it "could be used in view of its large range and modern facilities for avoiding radar detection." At any rate, it is clear that U.S. military circles have been using the situation in order to push the program for the creation of "Stealth" bombers through Congress.

In Congress itself those who considered this program "excessively expensive" (one "Stealth" bomber costs about $865 million, nearly $1 billion!) are now changing their stance and are in favor of the Pentagon's producing yet another superweapon. Moreover, the question of increasing appropriations for the SDI program has been raised.

All this shows how dangerous the conflict and Iraq's reckless agression have turned out to be. Not only for the fate of the Persian Gulf and the Near East. But for the cause of preserving peace and the disarmament processes, which have already begun in the interests of many millions of people.

U.S. Arms Buildup Questioned

LD1608225790 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Excerpts] Another C-140 transport, the Galaxy, carrying United States troops and weapons, has been landing in Saudi Arabia every two minutes on the average. Ever more United States naval vessels and warplanes are being moved to the Gulf and tens of thousands of reservists have been drafted. Vladislav Kozyakov comments:

Many American sailors, pilots and soliders have been moved to the area of the crisis so quickly that they did not even have time to say goodbye to their relatives. Most of them are proud of their mission because they are certain that the struggle against Iraqi aggression also defends America's national interests. However, ever more [word indistinct] have appeared. Is it the sole possible decision to send a 100,000 or even 250,000 troops as the Pentagon plans to an area where the heat is 40 degrees Celsius and the situation explosive? Does America really have no other way out than the one practiced in the years of the cold war, when Washington made one-sided decisions in the days of international crises, when the United States acted on its own or in cooperation with some allies and sent troops to fight?

To my mind it was clear right after the first report about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that the international situation has fundamentally changed. [passage omitted]

The old formulas giving preference to the use of troops and weapons are unlikely to work these days. The naval buildup in the Gulf by the United States and its allies has caused alarm and concern in a number of countries. Some Arab countries have in effect put on the same plain the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait and the sending of United States troops to Saudi Arabia and aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf. Both actions are seen as a source of serious threat.

Putting an end to the crisis in the Persian Gulf requires not more troops, more aircraft carriers, or other attributes of force; it requires collective actions with the help of the United Nations and diplomatic skill. Since the United Nations Security Council proved capable of imposed a unanimous embargo and taking other measures against the Iraqi aggression with the participation of the Soviet Union and the United States, it is definitely capable of taking more resolute actions to restore peace and justice to the region. The new world climate has created new opportunities for tackling the most complicated international problems without the use of force.

'Prudence,' 'Respect' Needed

PM1708111690 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Aug 90 First Edition p 3

["Observer's Notes" by V. Vinogradov: "Persian Gulf: Dangerous Confrontation"]

[Text] What did the Persian Gulf zone have in abundance until very recently? Undoubtedly, sand and oil reserves. But it seems that there will soon be almost as many soldiers and weapons there. The scale of the U.S. Desert Shield operation alone is staggering. Within its framework the Pentagon has begun the hurried transfer of U.S. troops and arms to Saudi Arabia and the adjacent regions. What Washington has undertaken may be judged merely from the list of what is being sent into the sands of Arabia. The list includes subunits of the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st Ground-Attack Air Division, and the 24th Mechanized Division, F-15 fighters, F-16 and FB-111 fighter-bombers, AWACS aircraft, Apache helicopters, Patriot, Chaparral, and Stinger missiles, and carrier forces headed by the aircraft carriers "Dwight D. Eisenhower," "Saratoga," "Independence," and "John F. Kennedy." Britain, France, Canada, and Australia have already sent or announced their decision to send their ships and aircraft to the Persian Gulf zone, and other countries are next in line. So it is not hard to imagine what "military overcrowding" is expected in this dangerously explosive region which, as it is, has not complained of a lack of weapons and soldiers.

Suffice it to say that Washington alone plans to increase its grouping there first to 50,000 servicemen and then, according to certain data, even to 250,000. Explaining the U.S. actions, President G. Bush said that Baghdad has "concentrated a vast war machine on the Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia and also in southern regions of Iraq which is capable of launching further combat operations after negligible preparation or without any preparation at all." And so, the President added, the U.S. Armed Forces will remain in Saudi Arabia as long as their "presence is necessary for the security of the region and accords with the Saudi Government's wish to defend the Kingdom."

Noteworthy in this connection are the reports which have filtered into the press that among the U.S. troops which have arrived and are stationed in Saudi Arabia there are Israeli servicemen and Israeli military hardware, including aircraft with U.S. identification marks. And it should be emphasized in general that Israel's position is unequivocal in the situation that has arisen. Tel Aviv declared right after the Iraqi attack on Kuwait that that action confirmed the long-held Israeli view of the Iraqi regime, and it urged the West to take the most decisive measures to halt the "wave of Iraqi expansionism." "I did not think," Israeli Defense Minister M. Arens, for example, said in an interview, "that Israel would be Iraq's next strategic target. However, I am sure that Saddam Husayn will not be satisfied just with seizing Kuwait." And he added that Iraq "is now seeking new targets," possessing at the same time "a big Army and an even bigger appetite." So a possible military confrontation between the United States and Iraq would clearly accord with Israeli interests, because even now the unresolved nature of the Palestinian problem has taken a back seat, as it were.

True, Saddam Husayn himself has mentioned this problem. And in a very distinctive way. In a special statement he promised to withdraw the Iraqi troops from Kuwait and to restore its sovereignty in exchange for a simultaneous and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli soldiers from the occupied Arab territories and a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. At the same time the Iraqi president suggested replacing the U.S. subunits stationed in Saudi Arabia with inter-Arab armed forces, excluding Egyptian forces.

It has to be acknowledged that this maneuver of Saddam Husayn's made sense. I will explain why. The reaction of the world community and, at first, of the majority of Arab countries (let us recall the results of the pan-Arab meeting in Cairo) showed Baghdad that they had no intention of tolerating what Iraq had done and standing idly by. Thus, having hardly ended the war with Iran, the Baghdad leadership found itself facing the prospect of a new war in the region and, consequently, new economic privations. Hence Saddam Husayn's dramatic appeal to the Iraqi people to "halve consumption of bread, meat, and other foods" and "not buy new clothes for a year."

Baghdad had to try to win over at least some, if not all, of the Arabs. And Saddam Husayn probably got his way by advancing his proposals (albeit even proposals he knew to be unacceptable). Take the following fact, for example: In the Gaza Strip six Palestinian baby boys born on one day received the name Saddam Husayn. But it is not only a matter of naming newborn babies. In Libya and Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania, Morocco and Yemen thousands of people are participating in demonstrations in support of Baghdad and expressing a wish to volunteer to stand beneath the banners of Saddam Husayn, "defender of the Arab nation," in order to counter the U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. Evidently, one commentator was right when he said that the Arabs will soon forget why the U.S. troops came to their region but will long remember who let them in.

To judge by the scale of the aforementioned Desert Shield operation, Washington is in earnest about its military presence in the Persian Gulf zone and is prepared for it to last a long time. As U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney said, "it should not be thought that this is a simple operation, that it will soon be over, or that a considerable U.S. effort will not be required for this." You get the definite impression that Washington is concerned, in the final analysis, not so much about military measures to ensure the "defense" of Saudi Arabia as about its long-term military plans in that region. Is this not the dividing line between what accords with the interests of the world community and the strategic interests of the United States itself and some of its allies, who seem to be seeking to substantially change the correlation of forces in the Near East and the Persian Gulf?

Is it really necessary to concentrate and focus such a huge number of troops and weapons in this region? It would only take a few shots to ring out on the Kuwaiti-Saudi border, and war could become inevitable. And where is the guarantee that Saddam Husayn, on encountering strong military oposition and a rigid economic blockade and, moreover, feeling the support and sympathies of a part of the Arab nation, will not risk another armed adventure with unpredictable consequences not only for this region? Thus, a U.S. satellite has detected "chemical activity" by the Iraqi Army, which is preparing missiles and aerial bombs with a chemical "filling" for possible use. And Israel has carried out a really demonstrative launch of its new Arrow antiballistic missile, on whose development and production it cooperated for a long time with the United States.

So, it turns out, should everything be left to run its course, and should the Baghdad regime be left alone? Of course not. Anyone who, contrary to all international norms, resorts to fist law must not enjoy the fruits of his aggressive actions. This is why, right from the start of the Persian Gulf crisis, the Soviet Union has firmly and clearly advocated extinguishing as quickly as possible the conflagration that has flared up, restoring the situation that existed prior to 2 August, and withdrawing the sides for a political dialogue with a view to the peaceful settlement of disputed questions.

The acute and unpredictable nature of the present situation in the Persian Gulf zone insistently requires that all who are directly involved in the dangerous confrontation developing there display prudence, circumspection, and respect for the will of the international community.

Only one acceptable path can now be seen in the conflict zone. This is not a gamble on force but patient political and economic influence on Iraq. The effect will hardly be rapid, but must undoubtedly come.

Likelihood of Oil Crisis Noted

PM1708113290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Aug 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by Lev Strzhizhovskiy under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "A Complex Question"]

[Text] All mass media news reports in the whole world are beginning and ending with reports from the Persian Gulf. Increasingly dramatic headlines are preparing world public opinion for possible military action. As has happened often before, the actual reason for the conflict is buried under a heap of figures about the number of soldiers, aircraft, tanks, and weapons in the opposing armies. The smell of gunpowder has become much stronger than the smell of oil. And after all, it is because of oil that Kuwait was occupied. The Security Council has adopted a decision on an embargo on trade with Iraq. The United States has moved its armadas into the Persian Gulf area and many other things that we have yet to find out about are very likely to happen. Petroleum is constantly used not just in the engines of machines, but also in the perpetual motion of world politics. Is mankind threatened with a third oil crisis?

Washington is explaining its energetic actions in terms of the desire to avoid this. Today the ships of the United States and its NATO allies have not just sealed off the Persian Gulf. At the same time practically all Iraqi supply routes and oil pipelines have been cut off. It is typical that several Iraqi tankers that arrived in the United States carrying oil that had already been bought, did not obtain permission to discharge it. Specialists have already worked out a new oil balance and many countries are concerned about this.

Statistics help clarify the picture. The Persian Gulf area meets one-fourth of world oil demand. A total of 66 percent of known world reserves are to be found here, which amounts to 1 trillion barrels. The embargo on Iraqi oil has changed the situation: The world has lost five million barrels a day. But there has been no catastrophe. Taking past experience into account, the United States has at its disposal a strategic supply of oil for 100 days, Japan for 132, and the FRG for 135. All large oil companies have corresponding reserves. The consequences of the embargo have appeared in other things. Oil prices have risen, with all the elements of instability that that entails: a price rise on gold, a fall in the rate of the dollar, and a further boost in inflation.

Of the overall volume of oil sold, approximately 20 percent is made up of short-term supplies. These have raised the price ceiling to $26 a barrel. Western economists are predicting that all oil will be sold for $30 a barrel within the next few months. They are also naming one of the main suppliers: As a result of the new prices, according to their calculations, the Soviet Union could increase its oil revenue to $7.25 billion.

This view, in my opinion, is both tempting and dangerous. You don't know what is better, so to speak. The Soviet Union, which is interested in credits, would not like to upset economic relations within the Western economy to any degree. And the growth in prices has already led to alarm: President Bush has spoken about this, and the OPEC organization has made a statement. The aim of these clarifications is to calm down the public and explain that today's price vacillations are connected with politics rather than economics.

The U.S. JOURNAL OF COMMERCE formulated the following thesis: "The Soviet Union does not want the collapse of the economies of Western countries, and is trying to obtain assistance from them." If there is a slump in the West, it is not difficult to guess the consequences: The demand for many Soviet export goods will come to an end, and there will be no question of any investments. There is one obvious solution. In politics—to support the West's efforts in resolving this crisis, and in economics—to stabilize our oil supplies and be satisfied with what the market offers. And that is a lot. The newly acquired billions, according to Western specialists, would be equivalent to the Soviet trade deficit for 1989.

But the exported oil gives rise to another controversial and delicate problem of a purely domestic nature. I would call it the problem of glasnost. After all, the trade deals that have been signed today will turn into in real money tomorrow. Where will it go? At the moment it is not at all easy to answer this question.

Foreign Ministry Reacts to Iran-Iraq Settlement

Newspaper Carries Statement

PM1708105890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 1

["USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman Statement"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] There have been numerous commentaries already on the Iraqi leadership's statement. But, irrespective of how one explains this decision, the main thing, in the opinion of the Soviet side, is that if the initiative is implemented it will put an end to a serious source of tension in the Persian Gulf area, which is riddled with conflict situations as it is. The prospects are emerging for the implementation of the important UN Security Council documents known as Resolution 598.

The Soviet Union, as is known, consistently made a great effort to overcome the Iran-Iraq conflict, which for a long time did harm to both peoples' interests and took many human lives in the course of a brutal and bloody struggle. The Soviet Union hopes that with the achievement of an Iran-Iraq settlement, prerequisites will appear for progress toward establishing stability in the Persian Gulf zone.

Belonogov Receives Envoys

LD1608140390 Moscow TASS in English 1349 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov today received Iran's ambassador to the Soviet Union Nasir Heirani-Nobari.

They discussed the Iran-Iraq settlement. The Soviet side emphasized that the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 and the solution of all disputable issues by Iran and Iraq would be a vital contribution to stability in the region.

Soviet-Iranian relations were also discussed.

The same day, Belonogov received Iraqi ambassador to the Soviet Union Ghafil Jassim Husayn.

They discussed the situation in the Gulf. Belonogov said that the Soviet Union welcomed Iraq's initiative, announced on August 15, to settle the Iran-Iraq conflict and expressed hope that this constructive approach would spread to the solution of other regional problems.

Afghan Rebels To Negotiate Release of POW's

LD1608143190 Moscow TASS in English 1408 GMT 1408 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—Afghan rebel leaders are planning to send representatives to Moscow to negotiate the release of Soviet prisoners of war with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS newspaper reports today.

The newspaper quoted Iona Andronov, deputy chairman of the Russian parliamentary commission on international affairs.

Andronov, who also chairs the Soviet Association of Families of Soviet P.O.W. in Afghanistan, is heading a Soviet delegation visiting Pakistan.

Delegates held talks with Peshawar-based provisional government president Sibghatullah Mojadeddi [title as received] and rebel leaders Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Before opening talks in Moscow the rebel leaders hope to negotiate an end to mass destruction weapons' deliveries to Kabul from Russia, Andropov told the newspaper.

For the first time, the reception given by rebel leaders to Soviet representatives wasn't "harsh", the newspaper said.

Hikmatyar promised Anna Popova and Mariya Dubina that they will meet their sons kept prisoner by one of his field commanders.

Other members of the provisional government assured delegates that they will allow meetings with Soviet POW's as is usual in the civilised world.

East Europe

Envoy to CSFR Views 1968 Events, Relations

LD1608134390 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1000 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Yesterday, we broadcast an interview with Boris Pankin, Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Because it evoked a considerable response among you, the listeners, and with regard to the fact that according to your telephone calls not everyone heard it, we are now rebroadcasting this interview made by Vladimir Brabec.

[Begin recording] [Brabec] Life was very busy here at the time [as heard], but the tragic 21 August [1968] came later. Nowadays it seems as if absolutely new conditions, a new situation, a new atmosphere, and also new people exist here. Mr. Ambassador, I would nevertheless like to hear how you view today the events that affected our two countries 22 years ago.

[Pankin, in Russian, fading into Czech translation] Yes, the anniversary of the tragic August events is drawing closer. It is clear that each citizen of Czechoslovakia, just like all of us—the Soviet people—recollects these events with pain, both in minds and hearts. Although one would like to forget them, one finds that it is neither possible nor expedient to do so. The fact is pleasing for us—if I may use this word—that today, on our Soviet side, we have fully and profoundly reevaluated the events of the tragedy which threw us, just like it did you, many years back. All we can do is to note with regret that the subsequent developments did not take the direction that was already then proposed by the Prague Spring, headed by Alexander Dubcek, the current federal parliament chairman. And today, while shaking off in earnest all the mark of that time, and all the dirt of the past, we are trying to look to the future.

We would like to go back to the times so long ago, where many outstanding chapters can be found from the era of past centuries. In modern history these chapters represent first and foremost the struggle against fascism. I know that despite all that happend later, people in Czechoslovakia remember the days of the liberation of Czechoslovakia and Prague. We are drawn together by ordinary, humane, as well as our common Slav roots, and at present we are drawn together also by economic issues. All of this creates a kind of bond between friends. We must proceed precisely from this point in mapping out our new future. And this is what I, as an ambassador, though a newcomer to this post, regard as my main task: To resurrect our trust and to proceed from this trust for the benefit of our two states and our peoples.

[Brabec] I think that ahead of us lies a lot of good and useful work for the benefit of our two countries.

[Pankin] President Havel's visit to Moscow, where Havel and Gorbachev signed a declaration on cooperation that has become a foundation for our new cooperation, was a historical event. We reached an agreement on troop withdrawal from the Czechoslovak territory, and now we carefully watch each week how the agreement is being fulfilled. Some problems are arising in connection with their settling at home, but this is our worry. The time schedule of individual stages is being observed. Intensive restructuring of economic mechanisms, which is acquiring full contemporary yardsticks, is under way. Recently there were several visits by your ministers to our country, in particular the ministers of foreign trade and economy. Other visits are planned. In the beginning of September the premiers of our two governments will meet during the Baltic conference in Sweden, where they will discuss a number of questions in which the two sides are interested.

I think that we should also invigorate the intellectual sphere—the sphere of culture, tourism, and other direct contacts between people, so that the broadest possible spectrum of the two populations will be given a chance to get to know one another, so that all this will be natural, so that also the people and groups who were forced to stand on the sidelines for many years will also become involved. After all, we know what was happening in the past. Official delegations were meeting and embracing each other as if they were friends. The good thing is that they have gone, and that a time of normal relations between human beings in all spheres has arrived.

[Brabec] You will probably agree with me that Europe will accept us only as truly good and sincere neighbors.

[Pankin] Yes, it is indeed the case. We were always in Europe, but now we are talking about a kind of a new structure of a European home, which will, after all, be built not only by us and you, but also by a future united Germany. And thus the relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, as well as between East European states, where important changes occured, are, of course exceptionally important, because we represent almost 50 percent of Europe. The construction of a future European home is being watched with great attention and hope by the whole world, which wants to see in this model the foundations for an all-humanity home. [end recording]

Soviet, Czechoslovak Scholars To Study 1968

LD1608212190 Moscow TASS in English 2002 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Dunaevskiy]

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—Soviet and Czechoslovak historians have agreed to jointly study the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia.

The agreement was reached during a visit to the Soviet Union by a team of Czechoslovak scientists led by Vaclav Mencl, chairman of the Czechslovak government commission investigating the 1968 events. The group visited the Soviet Union from August 14 to 16.

The visitors met researchers from the Soviet Institute of History and the Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies to exchange information about their work on the issue.

Soviet scientists will send interviews with participants and witnesses of the 1968 events to Czechoslovakia, Aleksandr Chubaryan, director of the History Institute, told TASS.

Next year, scientists plan to hold a seminar on the issue in Prague. Scientists from other countries have been invited to ensure unbiased analysis, Chubaryan said.

West Europe

FRG Foreign Minister's Visit Previewed

Plans To View Relations

LD1608143190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 16 Aug 90

["Viewpoint" program presented by commentator Nikolay Agayants along with "colleague" Viktor Levin]

[Text] [Agayants] As already reported, FRG Foreign Minister Genscher is due to arrived in Moscow on 17 August to hold talks with Shevardnadze, the USSR foreign minister. Let me recall that Soviet-West German summit meetings in Moscow and in the Caucasus were held quite recently. Both foreign ministers took part. Ahead of us is the 12 September Moscow meeting of foreign ministers of six states as part of the two-plus-four formula, comprising the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France, and foreign ministers of both German states. So, this is yet another working meeting. The ministers meet each other frequently. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that new talks are necessary. I ask Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, my colleague, to tell us in greater detail about the main tasks for tomorrow's meeting.

[Levin] Several days ago Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the FRG foreign minister, said one of the main problems consisted in completing the preparations for a conference of the foreign ministers of the six states making up the two-plus-four formula, so that all the documents pertaining to the foreign policy aspects of the unification of the two German states should, in practice, be adopted at this conference.

It has to be said that such an opportunity does exist. It was opened up for real as a result of talks between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, our country's president, and Helmut Kohl, the FRG chancellor. These took place exactly a month ago and were held, as you have said, in Moscow and in the Caucasus. The essence of the accords reached during these talks consists in this: As soon as Germany's unity becomes a fact, Germany will acquire full sovereign rights.

[Agayants] Viktor Nikolayevich, the question arises of whether our agreement to hand over all the soverign rights to the unified Germany came rather easily, speedily, and unconditionally, and should we not have bargained? This question reaches us in the letters of our radio listeners. There is, in particular, also the question of Germany's NATO membership. But, once we hand over all the sovereign rights then this issue, too, acquires altogether different terms of reference. Well, if Germany is going to be sovereign, it will have sovereignty over the resolution of this problem. We have thus practically, as it were, agreed to the unifed Germany's NATO membership.

[Levin] Here, I think, one has to appraise this whole situation in a realistic and serious manner. Let us start from what is the main thing—the sovereignty of the single Germany. Let us think: Do we have any sort of moral, political, or legal right to refuse the unifed Germany the right to sovereignty? To begin with, it is an unalienable right, arising from all the norms of international life. Secondly—and this point must not be lost from sight either—some time ago, way back in 1955, we extended full sovereignty to the GDR. The treaties we have since concluded, treaties of friendship and cooperation, numerous economic agreements—and there were many of them—and other agreements, all were based on the recognition of the GDR's sovereignty. Well, if you take both these aspects into consideration, and these aspects are extraordinarily essential, the question arises: Upon what basis could we now refuse sovereignty to the unified Germany? Of course, politics is a fine and delicate art. I think that through the Arkhyz accords we also extended a certain credit of trust to the future unified Germany. But, I am deeply convinced that this credit will, on a long-term basis, and I would even say in its historical aspects, yield significantly higher moral dividends than any sort of opportunist advantages which we could theoretically squeeze out of them, as it were, when giving our agreement to the sovereignty of the unified Germany. This aspect must also not be lost from sight.

[Agayants] Viktor Nikolayevich, I would like to return to this question: After all, we practically lifted our objections to the unified Germany's NATO membership. But we used to pose this question in a rather sharp form and repeatedly stated that NATO membership of the unified Germany was absolutely unacceptable for the Soviet Union.

[Levin] Yes, that is the way we did pose this question. I think that today it is perhaps possible to admit that this way of posing the issue was none too realistic, since we proceeded from a very concrete situation, without looking to the future. We came to see very soon that the development of events in the world, not only in both German states, but also in the whole of Western Europe, in the whole of NATO bloc, was acquiring such a nature that our being so categorical was, if you like, losing its justification. After all, the London NATO Council meeting paved the way toward, essentially, a reorientation of the bloc geared toward its politicization and against its previous course for military strength. More than that. After all, when all is said and done, let us reflect on the reason for the existence of the Warsaw Pact and NATO—to repel aggression on the part of the other bloc. We used to say: To repel aggression by NATO. NATO people used to say: To repel aggression by the Warsaw Pact. Now no one says such things any longer. More than that: Everyone understands that war on the European continent is practically being ruled out. Incidentally, for this reason too, I think we have no grounds to fear the unified Germany's NATO membership as a factor of military threat to our country and our allies.

[Agayants] What other question does Genscher intend to discuss in Moscow during his talks with Shevardnadze?

[Levin] The FRG foreign minister said that the solution of the problems connected with the stay of the Soviet armed forces on the territory of the present GDR will be among these questions. Here, again, one must go back to the Arkhyz accords, where an agreement was in principle reached to the effect that Soviet troops would remain on the territory of the present GDR for between three and four years following the unification of Germany. No NATO structures are allowed to be transferred to this territory during this period. Foreign troops or nuclear weapons cannot be deployed on this territory in future.

We are also interested in the fate of our armed forces, the Western Group of Forces. Three or four years is, it must be said bluntly, an insignificant time to safeguard the technical conditions for their withdrawal. The point does not just revolve round the 370,000 or 380,000 servicemen deployed there. The point is that an enormous amount of materiel, fighting equipment, and so on has been stockpiled there. All this must be transported to the Soviet Union's territory, and the servicemen must be found accomodation. If this problem can be solved quite simply with regard to the soldiers who—to theirs' and their parents' joy—can simply be allowed to go home, what is to be done with regard to officers? They must be ensured housing and work. It is not a simple problem and it is being taken into account. Here, I think, the Arkhyz accords give considerable hope to assume that this problem will be resolved in the best possible way for all concerned. An accord has also been reached to the effect that the unified Germany will make not inconsiderable material resources available for the upkeep of our troops on the territory of the present GDR. Apart from that, the accord ensures that the unified Germany will also help normalize conditions of life for the servicemen being redeployed in the Soviet Union. This appears particularly significant to me. I am inclined to understand it as the participation by German capital in the construction of housing for servicemen, and it is a very noteworthy aspect.

[Agayants] I read a press report that Shevardnadze and Genscher, at their coming meeting in Moscow, will discuss political-economic questions, the questions of economic ties. What can you say on this score?

[Levin] It is the question, I imagine, of the further development of economic ties, above all with the enterprises on the GDR territory. You know that the GDR was our biggest foreign economic partner among our allied states. Incidentally, the FRG is the biggest trade and economic partner of ours among Western States. Of course, the formulas of economic relations were inadequate—one thing from the GDR and an altogether different one from the FRG. Now that the tortuous, complex economic reorganization process is underway in the GDR, very many complex questions arise, and so the problem here is to find the best possible solution, and it can only be found on a mutual basis.

[Agayants] Thank you. Here we bid you farewell, esteemed comrade radio listeners.

'Fruitful' Meeting Expected

LD1608162990 Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Excerpts] The foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and West Germany, Eduard Shevardnadze and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, will hold another meeting in Moscow on Friday. Here is a commentary by Yuriy Solton:

It is almost a safe bet to say that in Moscow the two officials will continue the discussion of questions related to German unification. The biggest of them has been settled in principle; the meeting of President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl last month removed the key obstacles to an international legal document on the external aspects of unification. The draft of the document is now in the hands of experts. It will be submitted for consideration to the ministers of the two German states, the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France that will hold another two-plus-four meeting in Moscow in September.

There is every reason to believe that it will be the last conference, all the more so that the two German governments have shattered the doubts of neighboring countries by confirming the postwar borders. However, many bilateral and multilateral questions still have to be settled.

For example, the leaders of the Soviet Union and Federal Germany agreed that the future united German army will be decreased to 370,000 men in three to four years. During the same period the Soviet troops stationed in the territory of the German Democratic Republic will be pulled out. But how does this understanding fit in the context of the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe? Is it compatible with the Soviet- American agreement reached earlier to leave 195,000 servicemen on both sides in central Europe?

And one more thing: The Soviet Union is no longer opposed to the NATO membership of unified Germany if its government wishes so. But what will happen to the balance of forces in Europe, considering that the war treaty has practically stopped functioning in the military sense? How will the strengthening North Atlantic Treaty influence the formation of an all-European security structure? [passage omitted]

Before his visit, Hans-Dietrich Genscher told journalists that German-Soviet relations have assumed a new quality they have never had. [passage omitted] Sharing the viewpoint of the West German minister, I'd stress that it gives reason to expect fruitful results of the coming soviet-German meeting.

Shevardnadze, FRG Counterpart Meet 16 Aug

Shevardnadze Welcomes Genscher

LD1608173490 Moscow TASS in English 1729 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher arrived on a brief working visit here today.

At Vnukovo airport, he was welcomed by his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze and other officials.

Ministers Open Talks in Moscow

LD1708064990 Moscow TASS in English 0631 GMT 17 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 17 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and his West German counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher have started their talks at a Soviet Foreign Ministry mansion here today.

During Genscher's one-day visit, the sides are expected to discuss a wide range of issues connected with the implementation of basic agreements on international aspects of the unification of East and West Germany and prospects for Soviet-German relations.

The ministers will also discuss international problems, including the explosive situation in the Persian Gulf.

German Unity, Gulf Discussed

LD1708081390 Moscow TASS in English 0735 GMT 17 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Sergey Ryabikin and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow August 17 TASS—Soviet and West German Foreign Ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and Hans-Dietrich Genscher began a one-on-one meeting in a Soviet Foreign Ministry mansion in Moscow today. Genscher arrived here on a brief working visit last night.

Talking to a TASS diplomatic correspondent before the meeting, Shevardnadze said that "German reunification has proceeded more rapidly than expected."

"We shall have to put in some hard work as there is little time left. We need to work to expedite agreement on the external aspects of German reunification. This is our mood as we start working," the Soviet foreign minister said.

Commenting on the situation in the Middle East, he said its evolution is hard to predict and this causes grave concern to all countries, including the Soviet Union.

"No one can guarantee against an explosion in the region—neither the Soviet Union nor the United States nor Europe. I think in these conditions various options should be pursued," Shevardnadze said.

He said that Arab countries could do a lot "if they act in unity" and that collective efforts, most notably those taken through the U.N. Security Council, are an important condition of settling the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict.

Genscher said, for his part, that West Germany will do everything to ensure that the "two-plus-four" meeting takes place in Moscow on September 12, as planned, and that "foreign policy aspects do not present an obstacle to German unification."

Ecological Expedition Planned With Finland

PM1608110190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 9 Aug 90

[Report by V. Bogatkin from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A scientific ecological expedition Baltic-90 has set off aboard the vessel Professor Khlyustin.

[Reporter] One of the leaders of the expedition is USSR People's Deputy Pilot-Cosmonaut Viktor Savinnykh.

[Savinnykh] Today the expedition has arrived in Helsinki. [video shows Helsinki quayside and vessel Professor Khlyustin] Finland, the first country of the Baltic region is our first port call. We have already held a number of meetings at the Ministry of Environment, the Maritime Institute, and other establishments, and everywhere we see Finnish experts' interested in the joint elaboration of large-scale projects to protect the Baltic Sea.

[Reporter] A news conference was held on board the vessel at which members of the expedition briefed the mass media on the program and aims of the scientific ecological expedition Baltic-90.

Finmap, a well-known Finnish company, invited the members of the expedition and acquainted Soviet cartographers with its achievements in the sphere of compiling modern maps.

[Savinnykh] We are visiting this company which is renowned in the world for its excellent maps, and as cartographers we are concerned today about ecology. We would like to jointly compile ecological maps which are so necessary today to provide information about what is happening around us.

Political & Social

Citizenship of Solzhenitsyn, Others Restored

LD1608131390 Moscow TASS in English 1218 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—Soviet citizenship has been restored to 23 writers, academics and musicians who were deprived of it between 1966 and 1988 and now live abroad.

They include writers Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Vasiliy Aksenov, Vladimir Voynovich, Lev Kopelev, Georgiy Vladimov, scientists Yuriy Orlov, Valeriy Chalidze and chess player Viktor Korchnoy, Presidential Press Service spokesman Valentin Kulikov told TASS.

Commenting on a corresponding presidential decree, Kulikov said that the decree came into force since the day of its signing.

The USSR Foreign Ministry is instructed to inform the above people of the decree and issue them the passports of Soviet citizens if they wish.

The presidential decree with the complete list of names will be published late this month in the regular issue of the gazette of the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Ryzhkov on Government Program for 'Single Entity'

LD1708073290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 17 Aug 90

[Text] There will be a sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in the Kremlin today, during which a report by Academician Aganbegyan, chairman of the commission assessing alternative options on the transfer to a market economy, will be heard.

Very soon we will be able to find out whether there are any alternatives to the government program. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, is convinced that it is precisely the government program that will assist the country in extracting itself from the onerous position at which it has arrived.

I am offering you the opportunity to listen to what Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov said to our correspondent. The recording was made at a meeting between the head of the government and members of the working group for the preparation of a program of transfer to a market economy.

[Begin recording] [Ryzhkov] The foundation of our conception and the corresponding program, which we are now developing and which we will put forward, is the Soviet Union as a single entity. This is the main thing. [Words indistinct] economic field is the Soviet Union, and this must unite us, generally speaking. We are seeing that, today, completely different trends are evident. It is being said: No, let us have a Ukrainian market economy, a Moldavian market economy, an Estonian market economy.

So, correspondingly we have to begin bringing in either some kinds of restrictions or introducing some kind of customs. This in no way coincides with our position. We only have to set off down the road that is being urged upon us, and... [changes thought] such separatist economic trends are very strong. Incidentally, I said at the 28th congress that economic separatism is no less dangerous than political separatism. If we set off down that road, I consider that as the beginning of the disintegration of our large, I mean great, state. But we consider that this is a retrogressive path. I do not know where it will land the country. Look, 500 years ago, Ivan III already had laws, common ones, perhaps one can say, all-Union, state-wide laws. And, I mean, we must live in accordance with certain laws. And, therefore, once separatism predominates, then all this will be torn up into individual shreds, what, 15 shreds—I don't know, then...

[Unidentified speakers, interrupting] Sixteen in Russia. Sixteen autonomous ones.

[Ryzhkov] Then our program, quite honestly, will be inapplicable. We are laying precisely this principle as a platform, that there must be a Union state. But this does not mean that the republics will be left with those rights that they had. Of course, the republics must be strong. They must be given an opportunity and at the same time be given economic independence, given the possibility of transferring capital and transferring material resources.

Look at what is being done in West Europe. Look at how it is undergoing that integration. In 1992 customs will be dismantled, dismantled. That is, all sorts of restrictions will be dismantled. This does not mean that there is no regulation there.

[Unidentified speaker] That is an interesting path.

[Ryzhkov] Yes. There is regulation there too. But they are making a very major step forward in integration—an exceedingly important step. And they consider that strength is only to be found in this. We must take this road. Should we take the contrary path, I think that we will be in an extraordinarily onerous situation. Each republic will have to undergo a crisis to get out of it. [end recording]

Gorbachev Warns Students of Cultural 'Shortage'

PM1708100290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Aug 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Letter from M.S. Gorbachev: "Letter From USSR President to All-Union Rally of Higher-Grade Students"]

[Text] Dear kids! Thank you for inviting me to meet with you. But, since circumstances prevent me from attending, I have decided to share my thoughts with you in this letter.

Both from your message and from what I have been told by comrades who have visited "Orlenok" [young people's summer camp] I am aware of why you are meeting and what you have been working on for the past month. I am impressed by the seriousness and scale of your approach to issues. Your vital, bold, and open ways of thinking are the most hopeful aspects of your work.

Your generation was probably the first to rid itself of almost genetically shackled thinking, the damaging mentality of imprisonment, and the distorted view of universal human values.

In all this I see the portentous result of perestroyka. Your reaction that the country's problems are your own, your active civic stance, and your desire to be prepared to shoulder the search for ways to solve them are particularly important when the country is on the threshold of profound transformations in the economy, in the state forms of our multinational community, and in the sphere of further democratization of our entire society.

The way we get through this highly responsible stage will determine the country's destiny—including that of your generation—for many years and decades to come.

You are now not only hearing about but actually encountering the difficulties of this transitional stage. A great many things probably worry you. But, at the same time, you are lucky. You are being molded as citizens at a time when society is being inundated with the most varied information, including a mass of major new pieces of knowledge, original ideas, critical reassessments, and painful thoughts about the past and the future. This should not confuse you as to what to believe, what to take on board, and what to reject. It is important that in this flood of information you should not give in to the devastating temptation to reject everything and engage in meaningless carping verging on cynicism, which is particularly dangerous at a tender age. Yes, we are going through a crisis, but it is not a catastrophe, just a difficult period en route to the country's renewal and regeneration.

The involvement of your generation in independent activity has coincided with perestroyka, which is aimed at implementing revolutionary change on the path of asserting in society freedom, democracy, glasnost, and the humanization of all relations between people within the framework of the socialist choice. Through perestroyka we are moving toward new forms of life, gearing both economic and political processes to the people. We want to implement the ideas that were enshrined in October 1917 but were not realized. We want to return to the roots of the socialist ideal and finally overcome people's alienation from the means of production, power, and culture. That is the quintessential idea behind perestroyka.

It is opening up enormous opportunities for shaping personalities—allowing them to blossom—and developing real civic qualities in people.

This is a great time. It is making demands of all sections of society, but there are particular demands on you who are entering independent life. Despite all the difficulties and dangers of the current transition, we must get through it, and I am convinced that we will. We will stick it out and be successful.

Of course, schools must change too. Perestroyka is making colossal and unusual demands on schools and the teaching system. Any new society will ultimately be successful thanks to its schools and educational system. This age-old truth is more topical than ever for us now.

I share your criticism of the state of our schools—both in terms of material supply and with respect to staff. I want to emphasize to you yet again the great importance of the problems of schools and the authorities' great responsibility for solving them at all levels—from top legislative and executive organs to oblast, rayon, city, and rural organs.

This is a nationwide task. And we need a state program in this area. Preparations for it are already under way.

But, in addressing you, I would like to say that a great deal will fall directly to you. If you take the attitude that the state should give you this, that, and the other, that it should provide, supply, and allocate you with everything, and so on and so forth—then we will take a long time to get out of the difficult position we are in. You yourselves will have to shoulder some of the burden of raising society's intellectual level—without which there will be no spiritual revival in the county and we will be unable to ensure the scientific, technical, and, on the whole, social progress that it needs so vitally.

The most important shortage at present is the shortage of culture. I think that this is the reason for the many calamities, disorders, discord, and even crimes in our life—not least on ethnic grounds. There is no way to overcome this shortage other than to acquire culture. And this is particularly important at your age—the most impressionable, receptive, and open age for the acquisition of the spiritual and moral requirements you will need for the rest of your lives.

We need to be able—not only in bookish isolation, but in contact with friends, parents, and teachers, in collectives and in discussions—to develop our own view of things out of the abundance and diversity of spiritual sustenance available, and to build up our own personal "stock of culture," which will later foster more and more knowledge and make your lives interesting and you yourselves useful people for many, many years to come.

An enormous role in shaping these individual and civic qualities can and will be played by youth organizations, among them—I am sure—political organizations such as the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League].

One other point. Everything for which we are striving (fully resolved to rid ourselves of what is hampering our progress and to cleanse ourselves of the built up layers overshadowing our past and its difficult legacy) and our readiness to overcome any difficulties and not spare any effort is all motivated by a great sense of patriotism and a desire to see our motherland, our people, and the community of our peoples happy and prosperous. Without this sense we will be unable to cope with the huge amount of tasks facing the country. You young people will have to strengthen that sense with your energy and your inherently youthful, acute attitude to justice, honor, and decency.

I wish you all good health, good spirits, and success. I expect you to become actively involved in the great cause of perestroyka.

Abalkin Discusses Transition to Market Economy

AU1608160190 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 13 Aug 90 pp 138-143

[Interview with Soviet Deputy Premier Leonid Abalkin by Wolfgang Kaden and Fritjof Meyer in Munich; date not given: "The People Are Afraid"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Leonid Ivanovich, why has Mikhail Gorbachev suddenly accepted your program of speedy transition to the market economy?

[Abalkin] It was easy for the leadership of our country to accept this plan because it is logical and it corresponds to the concept of perestroyka. Far more difficult is to convince our country and our people of this. The slow actions, the unnecessary caution concerning implementation have obviously done a disservice to the reforms.

Three-and-a-half years ago, everything could have been implemented much more easily and with greater success. Comrade Gorbachev's prestige was undisputed then and the people were willing to support any of his steps, even the most radical. But there was not enough determination, not enough political will.

[DER SPIEGEL] Another three years have been wasted?

[Abalkin] Actually no; after all, we learned a lot in these three years. Since then, the situation has rapidly changed. The trust in Gorbachev and in the country's leadership as a whole has decreased. The deterioration of the economic situation has strengthened the conservative voices.

Calls that things were better in the past are becoming louder and louder; it is said that it is necessary to return to the old system. However, it is not possible to further postpone the reforms. If I have any personal credit, it is the fact that I stubbornly insist: This reform must be carried out as quickly as possible.

[DER SPIEGEL] Have you been able to convince Premier Ryzhkov and the other government representatives of this?

[Abalkin] I have been able to convince them that the reform has to start immediately. For me, this was linked with learning something different. As a scientist, I had grown accustomed to individual work; I wrote what I wanted and I was personally responsible for this. However, political responsibility always is the result of collective work, in the same way as tennis is different from soccer, where things depend on the good coordination of the players. I have to stick to the rules of team work.

[DER SPIEGEL] What is the score? Gorbachev calls the situation on the consumer market "intolerable and simply socially dangerous."

[Abalkin] In 1990, the entire industrial production has declined by 0.7 percent so far; the production of consumer goods, on the other hand, has risen by 6.7 percent.

[DER SPIEGEL] What is the reason for this good news?

[Abalkin] Consumer goods, which are now produced by arms enterprises, have experienced an increase by 22.5 percent, for instance; goods turnover has risen by 13 percent. These are fantastic figures. No prospering economy can boast of such high growth rates in the sale of mass consumer goods.

[DER SPIEGEL] But the shops are empty.

[Abalkin] This is so because the situation is confused and the people are afraid of reforms, which leads to excessive development of demand. In addition, the amount of money has increased more quickly than the supply of goods. The money income of the people has risen by 14 percent—these are wages, pensions, grants, repayments of state loans, social benefits.

[DER SPIEGEL] How come? Wages and prices are set by the government, after all.

[Abalkin] Think of the miners. They did not deliver their production, but they pocketed their wages. The government could not afford to resist them. When Mrs. Thatcher was here she said: So what? In my country they were on strike for a year.

[DER SPIEGEL] And?

[Abalkin] Great Britain has had experience with strikes for decades; we were confronted with this problem for the first time last summer.

[DER SPIEGEL] The old system is based on low wages and low prices; both are under strict control by the state.

[Abalkin] We have released one of these elements—the wages.

[DER SPIEGEL] Have you also printed money?

[Abalkin] Yes, of course. We have renounced the restrictive administrative control of the circulation of money. Last year the amount of money increased by 18 billion rubles [R].

[DER SPIEGEL] This is approximately the annual wages of 6 million workers. The domestic value of the ruble declined by this amount. Within one year, the consumers had to pay 14 percent more for their basic needs. Does the government actually know what it is doing?

[Abalkin] Once I showed the Supreme Soviet deputies what a billion actually is. If one stacks R100 notes, 1,000 notes—that is, R100,000—make a bundle of 10 cm; 1 million are one meter high; and 1 billion one km.

[DER SPIEGEL] But it is the government that prints the money.

[Abalkin] The government in its old composition. The new government has been in office only since the middle of last year. We are responsible for the 1990 budget. I do not want to praise myself, but I would like to give you some figures: In 1989, the state budget deficit amounted to R120 billion. For 1990, we have set this deficit at R60 billion. During the first half it amounted to R24 billion. This is a success, but it is still not ideal. We have to pursue an even stricter financial policy, but this is not possible without a price reform.

[DER SPIEGEL] Where have you saved?

[Abalkin] In investments, which are financed by the budget—this is also the biggest reserve for the future. Furthermore, we cut back military expenditures, not only the costs for keeping the Army itself, but also for the procurement of military technology. We also saved a bit concerning our administrative expenditures; this item is relatively small. And we also saved something in subsidies—this is another big reserve: the subsidies for unprofitable enterprises and for agricultural products. Today they constitute the largest item of expenditures in our budget—about R10 billion.

[DER SPIEGEL] In the future will you no longer pay the enterprises for their losses?

[Abalkin] Already this year, we abolished subsidies for fruit and potatoes and permitted the sale of this produce at free prices.

[DER SPIEGEL] The consumer has to pay. Potatoes cost 10 percent more; fruit cost 14 percent more.

[Abalkin] These are market prices. As regards the general reform of retail prices, we are partly compensating the additional expenditures of the population—on average, two-thirds of the price hikes are compensated for. Some groups of the population, however, are to receive 100-percent compensation—these are pensioners, invalids, students, families with many children, some categories of employees, and, above all, doctors and teachers.

The abolition of subsidies for unprofitable enterprises is a step toward the market. The protection of socially insecure strata of the population belongs to the fulfillment of our social tasks. Both steps make the broad strata of the population support our program and, at the same time, weaken the position of our critics.

[DER SPIEGEL] The average earner feels the price hikes to be an enormous burden....

[Abalkin] ...this is the only way to improve our financial system. Strictness is necessary; the readiness to put this program into practice despite all difficulties.

[DER SPIEGEL] The government has started to abolish the command system, but it has introduced market economy elements only with great hesitation so far.

[Abalkin] This is one of the main reasons for our current difficulties. There is a nasty proverb in our country: Breaking is not building; thus you do not need to much brains for it.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why has the Soviet Union not started with reforms in agriculture, like Hungary or China? Agriculture is prepared for the market; there you already have thousands of independent enterprises; there are no powerful monopolies as in industry.

[Abalkin] Correct. If we had started the economic reform, which we are beginning now, five years ago, we now would not have any problems with foodstuffs anymore and could make all other changes in the market more easily without giving rise to social tensions in the country.

[DER SPIEGEL] If you want to change the economic conditions, you need competition instead of supplies by state monopolies. Without competition, you will not achieve a market economy, nor will you achieve its economic advantages.

[Abalkin] I fully agree with this. As long as the total nationalization of the economy is not abolished, there will not be any competition. This is the ABCs of the market.

[DER SPIEGEL] Until then a price reform is also useless, because otherwise the absurdly high monopoly prices continue to be valid.

[Abalkin] I agree with you again. In our country, we have three forms of monopoly: state ownership; organizational monopolization in line with industrial branches which are administered by ministries; and, finally, technical monopolization—gigantic enterprises are the sole producers of certain goods for the entire country.

There is only one single enterprise in the Soviet Union which produces filters for cigarettes. This is paradoxical. Imagine, this enterprise could determine its prices itself! In monopoly production, the free formation of prices is the surest way toward destruction—this is also the view of Western experts. There is no market there, only the dictate of the producers.

As long as there are still monopolies, the state has to exercise control in these areas, at least as long as our monopolies do not have to compete on the world market. We will get over monopolism once and for all only if our economy opens up toward the world market.

[DER SPIEGEL] You could also disentangle the monopolies.

[Abalkin] At the first stage of transition to the formation of prices in line with market laws, we want to actively aid new, non- state enterprises.

[DER SPIEGEL] New medium-sized companies?

[Abalkin] Hundreds and thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises have to be established, also by using foreign investments. Over the next few days, a corresponding government decision will be signed. Companies of the trade, service, and foodstuffs sector will be sold to the people. Individual persons, family companies, and cooperatives may buy small enterprises, medium-sized and large enterprises which are turning into stock corporations....

[DER SPIEGEL] ...in which the state keeps the majority of the shares?

[Abalkin] During the first stage, yes. Think of the dimensions: The basic assets in the national economy, that is the investment capital, currently amount to R1.8 trillion, according to the latest estimates. At best, the population has the means for buying shares for R100 billion, that is, about six percent of the entire volume. At best, an equal amount could come from abroad in the best of all cases.

[DER SPIEGEL] You do not want to privatize all industry....

[Abalkin] ...of course not. For instance not the railroads or the hydrological power plants, energy systems, the main gas and crude oil lines.

[DER SPIEGEL] And the arms industry?

[Abalkin] This can be discussed. I will give you an example from the debate that we had in government: The railroads remain with the USSR Railroad Ministry. But this ministry has a factory for railroad car repairs, which could be turned into a stock corporation.

[DER SPIEGEL] The railroad repair enterprises are nationalized even it the FRG. But they could be privatized, why not?

[Abalkin] The same goes for the armament companies.

[DER SPIEGEL] The gigantic tank factory Uralmash, where your premier was formerly director general?

[Abalkin] Why not? Now, for example, we are examining whether we should release the large Baltic Sea shipping company for rent. Of course, the responsible ministry is strictly against this.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Moscow ministry. What does the mayor of Leningrad think of this?

[Abalkin] He supports the project. We would like to put the shipping company neither under Moscow nor under Leningrad administration; it pays its taxes to the USSR budget and to the budget of Leningrad. The more profit it makes, the more Leningrad gets, also in foreign currency. We defend the independence of the enterprises.

[DER SPIEGEL] If you rent the shipping company, the state remains the owner.

[Abalkin] But the entrepreneurial activities are fully transferred to the tenant. This is the Soviet model: With such a large amount of capital a quick transition to private property or to a stock corporation is unrealistic, even with the help of foreign participation.

State monopolism has to be broken quickly, and there rent is feasible. The state remains the owner of the capital; it concludes the leases for a certain period of time and with the possibility of extending it.

[DER SPIEGEL] A tenant does not get loans as easily as—in a Western market economy—the owner of a plot of land. A bank demands collateral; the best is always real estate property.

[Abalkin] So far the state or the government have guaranteed loans; in foreign trade they are guaranteed by the foreign trade bank. These are remnants of the old system. Now the guarantees have to be made by those who take the money and the guarantee must be their property. If an enterprise does not pay back its loan, the creditor must have the right to seize this property, to sell it, and to get his money from there.

I suggest to do this both in international and domestic relations. If a kolkhoz does not pay back a bank loan—this is done very frequently in practice—and if the planned risk insurance does not cover the loss, its assets and its property are auctioned off: the stables, the thresher-harvesters.

[DER SPIEGEL] For the thin animals and the broken down machinery the bank will never get its loan back. Charges on land and mortgages are much safer—and also less expensive. But land obviously involves ideological issues.

[Abalkin] If an enterprise is unable to guarantee the repayment of a loan, the bank may refuse to give a loan. As regards land, there are also historical reasons. In Russia, our peasants did not have any private property before the revolution.

[DER SPIEGEL] This was feudalism. Before World War I, the reformer Stolypin successfully strove for peasant family enterprises.

[Abalkin] He started too late. We are taking another path. The land is given to the peasants for unlimited lease, with the right to leave their land to their descendants. This makes this form acceptable both for society and for the peasants. This is the maximum of what one can do in Russia at the beginning of the 1990's, and this is difficult enough. We will see what will happen after the year 2000.

I talked about Russia. It cannot be ruled out that other solutions can be found in other Soviet republics. We have to stop looking for solutions for all other republics just in Moscow.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you really willing to commit the sacrilege of making a transition to private ownership of producer goods, with the goal of a complete privatization of industry, the enterprise, and, in the end, also of land.

[Abalkin] In the language of the West there is only one alternative: state or private property. But we also know the term, "non-state property," which is not private, for instance collective property. This includes cooperative property, and the stock corporations are also among this.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you willing to recognize private property?

[Abalkin] Yes, among the variety of other forms of property. personal property are cottages, cars, saving assets. Individual ownership, as we call it, of producer goods exists among peasants; shares also belong to this, but not the stock corporations.

[DER SPIEGEL] What if a stock corporation belongs to only one share-holder....

[Abalkin] ...according to the law, there must be at least two share-holders; thus it is collective property.

[DER SPIEGEL] You are a good Marxist. Karl Max saw the stock corporations as an element of socialized production, with private acquisition.

[Abalkin] I think that he expressed this in a more subtle way: The stock corporations constitute the abolition of capital as private property within the limits of the capitalist way of production.

This brings me to the consideration whether the great importance of stock corporations in the West is not a factor which no longer permits it to call them capitalist societies in the traditional sense? If Marx had analyzed today's modern structures in the West and not those of the 19th century, he probably would have drawn completely different conclusions.

[DER SPIEGEL] You are the member of a party which has just again expressed its support of the "communist perspective."

[Abalkin] I do not agree with this statement in the CPSU program documents. The question of a communist perspective can only be the topic of the scientific discussions. However, a political party cannot proclaim something to be its goal which has not yet been proved by science. It is certainly possible that in the course of scientific research, the possibilities of a different perspective are proved.

[DER SPIEGEL] In any case, your own next perspective is a social, democratic welfare state with a functioning market economy?

[Abalkin] I am always looking for a term for this concept, which might correspond in its depth and conciseness to what Ludwig Erhard invented. I mean the social market economy. I would just add a few letters: socialist market economy. But this does not quite express the idea, either.

[DER SPIEGEL] When will there be the last plan for the abolition of the planned economy?

[Abalkin] Never. France is now implementing the 10th economic plan. Life there is not bad. But this is a completely different plan. Ask me about the abolition of the existing administrative-bureaucratic plan system.

[DER SPIEGEL] When will the central control organ, the State Planning Commission "Gosplan," disappear?

[Abalkin] Soon. The current chairman of the State Planning Commission, Juriy Maslyukov, got to know the Ministry of FRG Economics Minister Haussmann during a visit to the FRG. After his return to the Soviet Union he said: We abolish our State Planning Commission and, in its place, we establish an economics ministry. As a result, his employees wanted to start a hunger strike.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Abalkin, when will the shelves in the shops be full?

[Abalkin] This could be done overnight or within one month, like in Poland. One can get everything there now, one can easily buy a house or exchange dollars. But there are 600,000 unemployed people, the production volume has declined by 30 percent. This is possible because the government has a high prestige; this is a government of social concord.

[DER SPIEGEL] What would happen in Russia if you made the transition to the market economy in one stroke?

[Abalkin] Such considerations are simply terrible. This would lead to the unification of all opponents of perestroyka, of all conservative forces in the country, to the relapse of our country into the time of about 10 years ago.

The question of "when" is linked with the question "for which price." If we do not want to pay too high a price, it takes longer until we can cover the demand of the masses. We do not want to endanger perestroyka itself; we must not give the conservative forces any chance. Therefore, this task cannot be solved within one month, but, perhaps, in one-and-a-half or two years.

[DER SPIEGEL] When will there be competing enterprises in the Soviet Union, which determine the prices of their goods independently.

[Abalkin] The market will be established at the beginning of next year, 1991.

[DER SPIEGEL] Leonid Ivanovich, thank you for this talk.

Soviet Germans Meet on 'Restoration' of Autonomy

LD1608213390 Moscow TASS in English 2121 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Lev Aksenov, Sergey Ryabikin]

[Text] Moscow August 17 TASS—Speakers in heated discussions at the third extraordinary congress of All-Union Society of Soviet Germans "revival" here are unanimous that only the restoration of German autonomy in the Soviet Union would make it possible to preserve the people whose ancestors had settled in Russia more than two centuries ago.

Many speakers say that the sluggishness of federal authorities in working out a solution to the problem of Soviet Germans has become the main cause of their growing emigration to West Germany: 45,000 Germans left the Soviet Union over the first four months of the current year alone.

Judging by everything many ethnic Germans lost any hope for a solution of their problems in the USSR. Literally every speaker on Thursday suggested that the Revival Society should tackle an organised depature of Soviet Germans abroad. The recently-proposed idea to form an extra-territorial association of Soviet Germans, with the rights of an autonomous republic to be granted to it, has been strongly criticised at the conference.

"Calls for an organised departure have quite real ground," Genrikh Grout, co-chairman of the Revival Society, told TASS. "Emigration is gaining in scope, since people lose any hope for the restoration of autonomy, for the restoration of justice. I have only per cent [as received] of this hope left but I want to call on people thinking like me to continue efforts towards the attainment of our main goal—autonomy."

Western Border Checkpoints 'Back to Normal'

LD1608162290 Moscow TASS in English 1530 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—The situation on Soviet western borders is back to normal following a three week glut at several checkpoints. The rush came after the government said it would ban travel by temporary exit permits, a Soviet customs spokesman told TASS today.

The July 20 government order, changing regulations for Soviet citizens travelling to East European countries, spawned five seven-kilometer tailbacks [lines] at checkpoints in Brest, Mostiska, Chop Vadul-Siret, Uzhgorod, and Lazdijai.

In a last-ditch attempt to cross the Soviet border before the August 10 deadline set by the government for those allowed to travel by special inserts to ordinary passports expired, people nearly stormed checkpoints.

On some days, customs officials in Brest processed more than 30,000 tourists, twice their maximum capacity.

Tensions were relieved only when the government announced that those who have inserts issued before August 1 would be able to exit any time, while the pass was still valid.

Problems, Tasks of Border Guards Assessed

90UF0423A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 90 First Edition p 6

[Interview with border troops commanders by correspondent Yu. Samsonov; place and date not given: "Conversation on a Topical Issue": "The Border of Today"]

[Text] **Participating in this conversation are: Lieutenant General V.K. Gaponenko, commander of the Baltic district border troops; Lieutenant General A.G. Viktorov, commander of the northwest district border troops; Lieutenant Colonel A.P. Popov, commander of a border guards detachment; and Lieutenant Colonel V.I. Rogozhkin, deputy commander of a border guards detachment political section.**

[Samsonov] What is the current situation on the border?

[Gaponenko] It has become very difficult in the Baltic border district to fulfill the assignments given to us by the government.

The leaders of the republics try incessantly to take over our duties. We keep submitting our categorical protests in this respect. According to Article 73 of the USSR Constitution the duty of securing the borders belongs to the Soviet Union. And the atmosphere in which our soldiers have to live and execute their duties is far from being rosy.

We are putting up a considerable effort trying to use a dialogue and to get some constructive decisions both with the Supreme Soviet and local soviets of the republics and with their public organizations; we actively cooperate with their Communists.

[Viktorov] The situation in the country is very complicated and the border reflects it, as if in a mirror. In our area—the northwest—economic relations with neighboring countries such as Finland or Norway, for instance, have especially intensified. The number of tourists is increasing. Now the border guards face problems they could not even imagine before.

The volume of economic problems related to the border service has increased considerably, especially where it concerns the developing trade in the border and coastal areas. We are revising the role the border guards play in the system of ecological protection of the country and in conducting ecological policies at the border itself.

But the tasks are not the only problem. The people that we receive now have changed in many ways. They have become more interesting and more complex. They bring with them the entire gamut of ideas typical of their native places. Therefore, we cannot use our old methods when working with them and training them.

[Popov] Our detachment guards a section of our border with the PRC. After the Soviet-Chinese summit meetings the atmosphere in our region changed drastically. I would say it has become warmer and more friendly. But the volume of work has definitely increased. The volume of cargo traffic, for instance, increased tenfold in just one year. The mutual understanding between the border representatives of the USSR and the PRC improved and the number of border violations decreased. All this is a definite result of the new foreign policy course taken by our government. The border guards support and approve such a policy.

[Samsonov] The main guiding document for the border troops is the Law "On the State Borders of the USSR." How does it work under the new conditions?

[Viktorov] I think that we have not implemented the law in full measure yet. And it provides us with every possibility to get our tasks done. A new concept of border protection is being designed now which is based on the law and serves to develop it further. However, certain provisions of the law need some revision.

[Gaponenko] I would like to support Aleksandr Grigoryevich. The Law "On the State Borders of the USSR" was adopted comparatively recently and a lot more needs to be done to implement it. Another reason is that so many new things have entered our life lately that some of the items already need better interpretation. For instance, protecting the border after the cuts in border zones, letting people and cargo through the checkpoints, and protecting the border together with the countries of East Europe.

[Rogozhkin] If we have such conditions that the legal mechanism cannot function in general, then the law on the borders cannot be fully operational either. Let me give you an example. To simplify the procedure of crossing the border we need to improve the conditions at the existing checkpoints and to build new ones. And the corresponding decisions have been taken "on top." But those who should do it are in no hurry to act. I mean the local authorities, the Union ministries, for instance, the Ministry of Civil Aviation or Ministry of Automotive Transportation. We are simplifying the procedure, but for that we need passport check stalls, at least. We do not have them, and the checkpoints create traffic jams. The local residents complain to us, but it is the local authorities or interested agencies that should equip the checkpoints.

[Samsonov] Speaking of the local residents, what are your relations with them under the new conditions? We got used to the slogan: "The border is guarded by the entire nation."

[Popov] Recently, our detachment initiated a proposal to the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet suggesting facilitating the people's access to the border area. They opened the cities of Panfilov and Tekeli. We got more work out of that, but it improved our relationship with the local population—that and also making our subunits accessible to the local residents. To show that the prestige of the border guards is quite high among the local population, I just want to mention that two of our officers were elected to the local governing bodies.

[Rogozhkin] In our detachment, 36 people were nominated and 26 of them became deputies.

[Samsonov] You have mentioned here cuts in the border zones. Is this measure always viewed positively by the civilians?

[Popov] There is no one single answer to this. Look at our sector. The people have their traditions, their psychology, their relations, their traditional burial places—and it has become a border area. As you know, people get annoyed by any restrictions. But it might be different also. We have a "Krasny Vostok" collective farm there, and there is a big orchard near its center. The farmers are categorically against removing the border zone. We know from experience that once the border zone is removed crime rises three or four times. So this problem cannot be resolved in the same way everywhere.

[Samsonov] Now they talk a lot about depoliticizing the Armed Forces, the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. What do the border guards think about this?

[Gaponenko] The Army never was and never will be outside politics. And that includes the border troops. As for the political officers, you can ask any commander at any level and you will hear the same answer: We need the political officers.

[Rogozhkin] Political sectors should be state-legal bodies; they should cooperate with party and Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] organizations without ruling them. And through this cooperation they should resolve the same problems but do it from the position of a real military body. We cannot talk of de-partyization when 98 percent of our officers are CPSU members. Our detachment, by the way, has created a council of youth organizations. It includes the leaders of informal groups from our servicemen and the secretary of the Komsomol organization. They work together, and if 46-47 percent of our new recruits do not belong to the Komsomol, about 80 percent of them are Komsomol members when they are ready to leave the Army.

[Viktorov] It seems to me that we are trying to run in front of the train, as they say. The multiparty system so far exists only in declarations. Other parties still have to gain the trust of the people. And the Communists do not have to provide favorable conditions for their work.

[Popov] We conducted a poll. Almost all of the border subunit commanders said they could not work without the political officers. To depoliticize the troops means to ruin them from the ideological point of view and to bring about chaos.

As you can see, there is a sufficient number of problems at the border. And the border troops are trying to resolve them by all possible means. But they need help. We should not only protect our borders, we should also care for them.

Kalugin Discusses Disclosure of State Secrets

90UF0416A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 18 Jul 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin by journalists Leonid Zagalskiy and Oleg Moroz; place and date not given: "At the Cost of Generals Stripes"]

[Text] [Moroz] And so you were deprived of your military rank and all of your awards. What do you think about this decision?

[Kalugin] I consider it unfair and severe. As I understand it, it was also illegal since it was made arbitrarily, without an investigation or trial, and without granting me the opportunity to present my arguments or defend myself in any way. That is, I was actually stripped of my rank and awards because of a statement in the press. I committed no action that could have qualified as a state crime.

[Moroz] One could probably get the idea that you disclosed some state or official secret. Just take the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee according to which no law enforcement organ has the right to keep any negative information about individuals from the nomenklatura in party and soviet organs—such information is to be destroyed immediately. You mentioned these instructions several times and they are probably highly secret.

[Kalugin] Yes, they are absolutely secret and technically I did not have the right to discuss them. But I think there are laws and then there are laws. On the one hand there are moral norms and state laws which should be based on these norms. And on the other there are laws of the department, laws of the job, and, finally, laws of the mafia if you will. In this case I disclosed a secret document which in my view was immoral and illegal. It contradicts the Constitution. I know some real state secrets and I would never reveal them. But when it comes to the interests of any group, department, or mafia—here I consider myself free.

[Moroz] Along with you, punishment was probably meted out to the workers of Glavlit [Main Administration for Protection of State Secrets in the Press] who disclosed such an important state secret which caused irreparable harm to the rogues of the nomenklatura.

[Kalugin] I know nothing about that.

[Zagalskiy] How will that look technically—that certain bureaucrats come to you and demand that you return your medals.

[Kalugin] That I do not know....

[Moroz] There was no preliminary examination of your transgressions?

[Kalugin] Absolutely none.

[Moroz] You learned from the newspapers that you had been stripped of your rank and awards?

[Kalugin] I learned of it from the BBC. It was on a Saturday at my dacha.

[Moroz] So you listen to the voice of the enemy?

[Kalugin] I have that failing. True, to be precise, they called me from the KGB the night before—the first time since I had gone on vacation—and ordered me to come to the committee. I cannot rule out the idea that they wanted to accuse me of the sanctions at that time. But I said that I did not want anything to do with the present KGB leadership, which had publicly defamed me in PRAVDA, and that the only way to get me there would be through force; I would never go of my own will.

[Moroz] Is our conversation being monitored now? (Our discussion took place in O.D. Kalugin's apartment.—author)

[Kalugin] In this room? I doubt it. It is a difficult operation to install microphones. It requires the cooperation of the neighbors. Nothing is that simple. You have to drill some holes.

[Zagalskiy] Do you think they listen in on your telephone?

[Kalugin] I not only think so; I know that for sure. Because all I have to do is call someone, especially a KGB worker, past or present, or they can call me and literally within two or three hours there will be an official phone call to the person with whom I was speaking saying something like: "You know Oleg Danilovich... Bear in mind that you must be very careful when communicating with him...." That is, they are trying to intimidate and warn people.

[Moroz] So they have you "under surveillance." How do you feel about this?

[Kalugin] It is all right. I have been "under surveillance" many times. When I was working in America, for example. Only there it was an alien surveillance.

[Moroz] We had no warning phone calls after we agreed to a meeting with you.

[Kalugin] This does not apply to journalists—they warn their coworkers. Most of all they are afraid that others will follow my example. I think this is the reason for such hasty punitive action against me.

[Zagalskiy] What kind of pension did you receive?

[Kalugin] Three hundred fifty rubles.

[Zagalskiy] Did you have any benefits?

[Kalugin] My benefits—20 square meters more than the usual amount of dwelling space. Additionally, all military servicemen, at least those in the KGB, are given a 50-percent discount on their rent. This depends on their position.

[Zagalskiy] And a government dacha?

[Kalugin] I had a government dacha when I worked in the committee apparatus. After I went into the reserve I gave it up. The medical service was excellent; there was a special section for generals in the KGB polyclinic and hospital. These institutions exist in all the large cities and the capitals of the Union republics. Grocery orders... Off-premises trade... Of course, all of this was not of the highest class. This is not under the administration of affairs of the Central Committee or Moscow Gorkom [City Party Committee].

[Zagalskiy] Now they have taken all this away from you?

[Kalugin] Of course.

[Zagalskiy] And the pension?

[Kalugin] I will not have a general's pension. I do not know if I will have a soldier's pension or not. As you know, at one time Petr Grigorenko was demoted from a general to a soldier and assigned a soldier's pension—R12. I was not demoted but stripped of my military rank. Maybe there is a legal distinction, but I still do not know what it is.

[Moroz] Do you intend to protest?

[Kalugin] Yes, of course. I intend to consult with a legal expert. Moreover people's deputies are offering to help me.

[Moroz] You said in an interview that you expect a vengeful reaction to your disclosures from the KGB but you assume it will still take civilized forms. Did you expect precisely this reaction?

[Kalugin] No, I did not expect this reaction. It seemed to me that this sort of thing was over with—all this was already a part of the past. In our Gorbachevian times this is no longer possible: Somehow we have achieved something during the past five years, the country has received a respite and it could speak out. But as it turned out there are limits to glasnost and there are closed zones.

[Moroz] It seems to me that you came under the reactionary wave raised by the Russian party congress.

[Kalugin] Yes, that is the second aspect. I think the president's decision on the sanctions against me was dictated to a significant degree by his desire not to irritate the right-wing conservative circles who see criticism of the Army and the KGB as one of the main signs of the collapse of the state and the entire system.

[Zagalskiy] Do you think that Gorbachev was unable to be firm?

[Kalugin] Why would he want to have a falling out with Kryuchkov? He has plenty of enemies there anyway.

[Moroz] After Yeltsin, Gdlyan, and Ivanov you were one of the martyrs of perestroyka. But they were protected by the people. Will the people protect you? It seems to me that when resorting to such hasty and inappropriate repressive measures, among other things, they hoped that the people would not rise to the defense of a KGB worker regardless of who he may be, so great was the people's hatred for this organ.

[Kalugin] I would say that they were counting on that. I do not know whether they were right or not. I feel support from people these days. They are inclined to regard me simply as a person who has been unjustly punished rather than as a former employee of some department. I receive telegrams from many people whom I have never met in person and I do not even know where they got my address. Their words convey compassion and approval. I think the negative attitude toward the KGB will only become stronger after these actions. I know there will be the corresponding inquiries in the Supreme Soviets—both Union and Russian.

[Moroz] How do you intend to support yourself in life without a pension?

[Kalugin] I will work. I still have strength—after all, I am only 55. Now I have been working for three months as a consultant for the Association for the Development of Information Technologies. It was created within the framework of the Academy of Sciences. Velikhov is chairman of its board of trustees. They pay me R600. So you see it is possible to live.

[Moroz] After the president's ukase I am not sure that Velikhov will not want to fire you. In my opinion he is not the kind of person who would stick up for you.

[Kalugin] I admit that they might be frightened and ask me not to create additional difficulties for them with my presence.

[Moroz] There are rumors that you are Ustinov's brother-in-law. Is this true?

[Kalugin] These rumors are greatly exaggerated. My wife is the daughter of the former chief of the Leningrad branch of the Military-Political Academy imeni Lenin, Colonel Ivanov. We met in the eighth grade and have been married for 37 years.

[Moroz] Many people, especially among the intelligentsia, live in fear of a conspiracy and a revolt directed against democracy. How great is this danger? Do you think it is possible that there is a conspiracy or plot against Gorbachev similar to the one that was organized in October 1964 against Khrushchev and in which, as you know, an active role was played by then KGB Chairman Semichastnyy?

[Kalugin] Theoretically it is possible. But practically, knowing the current leadership of the committee, particularly Kryuchkov, I do not think the chance of this is very great. Kryuchkov is by nature, if one may put it this way, an assistant. All his life he has been someone's assistant. Mainly Andropov's. As chief of the KGB office he mainly did paperwork and did not make any decisions. Then he became chief of intelligence. And he was considered to be the assistant to the chairman for intelligence: Again no independent decisions came from him. I remember that whenever you went to him with some case he would immediately get on the direct line to Andropov: "Yuriy Vladimirovich, here is this situation.... What do you think? What should we do?" Andropov would explain to him what to do and he would calmly convey it to me. This is the kind of style, the kind of psychology he has retained in the chairman's post.

He will be with the strong person, the one who has the real power. Today he could be with Gorbachev and tomorrow with someone else if he feels that the other person is stronger.

[Zagalskiy] And with whom will the KGB stand?

[Kalugin] On the one hand, of course, with whomever Kryuchkov chooses. But on the other... In the KGB there are now very strong critical attitudes both with respect to the country's leadership and with respect to the leadership of the committee. They were not this strong even a month ago.

[Moroz] Critical attitudes—from the left or from the right?

[Kalugin] From the left. Young workers—by young I mean people under 40—think the KGB needs deep reforms and that it should be a different organization from what it has been up to this time. True, the older ones hold mainly more conservative views.

[Moroz] And if a conspiracy develops somewhere outside the KGB? Say, in the Army? Is the KGB oriented to prevent such attempts?

[Kalugin] No. Of course the KGB is also working in the Army but it has never been assigned such tasks. Of course if someone lets it slip that something is in the making somewhere, the KGB will not pass it by, but nobody is especially assigned to this kind of work.

[Moroz] But still do you think that meeting at football games or hunting, as was the case in 1964, people could come up with some kind of collective plot?

[Kalugin] I admit this is possible. That same General Makashov, when speaking at the Russian party congress, blurted out the position that is also held both by many highly placed military people and by many in the KGB leadership.

[Moroz] That is terrible.

[Kalugin] It is terrible. And this is why IZVESTIYA wrote that this general should retire. And if he did not, the president should fire him.

[Moroz] Instead of that he stripped you of your rank.

[Kalugin] It seems to me that the people will understand this simply: The president is afraid of the Army and the KGB.

[Moroz] One of the significant tasks currently facing the KGB, as I understand it, is the fight against organized crime. Yet we have not heard of any special successes here. From time to time there are individual reports about nabbing small groups of bandit-extortionists, mainly dealing with the population and cooperators but not only them. And yet everyone is saying that in the country there are powerful criminal groups, including some that are in with the authorities. Should fighting against them not fall within the sphere of the activity of the KGB? But now it is not clear not only what the scope of their activity is, but also in general how seriously the KGB takes this task, in which cases it becomes involved in resolving it, and what volume of work it takes for itself....

[Kalugin] The KGB has created a subdivision for fighting organized crime. This was done last year. Unfortunately, these subdivisions are largely powerless because they do not know their "subject." Anyway it would be better for these cases to be handled by the militia. They have more experience with and knowledge of a certain contingent. I know that many members of the committee do not wish to engage in this work; they think that fighting organized crime is a matter for the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Therefore I do not anticipate any significant results. People everywhere are talking about the mafia, the shadow economy, and the hidden millions, but there is no real proof available. Look and you will see that all the ethnic disturbances have been accompanied by declarations that somebody is behind the troublemakers. But there is not a single fact! Give the name, bring the person to court, if you have proof—this is the direct work of the KGB. But if not, then there is nothing!

[Moroz] Are the functions of the KGB within the country changing now to some extent? Readers frequently express uneasiness in their letters: Is the previous practice of listening in on telephone conversations, opening and inspecting mail, and keeping dossiers still continuing?... How do they use the information obtained this way? Can it be used in court, for expelling a person from the party, and so forth?

[Kalugin] All these means are being used fully, just as they have been used in past years. But with the existing judicial practice all materials gathered this way should be legalized. For example, you convey in a letter information or a suggestion which, in the opinion of the KGB, is reprehensible and can serve as evidence. But they cannot say they have confiscated the letter. It is necessary to legalize the situation. So the letter is usually "lost" in the mail; that is, they put into operation an entire system of actions which is outside the individual's field of attention. The same thing is true with listening in on conversations. Their content may be turned over to some KGB agent. The agent holds a conversation for verification without showing that he already knows the viewpoint of the person with whom he is conversing. As a rule, the person expresses the same or approximately the same opinion, and after that everything is easy.

[Zagalskiy] But how can that be corroborated if the conversation took place in person?

[Kalugin] As a rule, three pieces of evidence are sufficient for the court. The KGB has plenty of staff to organize the appropriate documentation. In general this is a "creative" process which requires a certain amount of inventiveness in order for it to look legal.

[Moroz] For a long time in the country there were organizations and groupings of a fascist leaning. They have become active in recent weeks. For example, in January-February there were widespread rumors about preparations for Jewish pogroms. "These are all rumors. We know nothing about them. If you learn something, report it to us," the KGB workers say (we heard this announcement with our own ears on the radio on 9 February).

Rumors... discussions... something not material. But no, there is also something tangible here—many people have applied to leave the country and others are about to. The people who leave are usually highly skilled—without a profession or skills there is nothing for them to do "over there." This is causing irreparable harm to the state. In brief, we are faced with large-scale sabotage (not to say actual trampling on human rights). Where is the KGB?

[Kalugin] This is a serious problem. Unfortunately, neither the country's leadership nor the KGB as a constituent element of it has been able to do anything significant to prevent the outflow of brain power. It would seem that there should be a large number of ways of dispelling the fears. Even through the mass media it should be possible to inform each citizen that any case of ethnic harassment will be mercilessly punished. For there is a law and the way it works has been demonstrated many times with real cases. Take that same scandal in the Central House of Literary Scholars. How it was investigated! The same old dragging of feet. I am sure it is possible to placate people and, of course, reinforce everything with legislative measures. But this is not being done!

[Moroz] How does the KGB feel about the Pamyat Society?

[Kalugin] Pamyat presents no danger to the authorities. Left-wing organizations are of much more danger to the authorities. Of course they have "their" people in Pamyat as well. But everything is in order there: They are monitoring and observing. Moreover, "their" people, knowing whose support and protection they have, can also exceed their instructions. And nobody will condemn them for this.

[Moroz] Speaking at the February plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, V.A. Kryuchkov said that perhaps we should not carry out perestroyka so quickly: "...Should we not make a more fundamental evaluation of the point of development we have now reached? Perhaps even stop in some way or at least calculate our steps forward better?" And then followed the sentence: "Of course we need perestroyka, but..." Does this not mean that the KGB is finding it difficult to find its place in the present day (I would compare it with rafters going over rapids)?

[Kalugin] This is precisely it. I will tell you more: Today's KGB leaders, with few exceptions, bear full responsibility for the injustice, if you will, for the crimes against our society and against our people that were perpetrated during the seventies and the beginning of the eighties. All of these leaders are in their places. Only one of them recently stepped down as deputy procurator general—Ivan Pavlovich Abramov. They let one of their watchdogs go. This is the person who organized all the persecutions of dissidents and cultural figures, beginning with Solzhenitsyn, Tarkovskiy, Lyubimov, and Aksenov, and ending with thousands of others who were more modest and less well-known. They all had the psychology of the Brezhnev school and perhaps that of the Stalin school. Nostalgia for those times is an organic condition for them, it is their way of thinking and living. How can they speak seriously about perestroyka?

[Moroz] I assume that you will not take exception to the idea that among the people there is widespread hatred of the KGB alternating with fear. What do you think should be done with this organization in order to change this attitude—restructure it, divide it into two organizations like the CIA and the FBI, reduce it, refocus it, or eliminate it completely? That is for the organizational side of the matter. But there is also a moral side. Does it not seem to you that the KGB should repent—give a public assessment both to the crimes of their predecessors during Stalinist times and to their own recent activity under Brezhnev?

[Kalugin] I shall begin with the latter: Indeed, repentance and purification are needed first. And whether or not there will be forgiveness will depend on this. Forgiveness from the people. But so far there has been neither repentance nor purification—so what kind of forgiveness can there be? The people's attitude toward the KGB is the same as it has been for many years.

As concerns reforms, I think the KGB should be fully depoliticized—in the sense that it should not be an instrument of the party or the country's leadership. It should be in all ways equal to other law enforcement organs—the militia, the procuracy, and so forth. It should have no privileges. Further, I think the KGB should be deprived of many of its functions of authority which make it politically dangerous. What will this require? In the first place, I would single out intelligence and I would place it under the president. This is an independent organ and it is not mixed up in any questionable internal affairs. Second, I would reduce the size of the organs at least by half. Today they are much larger than they were before the war....

[Moroz] That is, larger than that same NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] which carried out those monstrous repressions....

[Kalugin] Of course. It would seem that we have moved far away from that time so long ago—why do we need such a large apparatus? It is not doing us any good! Third, we must fully eliminate the system of political investigation. Reports on people because of their political beliefs or divergent views—which still exist—should be completely eliminated. This is immoral. I have nothing against having assistants and agents—no police organization has ever done without them—but all this should be determined by the laws and firmly established norms. It is permissible to use them in intelligence activity, in fighting organized crime and espionage... That is, where state security really is a factor. But when it comes to political opponents, this should be forbidden once and for all.

Further, I would remove all of the investigative apparatus from the KGB. There should not be separate investigations in the militia, the procuracy, and the KGB—there should be one single investigation. The border troops are another aspect. Why not combine them with the customs and make a main administration for border and customs control? And in our future common European home why do we need these hundreds of thousands of people in green caps stationed in the mountains and forests and in the ice-covered areas. What are they protecting? After all, spies no longer come across the Bering Straits or the North Pole.... Nor across our southern borders. There are nomads, some misguided profligates.... But mainly they are Soviet citizens. So the border troops exist not really to prevent a foreign threat, but to prevent our compatriots from fleeing. I know the figures for crossing in both directions. What else? We must eliminate institutions that engage in preparation and dissemination of disinformation within the country and abroad. This is dangerous business. It flourished under the conditions of Stalinism and exists to this day.

Finally, one more point: The KGB has at its disposal potential means which could cause harm to people's health and life. This potential was created under Stalin but it still exists in full. Why does it exist? For what purposes? In order to murder political opponents?

[Moroz] Are these means really being used?

[Kalugin] I do not know of any cases in the past two or three years, but before that they were. These are psychotropic and other means of making a person incapable of functioning and making him a cripple. And, if necessary, they can completely get rid of him. Further. The question of archives. I would immediately open up all the archives through 1954 inclusively—the Yezhov-Berdiyev-Stalin archives should be turned over to historians. Let them straighten it all out. I think the later archives should also be opened up, even if gradually and selectively.

[Zagalskiy] ARGUMENTY I FAKTY recently printed some questions from readers and answers from the KGB press center. Among other answers there was the assertion that outside informers are not paid; there is no such item of expenditures; they only help and sometimes they receive, say, an apartment; they are allowed by buy a car, and so forth. It this true?

[Kalugin] That is nonsense. As first deputy chief of the Leningrad KGB administration I myself signed financial vouchers in which we paid for services rendered by these people. It is another matter that these are relatively small sums of R20-30 a month. That is one kind of payment. For others the payment is not regular—it might be, say, once a quarter. But they are paid. And as for assistance, this is actually mandatory. Obtaining an apartment or getting a pass... This is a kind of material incentive.

[Zagalskiy] It is thought that almost all the prostitutes working for hard currency are employed by the KGB....

[Kalugin] No, that is not true. The KGB regularly takes advantage of the services of prostitutes. Most often they use higher-class women who are "placed" with someone—for instance, an ambassador or military attache. But prostitutes are drawn more to the militia than the KGB.

[Moroz] When I was in Lithuania I repeatedly heard that they are sending certain groups to this republic to organize provocations and disturbances and to arouse feelings of mistrust and so forth in the people. Is there any basis for these rumors? What tasks are set for the KGB with respect to Lithuania and other republics where certain undesirable events are in the making or taking place? Why do you think the bloody events in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia were not avoided?

[Kalugin] I cannot say anything about Lithuania since I was on vacation during the time of the events in Lithuania. But I can speak about the approach to this kind of situation as a whole. In the first place, the KGB never was oriented for working in these situations. In the second place, one must take into account the unique positions of the state security committees in the national republics: Many of them, especially in places where the people's fronts are strong, have joined with the leaders of these organizations, whether it be in the Baltic republics, Azerbaijan, or certain other republics. For this reason the USSR KGB sent very large groups of workers from the central staff—hundreds of people—to all the main hot spots of the republics. But their role absolutely does not correspond to the nature of the events taking place there—they are simply helpless. Imagine: A group of Russians has come, say, to Azerbaijan. The backbone of the local committee is made up of Azerbaijanis. They work with the population and know the ways and customs, not to mention the language. Those who have arrived there inevitably end up in isolation. Their work is absolutely ineffective. They are simply bored to death from inactivity.

Providing for security by sending mass quantities of personnel is typical of the Soviet system. Not intelligence but numbers. Send people and have them report to the Central Committee: "We have taken measures!"—"Ah, you have taken measures? Excellent." Everyone is satisfied. Or go into the KGB building during a crisis situation. Say the Tbilisi or Baku events. The entire committee is spending the night in their offices. They sleep on the couches and hideaway beds. Why is this done? As though this makes things easier in Baku or Sumgait or Fergana... It is simply an inability to organize the work which requires operational skills and the courage to make decisions. And, if you will, the incompetence of our party leaders, from whom taking measures means some mass actions, a call for action, and a declaration... But here we need an intelligent approach, especially when solving ethnic problems, and we must actually prevent the spilling of blood. We must find certain forces on which we can rely, with which we can join and oppose the extremists and isolate them. For the KGB has everything necessary—power, people, technical equipment. Nothing of the kind has happened. They are absolutely not coping with the domestic political situation. But when it is necessary to tweak someone's nose—Kalugin's or someone else's—they are very quick to do that.

Economic

Status of USSR-IMF Contacts Reviewed

90UF0424A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report on interviews with Fred Fuers, founder of the Fuers Foundation; Ed Hewitt, economist at the Brookings Institute and editor in chief of SOVIET ECONOMICS; and Boris Milner, doctor of economic science and first deputy director of the Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by V. Romanyuk; place and date not given: "The Ruble in a Hard-Currency World"]

[Text] The results of international competition on the problems of convertibility of the Soviet ruble were summed up recently in the United States. The competition was organized by the "Fuers Foundation" and sponsored by the Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the American Esalen Institute. The terms of the competition called for a plan containing the best realistic way to accomplish the task, taking into account the situation which has taken shape in the USSR—with the consumer market, monetary circulation, and foreign economic ties.

Renowned scholars were among the members of the international jury—V. Leontyev, Nobel Prize laureate in economics; Professor A. Krueger, International Monetary Fund adviser; and Professor D. Brada from the state of Arizona. Soviet specialists included Academician A. Aganbegyan, N. Petrakov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and I. Ivanov and B. Milner, doctors of economic science.

Of 600 entries arriving from 23 countries, a selection was made of the six best which will comprise the basis for discussion of a unified concept at the international conference coming this fall in Leningrad. Arriving in Moscow to prepare for this conference was the well-known American businessman and lawyer Fred Fuers, founder of the Fuers Foundation, and one of the judges, Ed Hewett, a leading economist at the Brookings Institute and editor in chief of the magazine SOVIET ECONOMICS (a U.S. publication).

[Romanyuk] Why did you decide to begin with the problem of convertibility?

[Fuers] I think this problem must be solved simultaneously with others. I would recommend that President Gorbachev establish a national commission on the problems of converting the ruble. That is what we would do in the United States.

[Romanyuk] And do you know in fact how we can accomplish convertibility?

[Fuers] The most important thing is to accomplish this with minimal loss for society. No single entry we received contained a complete answer—each has its pluses and minuses. We want to discuss them at the conference with the participation of U.S. and USSR scholars from all 15 republics. How do we know we will not have to get involved with converting not one but several currencies at once?!

[Romanyuk] Could you tell us the most interesting ideas contained in the entries submitted?

[Fuers] We who comprise the international board of judges agreed that we would not divulge publicly our personal opinions on the quality of the entries or the concepts themselves. We will discuss them at the conferences in Leningrad and Moscow.

[Romanyuk] Well, we have quite enough conferences it seems....

[Hewitt] True! But these two will have their own specific orientation—Leningrad will be a gathering of scholars and businessmen, and Moscow a more narrow circle of specialists. It is important that we select the strong elements of the proposed concepts and construct a strategy. I agree with you—convertibility is the result of reform but at the same time its key problem.

[Romanyuk] As I understand it, it is primarily the conditions under which the ruble is freely converted into other currencies. What conditions do you see as being foremost?

[Hewitt] Reform of price formation first of all. This must assist in currency stabilization. In addition, we must bring monetary issue under strict control.

[Romanyuk] V. Leontyev has advocated a revision of prices at the outset in directive fashion, in order to eliminate overt disproportions, and only then engage the market mechanism. How do you view this idea?

[Hewitt] I agree with V. Leontyev. Prices must be brought closer to world prices. But more important still, the question of ownership must be resolved.

[Fuers] You must recognize private ownership. Ninety-five percent of your enterprises fall under state ownership. It is impossible to move toward the market this way.

[Hewitt] Or take the credit-finance system. If I want to start a business but cannot obtain credit I won't get anywhere. Your banks are monopolistic giants for the most part which only redistribute money.

[Romanyuk] Certain economists are proposing introduction of a system of parallel currencies, ordinary and market, or retention of a "two-layered" economy: administrative regulators operating in one "layer" and market regulators in the other.

[Hewitt] I believe this version would result in the administrative system stifling the healthy sprouts of the market economy.

[Romanyuk] But if we all of a sudden relinquish USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], USSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], and other economic departments, there will be chaos....

[Hewitt] You already have chaos. But administrative chaos is the worst kind. A market cannot be established using administrative methods, it must grow on its own. And for the market to grow, a market environment is required—a stable currency and legislation permitting private ownership. You need competition and legal order overall.

[Romanyuk] Hasn't your Western economy taken the best from our planned system of management?

[Fuers] The United States has a regulated market economy. Any economy has to be regulated. The question is—by what methods. It is important that the market not turn into a Russian bazaar.

[Romanyuk] And what procedure should be followed in taking steps?

[Hewett] You must change the system of administrative management, get rid of the branch ministries. Then stabilize the ruble, stop printing "empty" money and tie up "hot" money to the extent possible. Simultaneously, you have to establish a securities market and issue shares, develop a system of commercial banks and small business, and introduce free prices to the extent possible. Finally, a system of economic security for business is necessary—this is very important—and also social protection, primarily for those who are the poorest.

[Fuers] You have a great country—you have to believe in yourself. There are no difficulties which cannot be overcome. And I hope some day I will be able to tell my grandchildren that I helped the Russians consolidate faith in themselves. The transition to the market is a risk and there will be inevitable losses. But a reward awaits! The country's leadership has a problem in convincing people of the correctness of this chosen path.

We asked Doctor of Economic Sciences B. Milner, first deputy director of the Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, to comment on the results of the competition.

[Romanyuk] We have now seen the names of the competition winners in the press. What tipped the scales when the prize-winners were being determined?

[Milner] Although not one single entry gives the single, best approach to the problem of convertibility, each of them covers a key issue which is fairly thoroughly worked through, and taken all together they answer the question as to how to accomplish convertibility. The start-off point of the first-prize projects was the premise that a market economy was the only possible path to a convertible ruble; they differed in how this was to be combined with other elements of reform.

The content of the analysis was interesting. Economist F. Holtzman from Taft University (U.S.), for example, identifies three causes of nonconvertibility of our ruble—exchange rate set too high, unreasonable domestic prices, and commodities inconvertibility—and notes with justification that the first cause is a market illness and the other two are illnesses proceeding from a planned economy. This leads us to the conclusion that we must eliminate the commodities inconvertibility by balancing the consumer market.

[Romanyuk] Easy to say!

[Milner] Yes, and complicated to put into effect. But this will enable us to find the currency exchange rate value near the equilibrium level on world markets. Its merits are seen in the project of G. Anulova (Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences) who focused attention on the development of foreign economic activity. Foreign convertibility of the ruble is identified as a priority for the near future. In order to facilitate the export of profits of joint enterprises, it is proposed that a temporary mechanism be created for guaranteed exchange of part of the profit by the Bank of Foreign Economic Relations at auction rates of exchange, by reducing earmarked plan allocations for substituted imports, and by a ruble convertibility fund for small and medium-sized Western enterprises financed by foreign donors. Within the country, in her opinion, we will have to immediately conduct a determined liberalization of settlements in foreign currency and permit the opening of foreign currency resident deposits in all empowered banks, and payment for labor in foreign currency.

[Romanyuk] The press is giving broad coverage to proposals on the introduction of various schemes of parallel currencies—gold chervonets, "marked" money, etc.. How were such proposals by competition participants assessed—certainly there were some?

[Milner] The international board of judges agreed that a new parallel currency would not inevitably lead to convertibility. In addition, all this "parallel," "real," "regional" money, it seems to me, is just a monetary measure requiring the same premises for its convertibility as the ruble itself; their introduction essentially means hidden monetary reform and further weakening of the ruble.

[Romanyuk] Boris Zakharovich, what do you see as the practical result of the competition?

[Milner] We will not necessarily get a final concept but more likely a collection of views, a clarification of positions. Incidentally, the government concept of transition to the convertible ruble will also be promulgated at the Leningrad conference.

[Romanyuk] All the same, how important is convertibility to us today? Under conditions of a falling ruble, a resolution to this problem is seen in very misty perspective. Is all this so urgent today?

[Milner] Under conditions of the Soviet economy, a convertible ruble will help formation of the market and facilitate competition in it, will make domestic prices authentic, help bring USSR production up to world standards, and finally assist in forming a sound foreign economic specialization for the country. Furthermore, also tied to convertibility are opportunities for assimilating new forms of international cooperation, more intensive attraction of foreign capital, and transforming our country into an international investor. Convertibility will without a doubt undermine currency operations of the "shadow" economy and will become a unique type of guarantor of the formation of an open economy.

[Romanyuk] Quite a few economic planners are convinced that convertibility can be introduced by decree—and immediately at that....

[Milner] This is impossible of course. And I will add that convertibility is a multistage process. It cannot be introduced too early otherwise we will end up with a fall in the currency exchange rate, inflation, and loss of control over the market and monetary circulation. Convertibility will put the country into the rigid framework of international competition, and a healthy economy is necessary in order to survive under such circumstances. In any event, we must clearly recognize that there are no precedents with respect to introducing convertibility in a planned economy. This is a category of market economy based on diverse forms of ownership.

Far East Aviation Gets New Passenger Aircraft

OW1708002190 Khabarovsk Television Service in Russian 0910 GMT 13 Aug 90

[From the "Dalniy Vostok" program]

[Text] The Second Khabarovsk Joint Aviation Detachment received a new generation Czechoslovak aircraft. It is a modification of the L-410 which is already well known and which has proven itself in the eastern skies. Last week the new plane completed its first flight on the Khabarovsk-Komsomolsk na Amure- Poliny Osipenko route.

[Correspondent] How is the modification an improvement compared to the old version?

[First pilot] Well, this plane differs first of all in that there is less noise and less vibration, that is the comfort of the passengers is increased. It will also be more comfortable for us because its range is greater than the range of the predecessor L-410UVP. There will be fewer landings, less consumption of fuel. These are the main ways in which the new plane differs from the old.

[Correspondent] Where there are fewer landings there is greater safety, as a rule.

[First pilot] Naturally.

[Second Pilot] This plane is one of the long awaited second generation aircraft. Unlike previous models, it has 19 seats instead of 15 and a greater take-off weight.

[Correspondent] This is your first of the new models. Do you expect any more like it?

[Second Pilot] Yes we are expecting more. We are supposed to receive five of them. We have already received this one. The second one is en route. There are crews in place to bring out the third and fourth. I think that sometime in the next two or three days we will have what for the time being will be the first shipment of aircraft here in place.

Sverdlovsk Cooperative Operates Materials Plant

PM1708104090 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 12 Aug 90

[Report by E. Erkomayshvili and V. Utin from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] Here is a report on the work of the Stroitel Cooperative in Sverdlovsk Oblast.

[Reporter] Young saplings, a fountain, flower beds, metaled roads—it's all such a contrast with the way the Nevyansk Construction Materials Plant, which lacked housing and consumer facilities in the past, used to be. And there was no time to be comfortable what with last year's losses, poor productivity, and low pay. It was then that the leaders of the Sverdlovskstroymaterialy Association took a chance and transferred not a section, not a shop, but the entire plant to cooperative members. And they have been so successful in organizing things that they have organized production of cement and full-cycle processing of wood from the cutting stage to the manufacture of finished products while increasing output of their basic products—bricks and facing tiles. [passage omitted]

Agriciltural

Problems of Gathering Harvest Highlighted

LD1608105990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0800 GMT on 16 August broadcasts a nine-minute report, introduced by announcer Tatyana Nikolayeva, on the country being taken by surprise by the big harvest. She says that less generous harvests have been coped with. "This surprise of 300 million tonnes of bread grain which nature has suddenly handed us turns out to be blighted by shortages," she adds, and goes on to mention the technical backwardness and the lack of help from the towns despite the urgent government resolution.

Nikolajeva hands over to Natalya Vartanyan who conducts a hook-up with Alma-Ata and Stavropol. Viktor Glukhovtsev reports from Alma-Ata that there is a good bread grain harvest but that there is a shortage of fuel, there are few combine harvesters, and few combine harvester drivers. Vartanyan quotes the chairman of the Kazakhstan Agroprom [agro-industrial committee] as saying in SELSKAYA ZHIZN that to date 14,000 combine harvesters have no drivers and that help should come from the town and from drivers from southern areas which have finished the harvest. She suggests Stavropol Kray farmers might help.

Nikolay Shchebalkov reports from Stavropol that they have just finished the harvest and some groups of combine drivers are on their way to North Kazakhstan.

Vartanyan says working terms in the Kazakhstan virgin lands are very good. "Each machine operator receives two or three quintals of grain free up to a tonne of bread grain at state purchase prices; he also keeps 75 percent of his pay from his main job and his return fare is paid, so we hope this appeal from the republic's Agroprom will be responded to by machine operators from other regions of the country," Vartanyan adds.

Glukhovtsev says we have come up against the amoral fact of setting shackling conditions. Some Kuban people have demanded three tonnes of wheat free for each operator. Vartanyan says the conditions are unacceptable for the republic. Today Ukraine operators are demanding 10 percent of their harvested grain free. Glukhovtsev says it is not fair: he remembers times when the whole country would selflessly come to the aid of the Kazakhstan harvest. He goes on to mention the lack of combine harvester accumulators and complains of the tardiness of the manufacturers in Kazakhstan. They have been trying to get the parts from other areas like Vladivostok. Vartanyan says she was surprised to find we even get them from Australia, and they come on time, but the ones in the USSR are late. Glukhovtsev goes on to complain that Rostov and Krasnoyarsk have sent only a third of the combine harvesters ordered, and those are not complete. Lacking reapers and pick-ups, they stand in the machine yards.

Vartanyan now turns to Stavropol Kray where Shchebalkov says the state order has been fulfilled with 2.28 million tonnes of grain having been sent to elevators, including nearly 400,000 tonnes above plan. There are mountains of grain, some lying in the open, and rain has fallen so there is risk of grain spoiling. There are problems with road transport, fuel, lack of rail wagons, long queues at elevators, poor grain cleansing equipment, and a lack of driers. There is a need for small elevators so any farm can keep up to 3,000 tonnes of grain. Asked if any grain has been sold for foreign currency to pay for small elevators, Shchebalkov says that less than 100,000 tonnes has been sold for foreign currency. A tonne of good Stavropol strong grain is only worth 49 convertible rubles while we buy it from abroad for nearly 200 convertible rubles. So our farmers are annoyed at the state for its attitude to our remarkably good grain. Glukhovtsev agrees and says our grain, especially virgin land grain, is not appreciated in spite of its high protein content, and we will cast this grain on the fields and import forage.

Special Harvest Trains 'Often Stand Idle'

LD1608204790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1700 GMT on 16 August on its "Vremya" newscast carries a two-minute report on specialized grain trains [zernovezy]. The report says these trains are the ideal way to transport the harvest by rail, yet there are not enough such trains and they are not being used to full capacity. They often stand idle. In July and August, more than 30,000 railcars of all kinds were "practically" taken out of circulation daily. They could have carried 250,000 tonnes of grain. The daily requirement is for 7,000 grain trains. "Four thousand railcars of grain remain unloaded every day." Yesterday in Uzbekistan, 198 railcars were not unloaded; in Tajikistan, 110 railcars; in Khabarovsk Kray, 194; and so on. Mutual recriminations are common. Since the beginning of the year, fines imposed on enterprises for keeping railcars idle total almost 260 million rubles, but fines merely transfer money from one pocket to another.

Scientific

'Progress M-4' Docks With 'Mir' Station

LD1708071390 Moscow TASS in English 0709 GMT 17 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 17 TASS—The Progress M-4 tanker-transport vehicle linked up with the Mir orbital complex at 9:26 Moscow time [0526 GMT] today.

The search and docking were controlled by automatic on-board systems. The link-up of the spacecraft with the orbiting station was controlled by the Mission Control Center and Cosmonauts Gennadiy Manakov and Gennadiy Strekalov.

Progress M-4 is attached to the complex at the side of the station's air lock. The re-supply vehicle delivered fuel for the joint propulsion unit, food, water, equipment, and mail.

The on-board systems of the Mir orbital station are operating normally, according to telemetry and the crew's reports. Manakov and Strekalov feel well.

'Resurs-F' Earth Satellite Launched 16 Aug

LD1708085990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0810 GMT 17 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow, 17 Aug (TASS)—A routine earth satellite, Resurs-F, was launched in the USSR on 16 August using a Soyuz carrier rocket.

The apparatus installed on the satellite is intended for carrying our multizonal and spectrozonal photography on various scales with the aim of continuing research into the Earth's natural resources in the interests of various sectors of the USSR's national economy, resolving questions of ecology, and international cooperation.

The equipment installed on the satellite is working normally.

When the flight is completed the exposed film will be handed to the Priroda State Research and Production Center of the USSR Chief Directorate of Geodesy and Cartography for processing and for the subsequent distribution of the information obtained to consumers.

Military

Yazov Reported Making Visit To Odessa 14 August

PM1508160890 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 17 Aug 90 p 3

[Reply by F. Zinko to reader's letter under the "Answering All Questions" rubric: "Honoring a Distinguished Visitor?"—first two paragraphs are a reader's letter]

[Text] Something unimaginable happened at our airport 14 August. Flights were cancelled, areas were cordoned off. What was going on?

[Signed] V. Korniyenko, Odessa

Residents of Odessa and visitors to the southern city were kept for a whole hour by the Odessa Airport authorities in the stifling heat of the glass terminal building.

Why? Probably in an attempt to organize a better welcome for a distinguished guest—Marshal D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense. The militia's help was used to cordon off the entire airfield prior to his arrival and all scheduled flights were completely halted.

Commenting on events, V. Sergeyev, commander of the Odessa Aviation Detachment, referred to instructions from the military district commander "which created inconveniences for us also."

Nobody can argue that distinguished visitors merit special honor. Maybe the aircraft should be directed to a separate stand, a carpet should be laid down, limousines and the welcoming party should be allowed direct access to the ramp, and maybe even an orchestra should be called out. But the mind boggles—why should thousands of passengers suffer because of someone else's toadying?

And one more point. A few days ago we published an article entitled "An End to Airborne Privileges" which said that a USSR Council of Ministers resolution had canceled the use of personal aircraft by all except the president, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the USSR foreign minister. Could it be that there are exceptions even to this resolution?

Baltic Republics

Reportage on Lithuanian-RSFSR Negotiations

'Text' of Communique

LD1608123690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 16 Aug 90

["Text" of government communique on negotiations held in Vilnius on 15 August between the governments of the Lithuanian Republic and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and signed by Lithuanian Republic Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene and Ivan Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers—read by announcer Algimantas Sadukas]

[Text] Negotiations took place on 15 August 1990, between the governments of the Lithuanian Republic and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]. The Lithuanian Republic delegation was headed by Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, and the RSFSR delegation was headed by Ivan Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

The primary aim of the negotiations was to develop economic and cultural cooperation between the Lithuanian Republic and the Russian Federation.

The states are of the opinion that the development of this cooperation will assist in increasing the welfare of the residents of both states.

The governments of the Lithuanian Republic and the RSFSR have agreed to carry out this cooperation in accordance with the decisions adopted by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet concerning the states' statehood, in seeking to maintain good-neighborly relations based on mutually beneficial, and equality in economic ties and guidelines.

It was acknowledged during the negotiations that relations between the states will be based upon fundamental principles of international law, while the agreements between the Lithuanian and the Russian Federated republics, as well as the rights and obligations resultant from them, may not be interpreted as the states' inclusion into some type of state union or community [sandrauga].

An agreement has been signed between the Lithuanian Republic and the RSFSR on trade and economic relations during 1991. The states have agreed that it is expedient to prepare an agreement for long-term economic and cultural cooperation.

The communique is signed by Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene and Ivan Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

The communique will be published in the press.

'Equal' Cooperation Noted

LD1608140590 Moscow TASS in English 1356 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius August 16 TASS—Russia and Lithuania will cooperate on an equal basis, to mutual advantage and in line with their sovereignty, as endorsed by their parliaments, a communique on one-day talks here between Russian and Lithuanian Prime Ministers Ivan Silayev and Kazimiera Prunskene said today.

Both sides, stressing the purely bilateral nature of their relationship, declared that agreements between them "cannot be interpreted as their inclusion in any alliance or community of states," according to the document.

They agreed on the need for a long-term economic and cultural cooperation treaty, the draft of which will be prepared by the middle of next year by a joint working group to be set up for the purpose.

A 1991 trade and economic cooperation agreement between Russia and Lithuania, signed two hours before midnight on Wednesday, provides for maintaining this year's level of relations in these fields.

Silayev told reporters before flying out of Vilnius that the talks and agreement were only a first step "to be apparently followed by talks and agreements with other republics."

Gorbunovs Meets Leaders of Free Latvians Group

90UN2509A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 12 Jul 90 p 1

[Communique by the Press Center of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet: "A Meeting Between A. Gorbunovs and the Leadership of the Association of Free Latvians"]

[Text] At a meeting held on 9 July with Gunar Meyerovits, chairman of the Association of Free Latvians of the World, and members of the board of the association, Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Latvia, said: "I feel your firm support, and our parliament welcomes every step you take in the West which brings closer the genuine independence of the Republic of Latvia." G. Meyerovits offered assurances that the association desires to help the Republic of Latvia, and has been doing this in previous years, preventing the world from forgetting the Baltic issue. He described the political activities of the Association of Free Latvians in the USA, Europe, and Australia as being particularly important at present, and stressed the significance of contacts with the Nordic Council which could come out in favor of Baltia taking part in the work of the CSCE with observer status.

While discussing the issue of further cooperation by Latvia with foreign specialists of Latvian extraction, G. Meyerovits recalled recent sanctions against N. Embrekt and J. Ritenis.

A. Gorbunovs said: "The public consideration of the Embrekt case in parliament gives us hope that in the future such cases will be ruled out. Prime Minister I. Godmanis has received assurances that there will be no more expulsions without notice to the procurator and a warning. This, however, does not rule out the failure of Moscow to just issue you a visa."

Speaking about the present situation, A. Gorbunovs called the resolution on a moratorium adopted by the Supreme Council of Lithuania a reality. A. Gorbunovs said: "It is urgent that we decide what to do because Lithuania is going to the talks alone. Gorbachev may demand that Estonia and Latvia also adopt moratoriums; however, Estonia will not do it, and our parliament will hardly agree to this." A. Gorbunovs expressed his apprehension that by using the moratorium demand, President M. Gorbachev will split the Baltic states, and will not begin negotiations with Estonia and Latvia, in turn dictating the harshest terms to Lithuania. A. Gorbunovs said: "The road would be easier if the three republics stuck together."

J. Freimanis, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission for Foreign Affairs, said that the Independence Declaration of the Republic of Latvia provided for a period of transition which is, in essence, a moratorium; this is why the demand to declare a moratorium cannot apply to Latvia.

Trade Union Leader Protests to Landsbergis

LD1408205690 Moscow TASS in English 2048 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 14 TASS—Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia Igor Klochkov today sent a message to President of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis in connection with the Lithuanian parliament's intention to discuss the nationalisation of property of Lithuanian trade unions.

"We consider the act as a violation of international legal norms, which infringes upon the interests of trade unions and, in them, of all working people of Lithuania. We express solidarity with our colleagues, the confederation of Free Trade Unions of Lithuania, and ask to inform deputies of our anxiety," the telegram reads.

Communist Monuments Dismantled in Siauliai

LD1608222290 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] According to a decision of the Siauliai town local government, some monuments were dismantled and removed this morning. They were the Lenin, General Baltusis-Zemaitis, Preiksas, and Grigas monuments. All these sculptures, undamaged and unbroken, are now in a safe place. The work took place in a quiet atmosphere and, according to the Lithuanian television correspondent, there was no applause or shouts.

Lithuanian Oil Plant Faces Tanker Car Shortage

LD1508223890 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Summary] Reports from Mazeikiai oil products and fuel supply enterprise indicate that Lithuania may be left without fuel. This enterprise, having resumed production following the lifting of the blockade, has managed to fill its diesel fuel and other product reserves. A shortage of railroad tanker cars for transporting these products is causing the problem.

"The enterprise requires 650 tanker cars to transport its products; however the railroad authorities have promised 520 cars for their use, but have only provided 450 tanker cars instead."

The enterprise could reduce its capacity, provided it does not have to stop production.

Latvia's Gorbunovs Discusses Neo-Fascist Groups

90UN2542D Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 14 Jul 90 p 1

["Response of A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic, to a Question From a Group of Deputies Regarding a Rally Planned in Bauskiy Rayon of Former Servicemen Who Fought in This Rayon Against Units of the Soviet Army in 1944"]

[Text] 1. The declaration adopted by the republic Supreme Soviet on 4 May of this year proclaimed the priority of international legal standards on the territory of the republic. It unequivocally follows from this that any propaganda in the Latvian Republic of national-socialism and fascism, including the use of SS symbols and uniforms as an organization declared to be criminal by the international tribunal in Nuremberg is prohibited. These provisions are clearly stated in criminal legislation in effect in the Latvian Republic. No one can have any other versions and interpretations in this regard.

Thus, there can be no question of alleged plans of the leadership of the republic to give its concurrence to the legalization of pro-fascist groups. At the present time, there is no indication of such manifestation in the republic. The actual situation just shows that a rash decision by a narrow group of persons in one of the rural rayons of Latvia makes it possible to spread unfounded rumors about the emergence of neo-fascist groups in the republic.

2. On 11 July of this year, the government of the republic circulated an announcement that unambiguously assesses a meeting in Bauskiy Rayon planned by a group of persons as a step leading to a destabilization of the political situation in Latvia. This assessment clearly

expresses the attitude of the leadership of the republic toward the ill-conceived undertaking of the Bauskiy office of the Environmental Protection Club.

The local office of the Environmental Protection Club, according to testimony of Ya.S. Razn, chairman of the Bauskiy Rayon Executive Committee, did not request the approval of any official for its action, believing the planned meeting of former soldiers to be a cultural arrangement conducted in an individual dwelling house.

3, 4. The planned meeting in Bauskiy Rayon has been canceled; however, the repercussions around the reports of information sources superimposes a particular responsibility for ensuring law and order in the rayon on local self-government organs, the militia, and the rayon department of the KGB. Instructions in this regard were given to the chairman of the Bauskiy Rayon Executive Committee.

Communist Party Stand on Paramilitary Group

LD1408185390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Text] The restoration in Latvia of the paramilitary organization Aizsargi, the Defenders, arouses concern and a negative reaction among part of the republic's population. This is said in an address of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee bureau to the government and the Supreme Soviet, published in the republican press.

Aizsargi was the only military-political organization of bourgeois Latvia whose activity was officially resumed under the fascist occupation. After the war a majority of its members who failed to flee abroad joined the ranks of numerous bandit groups. Over a period of several years they conducted an armed struggle against Soviet power and terrorized the local population. In this regard, the addressess stresses the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee bureau regards it necessary to state that the steps being made to restore the paramilitary organization are unconstitutional and contradict the intention of the USSR presidential decree on prohibiting the creation of armed groups not envisioned by USSR legislation and removing illegally kept weapons.

The document says actions to restore an organization with pro-fascist traditions destabilize the sociopolitical situation in the republic, which is not simple.

Latvian Workers' Party Club Considered

90UN2276C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 5 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by P. Antropov: "Workers Take Counsel"]

[Text] On the eve of the Second Plenary Session of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress a meeting was held in the Central Committee by workers belonging to the republic-level, electoral party organs. What developed there was a businesslike and constructive discussion about the workers' role in stabilizing the sociopolitical situation in this republic, as well as working out and implementing the party's socioeconomic policy.

The following persons stated their opinions on these and other matters: O. Yegorov, a fitter at the Stars Plant in Riga; A. Tarvid, an electrician at the Milking Unit Plant in Rezekne; O. Stepanko, a brigade-leader at the Khimvolokno Production Association in Daugavpils; N. Sergeyeva, a weaver at the Rigas manufaktura Production Association; V. Baranov, a grinder or polisher at the Industrial Robots Plant in Riga; along with other members of the Central Committee and the Central Auditing and Review Commission of the Latvian Communist Party. They noted that the party must take into account more fully the needs and interests of the workers; it must persistently defend them at all levels. Then the party organizations would also be able to count on more active support from working people.

The proposal to establish a permanent political club of workers met with approval. By skillfully organizing its work, it would be able to make a substantial contribution to the development of working people's political activities.

Speaking at the conclusion of the meeting were the scientists V. Kanter and A. Stetsurin, who acquainted the workers with their latest studies on the problems of restructuring society and the party.

The following persons also took part in the meeting: L. Abel, deputy chairman of the Commission for Socioeconomic Policy of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee; V. Shustov, deputy chairman of the Commission for Building Up the Party of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee; and Ya. Kalninsh, deputy chairman of the United Council of Labor Collectives of the Latvian SSR.

Soviet, Estonian Officials Discuss Ties

LD1608182990 Moscow TASS in English 1817 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—Problems of mutual concern, primarily the basic principles for relations between the Soviet Union and Estonia were discussed during a consultative meeting with representatives of Estonia in the Kremlin today.

Participants in the meeting—Estonian Minister E. Lippmaa, Secretary of the Estonian parliament's presidium A. Almann, chairman of the Soviet parliament's Council of Nationalities Rafik Nishanov, USSR Presidential Council member Grigoriy Revenko and Soviet parliament's presidium member Nikolay Gritsenko—decided to appoint plenipotentiary representatives for a continuation of the talks.

A regular meeting will be held in Moscow on August 23.

RSFSR

Yeltsin Returns to Moscow, Stresses Economics

Comments on Economic Reform

LD1608135890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1241 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow, 16 Aug (TASS)—Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet, has expressed the hope that the working group set up three weeks ago on the decision of the USSR president and the head of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] parliament "will present a Union program for economic reform and transfer to the market by 1 September." In Boris Yeltsin's view it would be possible to start implementing the program by 1 October.

Commenting at the request of journalists on the results of the latest sitting of the group, which took place today, Boris Yeltsin said that the USSR president "gets in touch with the group by phone virtually every day, and as far as I know he has decided to cut short his holiday to travel back earlier in order, personally, to steer [kontrolirovat] the group's work." "On the basis of the program we could come to an economic agreement—or an economic community—between the republics which as a whole support the principles laid down in it," the head of the Russian parliament said.

At the sitting of the group, he continued, accord was reached on a package of extraordinary measures on entering the market in order to avoid chaos in the transition period.

Recalling that all the necessary information should be given to the working group in line with a decision of the USSR president, Boris Yeltsin criticized the Union ministries of defense and finance for not submitting such information.

The head of the Russian parliament thinks that the program for a transfer to the market, on which the USSR Government continues to work, is unnecessary. "We should not work on two fronts, we should concentrate on our program in which the people believe and which has novelty and reality," he stated.

"If at the autumn session of the USSR parliament both programs are put forward—the Union one and ours—in such an event the Russian parliament will immediately adopt its own program and the question will be resolved," Boris Yeltsin said.

Meets Economic Working Group

LD1608153990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1407 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] At the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet today, Boris Yeltsin had a meeting with the working group for devizing the program of transition to a market economy set up under the aegis of the president of the country and the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. We have asked Mikhail Berger, economic observer of IZVESTIYA newspaper, about the meeting.

[Berger] The meeting was held in the sessions hall of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, in the White House as it is now being called. The meeting was attended by Academicians Shatalin and Petrakov, Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, members of the working group, and journalists.

Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin and members of the working group, set up as agreed between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, emerged after 1000 in the morning. Yavlinskiy, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, made a short report on what had been achieved. He said that, on the whole, the program is taking shape in the first reading, without nuances and details, perhaps, and there is a hope that it will be ready as scheduled. The problem is that a number of departments are not complying with the president's instructions and fail to submit the information requested by the group. They include the USSR Ministries of Defense, in particular, the USSR Ministries of Finances. After that, discussion of the program went on for over two hours behind closed doors, and later Yeltsin made a statement to the press. He said that the discussion had shown that fruitful work was underway, and that the program was a new one, indeed, containing fundamentally new solutions. He hopes and is almost certain that the program will be submitted on time. He added that the USSR president constantly monitors the group's work and contacts them daily.

[Announcer] In general, was it necessary for Boris Nikolayevich to interrupt his tour of Russia and return to Moscow to make this statement?

[Berger] This is a pre-planned return; there is nothing extraordinary or unexpected about it. I would like to stress this fact particularly.

[Announcer] Is Boris Nikolayevich himself satisfied with the progress and the amount of work already done?

[Berger] I am almost certain that he is satisfied with the work. Agreements with republic representatives are working out well, although not all republics are cooperating with the group, and not all have sent plenipotentiary representatives there. Latvia, Turkmenia, and Estonia are absent. The Union treaty is a matter of an indefinite future, while an economic agreement may take shape very soon. Well, Yeltsin said, so it will be an agreement between 12 and not 15 republics; there is nothing tragic about this. If those republics wish so, they will join the others, if not—that is their business.

[Announcer] Has Boris Nikolayevich resumed his tour of the country or is he still in Moscow?

[Berger] I think that he is in the air now, because at 1315, when that brief news conference ended, he said goodbye to us and added that he was already almost in Vladivostok.

Views Work of Reform Group

LD1608185890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 16 Aug 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A session of the working group dealing with the preparation of the concept of the Union program for the transfer to market economic relations was held today. Let me remind you that the work of the group is being supervised by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin.

[Begin recording] [I. Minayev] As was noted at the session, the first draft of the program has already been prepared. Moreover, the most fundamental provisions have been agreed with the majority of the Union republics. They have been discussed by deputies. Meetings have been held between representatives of the group and the heads of workers' movements, and mutual understanding has been reached on a majority of the points. A large number of proposals is coming in from members of the public. The group is trying to take them into account. Not everything in its work is proceeding smoothly, of course. The main difficulty, it was stressed at the session, is that many Union ministries and departments have not yet provided full information on the state of affairs in their sectors of industry. A news conference was held on the results of the session. It was addressed by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin.

[Yeltsin] We agreed to draw up a blueprint for preparations for the market, preparations for it. I have seen for myself locally that managers themselves do not know; there is a lack of confidence. They must have confidence that this program will provide the basis of a blueprint for preparations for the market, setting out what measures need to be adopted, not just on the level of the government and the republics, for instance, but also on the level of enterprises and the local soviets. The whole system of today's relations between enterprises needs to be left for a certain period of time. They may put it at three months, or perhaps more. This is because they are beginning to get worried today.

Measures are envisaged to stabilize the ruble. It is envisaged that practically all the republics will be involved in the program, and they, almost all of them, are already involved in it. It is to be implmented through republican legislation. Since there is no Union treaty, it has to be done through republican legislation, but a single program must be implemented. Hope has not been lost that the program—although perhaps not yet chiseled or polished—will be on the table by the 1 September deadline set by the president and myself, the aim being that in September the Supreme Soviet can discuss and adopt it. And the proposal—it was formulated today- - is that 1 October is to be counted as day 1 of the pogram—1 October this year. [end recording]

Decree Issued To Protect Economic Sovereignty

904A0551A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

["Decree of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on Protection of the Economic Foundation of the Sovereignty of the RSFSR"]

[Text] There have recently been important deals pertaining to the sale by the Union authorities of commodities and natural resources of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] constituting the economic foundation of the sovereignty of the RSFSR without concordance with the pertinent authorities of the republic.

In accordance with the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the RSFSR and in fulfillment of the RSFSR law "Property on the Territory of the RSFSR," the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

1. To deem invalid foreign economic and Union-republic agreements and deals pertaining to the sale of diamonds, gold, platinum, gemstones, silver, oil, coal, gas, uranium, rare-earth, nonferrous, and ferrous metals, lumber, furs, grain, and other strategic resources and commodities concluded since the adoption of the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the RSFSR without concordance with the RSFSR.

2. To introduce special conditions for transactions involving the resources and commodities specified in Article 1 of this decree, stipulating a special procedure for the conclusion of such agreements and deals.

3. To determine that the RSFSR is not bound in respect of credit and also agreements and deals pertaining to the resources and commodities specified in Article 1 concluded without the consent of the appropriate authorities of the RSFSR.

4. To determine that conversion of state-owned enterprises of Union jurisdiction located on RSFSR territory into joint-stock companies and the transfer to different forms of ownership must be effected on the terms and in the procedure stipulated by RSFSR legislation.

5. To instruct the RSFSR Council of Ministers to draw up proposals:

concerning the procedure of the conclusion of foreign economic agreements and deals pertaining to the resources and commodities specified in Article 1 of this decree;

concerning the creation of monitoring bodies ensuring compliance with the special procedure of implementation of the said agreements and deals with the right of unimpeded access for the exercise of control functions in special precious metal and mineral repositories;

concerning liability for violation of the established procedure.

The RSFSR Council of Ministers is:

to conduct an audit of all current agreements and deals pertaining to the resources and commodities specified in Article 1 of this decree;

to officially notify foreign representations and organizations of this decree.

Matters requiring legislative decisions to be submitted for consideration by the next session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

[Signed] R. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet
[Dated] 9 August 1990

USSR Decision Suspended for Sake of Harvest

LD1508212190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] In order to guarantee the harvest in good time and the maximum reduction of losses of agricultural produce, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium has partially suspended the implementation of the USSR Supreme Soviet decision providing for the procedure of the regulation by taxation of the increase of resources for the payment of labor for kolkhozes [collective farms], sovkhozes [state farms], and other state agricultural enterprises, processing enterprises, construction and service enterprises, and organizations of the agro-industrial complex.

Gidaspov, Leningrad Communists Discuss Tasks

LD1408204590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Text] There was a meeting today of Communists and leaders of industrial enterprises, scientific-production associations, and institutes of Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast.

Secretaries of the city and rayon committees of the CPSU took part.

In his introductory remarks, Gidaspov, secretary of the party Central Committee and first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast committee dwelt upon the tasks facing party activists and the whole Leningrad organization.

It was a question of the role which the Communist leader should play in developing the economy, in preparing for the transition to market relations.

Social problems, the production of goods for the population, and the gathering in of the vegetable and potato harvest occupied a prominent place in the discussion in which the leaders of the Baltiyskiy Works Association, the Svetlana plant, and others took part.

Moscow Party Membership Statistics Published

90UN2601A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 90 p 2

[Unattributed report published under the rubric: "Moscow Microphone"]

[Text] During the first six months of 1990, according to data of the Moscow City CPSU Committee, 4,763 people joined the CPSU and 25,886 left the party (20,681 submitted a personal declaration).

As for the reasons for leaving, 30.8 percent left due to poor health, 21.9 percent did not provide a reason, 14.2 percent blamed the drop in CPSU prestige, 9.0 percent did not want to fulfill their party obligations, and 6.3 percent considered themselves unworthy of remaining in the party.

In July of 1990, 441 people joined the CPSU and 19,484 people left the party.

Novgorod Chosen as Russia's Northwest Capital

LD1608212990 Moscow TASS in English 2116 GMT 16 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Zlobin]

[Text] Petrozavodsk August 17 TASS—Novgorod has been chosen as the seat of the union of the cities of Russia's north-west. This was decided at a meeting of representatives of 14 cities that are members of the Union.

The meeting which ended here on Thursday adopted a number of important decisions that will determine the development of the region in the near future.

Participants in the meeting adopted addresses to the Soviet and U.S. presidents and to the chairmen of the city councils and mayors of the cities of Nordic countries about the strengthening of peace in the zone of Arctic seas.

As the first serious step in this respect it is suggested that the two countries declare a moratorium on a nuclear arms build-up in the area of the Arctic Ocean and discontinue nuclear tests, including those on Novaya Zemlya Island.

Karelian ASSR Drafts Sovereignty Statement

90P50057A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Jul 90 p B3

[Unattributed article: "Even Karelia Considering Autonomy"]

[Text] Karelia intends to follow the models of Russia and the Ukraine by declaring the supremecy of its own laws over those of the Soviet Union. Among proposals put forth in a draft declaration of sovereignty published by the newspaper NEUVOSTO-KARJALA were those backing protection for foreign ownership of property and offering Karelian citizenship to residents of the republic.

The "declaration of sovereignty for the Karelian Autonomous Republic (ASSR)" which was published on the front page of the 20 July edition of NEUVOSTS-KARJALA is a draft document issued by the Constitutional Commission of the republic's Communist Party Supreme Soviet. According to the preamble, this draft is to be presented to the Supreme Soviet for its consideration.

The draft document states that the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic will become a "democratic, sovereign constitutional state" within the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union, and its right of self-determination can only be restricted by Karelia itself.

Although the right of self-determination will be limited to the territory of Karelia, the republic also intends to decide some aspects of foreign policy on its own. "The Karelian ASSR will independently decide all matters reguarding internal development and international relations separately from the decision-making bodies" of the Soviet Union and Russia.

Protection for Foreign Property

Together with jointly owned property, all forms of ownership are to be respected and protected. According to the draft, property in Karelia may also be owned by other Soviet republics, foreign countries and their citizens.

Karelian lands and all other natural resources in the territory of the republic will, according to the draft, belong to the people of the republic.

The inhabitants of Karelia will first of all be Karelian citizens, and only afterward Soviets or Russians. Karelians will, however, retain their Russian and Soviet citizenship.

All Karelians will be guaranteed the right to use their own language. Karelians, Finns and Veps will also be guaranteed the representation in the government.

Novosibirsk Oblast Party Conference Resumes

PM1508121390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

["Official" TASS report under the general headline: "At Oblast Conferences"]

[Text] The main areas of Communists' work to implement the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress were discussed yesterday at the second stage of the Novosibirsk Oblast party conference.

An organizational matter was also examined. Party oblast committee [obkom] first secrerary V.P. Mukha was relieved of his post at his own request. In their discussion of the application delegates noted that it is inexpedient to combine posts and they agreed that V.P. Mukha should occupy one post—chairman of the oblast soviet.

Second secretary V.N. Poleshchuk will act as party obkom first secretary until the report and election stage of the conference.

Khudobina Report on Ryazan Oblast Local Issues

OW1608043390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 13 August carries, as part of the "120 Minutes" program, a 10-minute video report by correspondent Tatyana Khudobina presenting news from Ryazan Oblast. Khudobina begins her report from the studio and relates the urgent need for help for the "depopulated" Ryazan countryside in bringing in the harvest, adding that this is a familiar situation. She tells of the oblast government and party leadership's "cool" response to new forms of farming, noting that only 17 of 500 farms in the oblast currently operate on lease terms. She notes that Politburo member Igor Stroyev recently visited the oblast to address local leaders on agricultural issues. Video then shows a Ryazan meeting hall and Stroyev is heard to say:

"Perhaps I did not hear you well, but time and again your nostalgia for only one form of management is encountered. Even on the subject of leasing, you speak in such meager, such polite terms, as if you were speaking to an innocent young maid who has never been married, as if it is a subject you cannot broach. And I think, today 78 percent of your peasants have no cow, and even if we rack our brains, the old people are not capable of raising them because they no longer have the strength for it."

Video then shows a young peasant woman leading a calf down the road. Khudobina says: "Here, a year ago on a similar visit, former Politburo member, Yegor Ligachev, called on the residents of Ryazan to follow the kolkhoz-sovkhoz [collective farm-state farm] route, and said that, if they were to develop leasing, it should be done only within the context of the kolkhoz."

Khudobina then interviews an old peasant woman who complains of shabby treatment by the kolkhoz leadership. Video shows the old woman spitting to characterize the leadership's attitude toward the peasants. She says that when they tried to write a letter of complaint to the local paper, their efforts were dismissed without serious consideration. "You are talking nonsense," they were told.

Khudobina then turns to the Ryazan City Soviet. Noting that it has already received more than 100 applications from city residents wishing to start private farms, she questions Chairman V.V. Ryumin on his efforts to create new relations between the city and countryside. He says: "The extra land which cannot be worked by the peasants must be turned over to those city residents who wish to work as farmers, as lease holders. We must make structural changes. I understand only two types of property: either, I am the master, or I am not." Video zooms to Ryumin's RSFSR People's Deputy lapel pin and he continues: "The city soviet has found itself in a very difficult position. Today, we are again forced to turn to the residents of the city and ask for help. But those who must help first of all are those who have never helped: the party committee secretaries, the chairmen of various committees, trade-union and soviet organizations, and so on, including all Communists, both workers and officials. This year, the burden must rest on them, on their sense of propriety. That is the position of the city soviet."

Video returns to Khudobina in the studio. She tells of the creation of a new city newspaper, RYAZANSKIY VESTNIK, the official organ of the city soviet. It is currently being printed in Lithuania, she says, because printing capacity "could not be found" locally. Video shows the headline of an article from the first issue of the paper. The article is entitled "The Satisfied Will Never Understand the Hungry." It discusses the irony of the existing situation in which officials can "stock up" on groceries in special stores, while the peasants who actually produce the food which fills the store shelves have no access to them.

Video then shows two men working at a recently discovered mass grave site in Ryazan Oblast. Video shows a closeup of a human skull, while one of the men comments that each skull he found had a hole, either in the forehead or the temple. Video pulls back to the local countryside and Khudobina says that, at first, local residents thought the remains dated back many centuries to a battle between Russians and the Mongol-Tatar hordes. But, she adds that specialists later determined that the remains were interred in the "not too distant past." She notes that an investigation of the site is being conducted by the local KGB organs and the local chapter of Memorial, a society dedicated to discovering and rehabilitating victims of the Stalin era.

Video then shows a home in Ryazan, where a worker is erecting a plaque which says that Solzhenitsyn was a one-time resident. Khudobina recounts some of the stormy events which Solzhenitsyn endured while living in the house, but adds that "justice is triumphing, memory is returning to the residents of Ryazan." She then briefly interviews the current resident of the home. To the question of whether his children will become familiar with Solzhenitsyn's works, he responds, "I think they will get to know his works. But, the very best result would be if he were to return to us, to his homeland." Video then cuts back to Khudobina in the studio, where she quotes lines written by Solzhenitsyn while he was living in Ryazan: "I experience my whole life as a gradual rising from my knees, as a gradual transformation from forced silence to free expression." Khudobina adds that Soviet society is currently going through a similar experience.

The report ends with a politically satirical song by a group called the Children of the Arbat over a video montage showing a Ryazan village, Solzhenitsyn giving an interview, and strolling with his wife through the woods, scenes from the mass-burial site, a group of young pioneers playing drums with an exhortatory CPSU slogan in the background, the sign on the outside of a psychiatric hospital, and a satiric depiction of a Stalin-era kangaroo court.

Background of Krasnodar First Secretary Viewed

90P50055 Moscow TRUD in Russian 10 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by Y. Petrov: "What Will the Successor Be Like?"]

[Text] **Yesterday A. Maslov took up his position as first secretary of the Krasnodar kray party committee [kraykom].**

He was selected out of a field of 31 candidates. Many feel that his victory was based on his relative youth and fresh views.

Aleksandr Vasilyevich Maslov is 41 years old. He was born in the Uspenskiy rayon of Krasnodar kray, worked as a driver, and graduated from the local agricultural institute, the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences. He was a livestock specialist at the kolkhoz, went from secretary of the rayon party committee [raykom] to the first secretary of the Komsomol kraykom, and then became first secretary of the Timashevsk raykom. He has been part of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus since 1987. He has three children.

The newspaper TRUD asked him right after the conference: "Do you consider yourself a 'man of the center' and an appartachik?"

"In such a short period of time I did not manage to become a man of the center," responded A. Maslov. "Nor do I consider myself an apparatchik in the negative sense in which that word is often used."

I. K. Polozkov's successor began his work with a tour of the kray.

Mass Graves Found in Groznyy; Inquiries Begin

LD1608033290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0200 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] An alarming report has been received from Groznyy, where, on the edge of the town and also in a number of places in the rural rayons of Checheno-Ingushetia, unusual mass burials of people who apparently died violent deaths have been discovered. Excavations are being carried out by archeologists of the republican local history museum in conjunction with members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Procuracy and with the participation of representatives of public organizations. An investigation has been initiated by the Procuracy. Given the nature of the burials, specialists presume that they are victims of the Stalinist repressions of the 1920's to 1940's on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia. But judicial and medical expert examination should provide a conclusive answer to all worrying questions.

New Newspapers Appear in Bashkiriya

LD1708082990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 17 Aug 90

[Text] DELOVOY CHELOVEK [BUSINESSMAN], EKO-VESTNIK [ECHO-COURIER], and DEYSTVIYE [ACTION] are among the new newspapers set up in Bashkiriya this year. Not long ago, readers received the first issue of yet another one. VERSIYA [VERSION] is the organ of the Provisional Committee for Combatting Crime in Bashkiriya and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the autonomous republic. The leading article says that the editorial board of VERSIYA will be constantly informing its readers on the crime situation, exposing its causes and searching for ways to counteract it.

Private Television Firm Founded in Vladivostock

LD1608124790 Moscow World Service in Russian 0936 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Excerpt] A group of journalists has founded an independent joint stock television company in the Far East town of Vladivostok. The local authorities have allocated morning time for it to broadcast. The program of broadcasts of the new television service contains local news, world events, and children's programs. The television company's sponsor is the Far East Merchant Marine. Meanwhile, in the Soviet capital, an independent radio station, Ekho Moskvy, has been set up on approximately the same principles. [passage omitted]

Western Republics

Belorussia-Azerbaijan Agreement Signed 16 Aug

Ties Outlined

LD1608163190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Belorussia has become the first Union republic to have signed a bilateral inter-republican agreement with Azerbaijan. It defines the prospects for political, economic, and cultural ties. Meanwhile, in Alma-Ata a delegation from Belorussia has signed a protocol envisaging the preparation of a similar agreement with Kazakhstan.

Azerbaijan's Bagirov Responds

LD1608195590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Interview with Agasalim Bagirov, chairman of the Republican Commission and minister of trade of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, by correspondent Islam Kuliyev in Baku; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Bagirov] The fact of the matter is that under the conditions of the transition to the market economy, all the republics want to achieve a balance with every republic in the import and export of consumer goods and other resources.

First, we are agreeing on the obligatory mutual delivery of all volumes which are already provided for. Second, we are carrying out work to get going contacts with respect to organizing or creating joint production. Third, we are considering representation in every republic in order, so to speak, to guarantee the provision of information.

It is a question not only of the economy in that agreement. It is a question of a great deal more. We consider that it is the development of our cooperation in the sphere of culture, in the sphere of national education, in the sphere of transport, and in the sphere of relations between the nationalities.

[Kuliyev] What will that give us?

[Bagirov] We have defined clearly how we will work in 1991. Taken as a basis were all the volume indicators for 1990. The balance of import and export between our republics is almost the same—254 million rubles worth of goods is taken out of our republic and 258 million rubles worth is brought into our republic.

An important aspect lies in the fact that we have agreed on the setting up of 10 joint enterprises.

[Kuliyev] What was the approach to that?

[Bagirov] It was very simple. The raw material resources on hand in Azerbaijan combined with the raw materials and technology resources in Belorussia allowed us to agree on investment namely in that technology.

Speaking of joint enterprises, I would like to say that joint enterprises—that is, let's say, the manufacture of small-size washing machines with the Gomel Machine-Tool Production Association, or the setting up on the territory of Azerbaijan of a joint enterprise for processing fruit and vegetable produce. [sentence as heard] You know that Azerbaijan is a fruit and vegetable growing area.

[Kuliyev] Are joint enterprises that produce construction materials envisaged?

[Bagirov] You know (about the need) for providing facilities today. There is a large number of refugees in our republic today who have not been provided with facilities, and so forth. They are held back, in the first place, because of the insignificant number of places.

[Kuliyev] Yes, and not only refugees. After all, we have around 300,000 citizens in Baku alone on the waiting list for a flat.

[Bagirov] That's quite right. Therefore, we consider that joint enterprises producing construction materials are a very important feature, and in that would be joint efforts for both republics.

Chernobyl-Related Strikes Sweep Gomel

90UN2556A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 14 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA correspondent A. Gotovchits: "No Work for Two Hours"]

[Text] **On 11 July a new wave of rallies and warning strikes swept over Gomel industries. The plant imeni Kirov, the machine assembly plant, the bearing plant, the radio technological equipment plant, the "Gomselmash" Association, and others stopped work for two hours that day.**

"From 0900 to 1100," says V. Bezrukikh, chairman of the trade union committee at the radio technological equipment plant, "1,500 people were on strike at our enterprise. The city strike committee issued an appeal calling for a two-hour warning strike, and before expressing support for it we conducted shop meetings. As it turned out, the majority of our people backed the workers' demands that the parliaments and governments of the country and the republic and the local authorities try to eliminate the aftereffects of the Chernobyl disaster."

These demands were formulated as early as May at the conference of workers' groups and strike committees. They insist that Gomel be supplied with ecologically clean produce in accordance with medical norms; they expect additional annual health care for parents and children, as well as additional leave and monetary compensation for health risks; they ask that diagnostic centers be opened in the city for regular complete medical check-ups; they want an increase in residential construction; and they want a free ecological zone status for the zone. However, these and other demands have not yet been considered by the governing bodies of either the republic or the country. Even the reconciliation commission mentioned in the Law "On Resolving Collective Arguments (Conflicts)" was not set up. All this has given rise to the new wave of rallies and strikes.

To attract attention to the unresolved problems for a risk-free life in the city, the strike committee organized a "March for Survival" from Gomel to Moscow on 6-7 July. The participants of the March met in the Kremlin with N. Ryzhkov, USSR Council of Ministers chairman, and told him about the tension in the city caused by the accident at the nuclear power station.

A telegram was sent to N. Ryzhkov in Moscow on the day of the strike. It was signed by Aleksandr Bukhvostov, cochairman of the city strike committee, and by L. Sechko, chairman of the City Soviet of People's Deputies. The telegram reads: "Dear Nikolay Ivanovich, the Gomel City Soviet of People's Deputies and the city strike committee have discussed the results of your meeting with representatives of workers' groups from Gomel Oblast, Mogilev, and Bryansk. They feel hopeful and confident that the government of our country will change its attitude toward resolving the problems existing in the areas damaged by the Chernobyl disaster. They are also hopeful and confident that the demands of the workers from the areas around Gomel handed over to you at the meeting have been discussed finally. In accordance with your promise, we ask you to inform us of the official time when Comrade Doguzhiyev, Council of Ministers deputy chairman, will arrive in Gomel. We expect him to consider all the issues mentioned at the meeting, as well as answers to the demands of the workers concerning the cleanup, and we also expect him to meet with the strike committee. We suggest that the discussion of the workers' demands, with the participation of Comrade Doguzhiyev, Council of Ministers deputy chairman, take place in Gomel on 18-19 July of this year."

Views of New Head of Ukrainian Parliament Seen

90UN2575A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 31, Aug 90 p 5

[Report on interview with Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, by correspondent Nikolay Baklanov; place and date not given; published under the rubric "Interview and Commentaries": "To Know How To Achieve Compromise"]

[Text] So, as our weekly has already reported, the Ukrainian parliament has a new chairman—Leonid Kravchuk. The head of the republic Supreme Soviet deemed it necessary even the day after his election to meet with the press and give several special interviews in order to clarify his positions on many questions of the parliament's activity and the shaping of a sovereign Ukraine.

I would mention right away that L. Kravchuk's viewpoint on key problems of domestic and foreign policy has remained unchanged. People who live in the Ukraine are sufficiently familiar with his views, which he has upheld as a prominent figure of the Communist Party of the Ukraine (he was elected second secretary of the Central Committee at the 28th congress) and while participating constantly in all serious debates with representatives of "Rukh" [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] and other opposition political forces.

Thus speaking about the Ukraine's future, the new head of the parliament emphasized that, as before, he sees it as a democratic, Soviet, socialist state. He advocates the republic being a part of the Union formed on the basis of a new treaty. He attaches great significance here to the development of direct relations with the other Union republics and the conclusion of bilateral treaties between them and believes that it is essential to embark on this work at once. This applies particularly to the republics which have great interpenetration in the economic sphere.

Discussing the new Union treaty, L. Kravchuk observed that it should primarily be mutually profitable to all and not infringe on anyone's interests. It would obviously be logical also to ensure that each republic determine for itself how it would like to see this most important document, proceeding primarily from its historical particularities, economic position, and available experience of relations with other republics and the central authorities.

The republics should also decide for themselves which rights they can delegate to the Union and which to reserve for themselves. They are not, after all, joining the Union in order to lose or sacrifice something or other. The imperial approach—put this here, put this there!—which still exists, the chairman believes, is living out its last days. It is not acceptable to any civilized state. What government in the world relegates its people's interests to a place of secondary importance? In such a case its lifespan is a matter of days so a system of life "on the second level," as they say, is now impossible. All peoples of our Union must live as they work and be masters on their own soil.

I would like to say the following as a comment on the chairman's words.

It is understandable that the conclusion of a new Union treaty is impossible without a balance of interests and the formulation of compromise taking account of the positions of all the republics. Such constructive work will depend to a considerable extent on the attitudes toward it of the different political forces, primarily those who are declaring as their mission the defense of national interests. In many republics a variety of national movements is enjoying ever increasing influence, and the Ukraine is no exception in this respect.

A highly indicative fact confirming this was the hoisting of the blue and yellow flag at the city soviet executive committee building in accordance with a decision of representatives of the Kiev City Soviet. This action, which was accompanied by a public prayer meeting and impressive demonstration and mass meeting which brought traffic on Kreshchatik to a halt, occurred almost immediately following the election of L. Kravchuk as chairman of the parliament, and, perfectly naturally, he had to respond to it. In his opinion, these actions were unlawful. They were evaluated similarly, incidentally, by representatives of the law enforcement authorities also, these latter referring to the fact that such a matter, according to the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution, is solely within the competence of the highest organ of state power in the republic—its Supreme Soviet.

The evaluation was thus made.... But a particular feature of the present situation is that words are by no means always followed by deeds. So with the "unlawful" flag also—it hangs, as before, on the central street of the Ukrainian capital, and people are by no means in any hurry to take it down. Why? This is, I believe, understandable. In the name of a search for compromise it is necessary to waive one's principles and close one's eyes even to the law.

The new head of parliament simply cannot fail to take account of all this, as, equally, of the fact that deputies of the Supreme Soviet representing the opposition "People's Rada" took part in the hoisting of the "national flag." And the chairman clearly has absolutely no interest in quarreling once again with the opposition. The more so in that he has only just come to occupy this highest office of state and that there lies ahead of him, it is to be hoped, a great deal of work requiring the members of parliament's joint efforts.

In any event, L. Kravchuk was unambiguous in his desire to cooperate with the "People's Rada" in his first speech following his election, at the press conference, and during the interview.

In his opinion, there are in the "People's Rada" people of high breeding. Intellectuals who know what they want and who are moving consistently toward their goal. They disagree with the federation's socialist choice and are seeking ultimately Ukraine's secession from the Soviet Union. There are also in the "People's Rada" people who for various reasons hate the Communists, and expecting them to be their friends can be ruled out.

"But despite all this," L. Kravchuk says, "I proceed from the fact that the 'People's Rada' exists and that its members are real people elected by the people to parliament. And it is necessary to live and work alongside them. And, when dictated by the interests of the cause, we need to know how to achieve compromise with them...."

Whether the chairman, who sees significant potential in the present republic Supreme Soviet, will succeed in sustaining this policy, time will tell. It may as yet be said that keeping a hold of the seething emotions and moving the work of parliament forward will be very difficult for him. In addition to the discussion and appointment of members of the government, which is in itself an extraordinarily emotional and critical business, other serious matters dictated by life itself are being raised continually in the hall of sessions. One such concerns the accident at the glass works in Bryansk Oblast and the contamination of the Desna, which supplies water to Kiev.... Another concerns the departure of 28 people's deputies and members of the "Democratic Platform in the Communist Party of the Ukraine" from the ranks of the CPSU. Yet another concerns the letter from the staff of banks and the Bank Council of Vinnitsa Oblast concerning the violation of the republic's economic sovereignty.... And another concerns the appeal of the all-Ukraine forum in

Zaporozhye of soldiers' mothers, which contains, specifically, inter alia, a demand for the immediate return home of young men from the Ukraine drafted for military service in other republics....

As you can see, each question is more serious than the last. And if we add to this the proposals concerning the creation of a commission to investigate the causes of children's ailments in Chernovtsy and the celebration of the quincentenary of the Zaporozhye Cossacks, we get a rough idea of the range of problems which confronted the new head of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet in the very first week of his performance of his high duties of state.

However, one has the impression that L. Kravchuk was prepared for this. After all, in his opinion, the republic's parliament should work not only on the creation of laws and legislative enactments and mechanisms of their implementation, but also receive information from people, the electorate, to which it is necessary to respond promptly and rapidly.

Understandably, such an active position, although promising considerable additional pains, would seem highly realistic. It is difficult to look for the republic's swift emergence from the crisis if the members of parliament concern themselves merely with "pure" lawmaking activity. The Ukrainian people are tired of waiting, and parliament's credit of trust is of a short-term nature. Sober-minded politicians, among whom we may boldly place the new chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet also, understand this truth well. In any event, Leonid Kravchuk has called on the deputies to overcome their emotions and their personal, party, or other corporate goals, rise above this and see that behind all this stand the 52 million-strong Ukrainian people and the state.

P.S. When this material was being prepared for the press, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet was on the third attempt to pass a decree regulating Ukrainian SSR citizens' compulsory military service and the employment of officers of the republics' law enforcement authorities outside of it. This document, which is seriously at odds with Union legislation, speaks specifically about the return to the Ukraine by 1 October of soldiers who are natives of the Ukraine from areas where interethnic conflicts are under way.

Implementation of Ukrainian Sovereignty Viewed

90UN2526A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 12 June 90 pp 1, 3

[Report on interview with Nikolay Aleksandrovich Shulga, chairman of the Standing Commission on Matters of State Sovereignty, Inter-Republic and Interethnic Relations, by PRAVDA UKRAINY parliamentary correspondent V. Nikipelov: "What Kind of Ukraine?"; place and date not given—first two paragraphs are an editorial introduction]

[Text] It is hardly necessary to state how important for every inhabitant of the republic is the question presently being studied by the Supreme Soviet—what kind of Ukraine should we have?

As we know, following adoption of the draft Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] as a basis, the draft was submitted to standing commissions for examination in consideration of comments and suggestions inserted. Deputies spent two days scrupulously studying all proposals, after which their corrections were in turn submitted to the Standing Commission on Matters of State Sovereignty, Inter-Republic and Interethnic Relations, for its consideration.

[Shulga] Our commission was faced with the task of generalizing all the proposals of the standing commissions and preparing this document jointly with the Commission on Matters of Legislation and Legality for examination by the Supreme Soviet in the first reading. Let me state that this is a very responsible undertaking. As far as significance is concerned, this is a destiny-bearing document in the full sense of the word. We are talking about whether we will be in a union of states replete with new relationships among the republics, or stay outside this union (in my opinion not everyone fully understands as yet all the consequences of such a step). I am convinced that today we need a new system of relations among the Union republics, where the center would fulfill the role of coordinator and relations between the republics would be structured horizontally on the basis of direct treaties between them.

[Nikipelov] Addressing specific points in the declaration, what caused the greatest amount of argument?

[Shulga] There are several such points. One of the basic positions, as we have already noted, is the issue of depth of sovereignty. Here, as we know full well, viewpoints diverge. But I would like to stress that genuine political experts must soberly look at the realities of life. The position of our commission is well known and has been expressed on many occasions.

A second question on which there is no unanimous opinion is that of the armed forces. In this regard, we must differentiate the following aspects of the issue. Where are Ukrainian citizens to carry out their military service? You have to take into account the present complexity of interethnic relations in other republics, the events which are taking place there, and the use of the army to quell these events—certainly all of this cannot help but alarm parents whose children are sent to serve in these hot spots of the country. And so the movement calling for our boys to carry out military service in their own republic is generally understandable.

On the other hand, however, the Ukraine requires a military defense. In view of this, should we destroy the structure of the country's armed forces established over decades? Especially since professionals emphasize that the very principle of defending a country is nonterritorial in nature; i.e., we cannot remove from it a single cell—the Ukraine, let us say—without causing detriment. The question inevitably arises of dividing this issue into two parts: on the one hand, the existence of unified strategic Union forces, and on the other—republic forces. Deputies from various blocs lean toward this concept—Academician Igor Rafailovich Yukhnovskiy, in particular. And of course all the specific details of such a division of functions of the armed forces must be worked out with the participation of a broad circle of specialists in various areas.

There are also complex economic questions associated with the intra-Union division of labor. This may be criticized, but at present there is nowhere else to go. After all, we cannot sever thousands of vital ties in one fell swoop. Some may object, saying that we are not obliged to sell our goods to some other Union republic, that they can be put on the foreign market and the currency thereby obtained used to purchase everything necessary. But let us be realistic—the quality of our production and level of labor productivity for the time being simply dictate that we all hold on to one another.

And there is a fourth question which is a source of doubt and concern to many people, especially people of other ethnic groups—a question related to observance of the rights of ethnic groups residing on the territory of our republic, and the observance of human rights. I am referring to the section which presently appears in the draft declaration as self-determination of the Ukrainian nation. The nation exercises self-determination regardless of whether it comprises the overwhelming majority of people, as in our case, or in Kazakhstan, where it constitutes only 33 percent.

But here, when we speak about self-determination of the Ukrainian nation, we must establish very delicately, clearly, and understandably for all, that the people of the Ukraine consists not only of the Ukrainian nation, that we recognize the same equal rights for Russians, Jews, Belorussians, Poles, Bulgarians, Gagauz, Crimean Tatars, Germans... Our republic is multiethnic. And these are not just words we have grown accustomed to saying. We have nine groups of nationalities, comprising more than 100,000 people...

[Nikipelov] And you have to add mixed marriages to this...

[Shulga] Absolutely right. Perhaps the greatest number of these is to be found in the Ukraine and in Kazakhstan. One out of every three marriages we have today is mixed. In other words, a third of the population is directly included in these interethnic relations. Imagine what a delicate question this is, touching the soul of each individual.

There are other factors, too, which can give rise to disputes, but these four are the most disturbing.

[Nikipelov] And what happens after this reading? How much time will it take?

[Shulga] I think just a little over a day. This is a very serious issue and it will elicit a great deal of discussion. But I hope that, following this, we will adopt the document at the next reading.

Yesterday at the Supreme Soviet Hall of Sessions, passions again flared. The deputies heatedly and emotionally discussed the main question of our life today—the question as to what kind of Ukraine we will have.

Recruitment for 'Ukrainian Army' Reported

90UN2562C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 90 First Edition p 5

[Article by S. Kalitenko: "Again, Calls for Struggle"]

[Text] Increasingly persistent is the talk in western Ukraine concerning the "services" rendered by former Bandera gang members in "fighting for Ukrainian national independence." Whereas a year ago at a rally in Lvov many people listening to talk about a monument to the Bandera gang interpreted it as provocation, today at almost every rally you can see portraits of Ye. Konovalets, R. Shukhevich, A. Melnik, and S. Bandera.

And they are actively concerned with memorials. Recently a memorial plaque was ceremoniously dedicated at the house in which the not unknown commander in chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, R. Shukhevich, completed his infamous biography; several days later a noisy show took place in Drogobych, and a stone marker was placed at the monument to Stepan Bandera in one of the central squares of the city.

True, the newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAINU stated that today we should be extremely careful relating to the forms and methods of struggle chosen by the Association of Ukrainian Nationalists, that the method of terror and propaganda of totalitarianism do not reflect our ideals. This could only be welcomed had we not had occasion to hear Lvov Oblast Soviet Deputy O. Vitovich at one of the rallies. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written about his dreams "to dictate his conditions to the entire world," his promises that "tomorrow there will rise new regiments and battalions of members of the organization of Ukrainian nationalists, who will lead the nation to victory, even if such victory is paid for in blood."

Vitovich is not alone in his heady talk. In Yavorovskiy Rayon, for example, an intense attack is under way against the Komsomol [Communist Youth League] and Pioneer organizations. And what would take their place? Adult "guys" go around the schools and try to get older students to sign up for the so-called "Ukrainian Volunteer Army." They promise money, free tourist passes for trips abroad, special camp sessions where they take them through a military training program...

Caucasus

Armenian Supreme Court Breaks Party Links

LD1608164890 Moscow TASS in English 1612 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—Communist Party members working in the Armenian Supreme Court have decided to suspend the activity of their party organisation, the IZVESTIYA newspaper reports today.

Communists said the court and its regional branches should be depoliticised and asked the Armenian parliament to legally confirm the judiciary's independence from political parties and public movements.

Armenia's Arutyunyan Views Party's Condition

LD1608141890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1239 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] The session of the republican Supreme Soviet continues in Yerevan. Our special correspondent Leonid Lazarevich interviewed Gayk Arutyunyan, deputy chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet.

[Begin recording] [Lazarevich] After four rounds of voting, a representative of the Armenian National Movement was elected as chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet. The Armenian Communist Party put its own candidate forward. Nevertheless, you later decided to stand for deputy chairman. Previously you worked as heard of a department of the Central Committee. How do you explain your decision?

[Arutyunyan] It seems to me that we have here common tasks and common aims, and Levon Ter-Petrosyan also spoke about this, that every citizen of the republic ought to help the republic, help our people, to get out of this situation. In our republic, many party workers and the people as a whole also believe the interests, the common national interests, are higher than class ones, and above other interests.

[Lazarevich] Before making your decision, you first consulted your party comrades, and evidently they supported this decision of yours. Does that mean the Armenian Communists are prepared to enter into a coalition with the Armenian National Movement?

[Arutyunyan] I did not have the time to consult with the comrades, because the proposal was made ten minutes before this session. Afterward I talked to my comrades and to the workers from the Central Committee with whom I previously worked. The majority approved of my decision. They also believe the issue here is not one of coalitions, nor of conflicts, but one of common interests and common aims.

[Lazarevich] In his first news conference, Levon Ter-Petrosyan said that the Armenian Communist Party is totally demoralized and incapable of an active political struggle.

[Arutyunyan] I believe that is correct to a certain extent. It does not apply to the Communist Party as a whole, but mainly to the leadership, however. There are in the Communist Party very energetic, fresh forces. They do not agree with the general approaches, and believe the republican Communist Party should belong to the republic, that the republican Communist Party should tackle the solution of national problems, and not general ones or just class ones. If these fresh forces within the Communist Party can break the old stereotypes and approaches, then the Communist Party will definitely still be effective and have a real influence on the processes taking place in our republic today. [end recording]